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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Motivation 
 
The belief of key legislators and regulators that corporate governance failures were at 
the heart of the corporate scandals in the early 2000 and the more recent 2007 financial crisis 
has led to increasing scrutiny and considerable interest in questions on corporate governance 
and corporate leadership among practitioners, academic research and corporate shareholders. 
As a result, corporate governance as a collection of control mechanisms that an organization 
adopts to ensure suppliers of financial capital to obtain a return on their investment (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997) has experienced far-reaching, frequently static and rather inflexible 
regulatory interventions over the last decades. Still today, there is an ongoing debate about 
further regulatory actions related to the separation of the CEO and chairman position or the 
introduction of mandatory age and term limits for executives and directors (see e.g., Milne, 
2016; Whitehead, 2011; Subramanian, 2015). 
The majority of the existing literature in corporate finance typically identifies certain 
governance attributes that either improve or harm the ability of corporate boards to effectively 
monitor the firms’ management. A significant body of the literature typically relates managerial 
entrenchment and CEO power, or other dimensions of the structure and composition of 
corporate boards to firm performance. Agency theory suggests that managerial power and 
entrenchment lead to impaired monitoring of the firms’ management and has therefore 
ultimately adverse effects for shareholders and corporate outcomes (see e.g., Fama and Jensen, 
1983, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). Several empirical studies on the relation 
between specific corporate governance structures, such as board size (see e.g., Yermack, 1996), 
CEO duality or the composition of boards (see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Agrawal 




provide support for the hypothesis that stronger corporate governance is associated with higher 
firm valuation (see e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009).  
More recently, the literature has started to emphasize that optimal governance structures likely 
depend on the specific circumstances of the firm. Hence, the selection of optimal governance 
structure requires a deliberate consideration of the inherent trade-off of potential benefits and 
costs that are associated with certain governance or leadership structures (see e.g., Brickley, 
Coles, and Jarell, 1997; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008). In this context, 
Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) provide empirical evidence consistent with potential 
costs and benefits of CEO power by documenting that more powerful CEOs are associated 
with higher variability in corporate performance, i.e., they are associated with the best and 
worst performing firms. Analyzing differences in optimal board structuring and composition 
across simple and complex firms, Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) as well as Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2008) document that firms determine optimal board size and board independence 
consistent with potential costs and benefits of monitoring and advising by the board. Faleye, 
Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011) further find that too intensive monitoring by the board has adverse 
effects on acquisition performance, corporate innovation, and ultimately firm value, 
particularly for firms that are more complex and for those whose value is strongly based on 
acquisitions and innovations. Overall, the empirical evidence provided by those studies casts 
doubt on the static framework regarding corporate governance and that, for example, smaller 
and more independent boards are necessarily positively associated with corporate performance. 
Although the literature provides various insights that significantly improved economists’ 
understanding on optimal governance and leadership structures, so far, only few studies 
investigate the dynamic changes over time and interdependences of governance and leadership 




leadership structures likely depend on the dynamics of the firms’ economic environment. First, 
sudden exogenous shocks to the firms’ business environment, such as the 2007 financial crisis, 
or the dynamics of the business environment might affect the appropriateness of certain 
corporate governance mechanisms and leadership structures over time. Erkens, Hung, and 
Matos (2012) and Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012) provide first empirical evidence. The 
authors find that higher governance standards, i.e., higher board independence, smaller boards 
or higher institutional ownership, are typically negatively related to the performance of 
financial institutions during the 2007 financial crisis. The authors argue that the adverse 
relation of corporate governance and firm performance in worse economic situations is 
attributable to excessive risk taking of banks with higher institutional ownership prior to the 
crisis. More independent boards are found to be associated with greater wealth transfer from 
shareholders to debtholders due to more intensive increases in equity capital during the crisis. 
Using the 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement as an exogenous shock to the 
competitive environment of U.S. firms, Yang and Zhao (2014) document that firms with where 
the CEO simultaneously serves as the chairman of the board, i.e., CEO duality, are associated 
with better post-shock financial performance than non-duality firms. Li, Lu, and Phillips (2017) 
show that granting a firm’s CEO more power can be particularly beneficial in more dynamic 
business environments since more powerful CEOs are found to be associated with superior 
financial performance in more rapidly changing and more competitive business environment, 
more product introductions as well as higher investment and advertising activity. 
Second, some empirical studies address dynamic situations related to the evolution and 
maturity of managers. These studies typically analyze how managerial behavior, risk taking or 
corporate investment policies change as managers become older or evolve over time. For 
example, Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016) analyze how CEOs’ investment and disinvestment 




increases over the CEO’s time in office while investment quality decreases. Brookman and 
Thistle (2009) document that termination risk of CEOs steadily increases during the first 
thirteen years in office before it starts to slightly decrease with the CEO’s tenure on the job. 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014) study how an increasing proportion of directors who are 
appointed by the CEO over her tenure might impact managerial compensation and CEO 
turnover decisions of corporate boards. Analyzing the relation between CEO age and corporate 
risk-taking, Serfling (2014) documents that CEOs take significantly fewer risks as they mature 
over time. Older CEOs are negatively related to research and development expenses and 
operating leverage, while CEO age is found to be positively related to the firms’ degree of 
diversification across business segments. While Yim (2013) shows that CEOs’ acquisition 
activity declines as CEOs become older, Serfling (2014) finds that older CEOs are more likely 
to conduct risk-reducing diversifying acquisitions.  
Third, dynamic situations can alternatively emerge in the context of feedback situations with 
corporate shareholders and financial markets. A large strand of the literature uses event study 
methodology to analyze investor reactions around, for example, announcements of corporate 
acquisitions, changes in the firms’ governance or leadership structure or following the 
introduction of new governance reforms or disclosure regulations. Kau, Linck, and Rubin 
(2008) examine whether managers listen to the feedback from financial market before 
conducting an acquisition. The empirical findings indicate that managers are more likely to 
refrain from the transaction if the stock market reaction to the announcement the acquisition is 
less favorable. Dey, Engel, and Liu (2011) analyze shareholder reactions to the announcements 
of forced separations of the CEO and chairman positions due to shareholder pressure. The 
empirical results suggest that investors seem to dislike forced separations since such 
announcements are found to be associated with lower announcement returns. Yermack (2006) 




investor reactions around the initial disclosure of personal aircraft use of CEOs as well as 
following the disclosure of CEOs’ deferred debt incentives. The studies find that the first 
disclosure of both CEO perquisites and sizable CEO debt incentives lead to significant drops 
in the firms’ share prices. 
The objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the scarce literature on dynamic aspects in 
corporate governance and corporate leadership. The dissertation focuses less on cross-sectional 
differences and more on the question how dynamic changes over time and interactions with the 
economic environment in a nonstationary world might alter the effects and help assessing 
optimal governance and leadership structures.1 The dissertation incorporates the three 
previously outlined forms of dynamics to analyze the relation of age and tenure of corporate 
managers as well as the choice of board leadership structure of public companies. First, 
dynamics induced by changes in the business and industry environment or suddenly changing 
economic market conditions (see Chapter 2 and 3); second, dynamics due to the evolution and 
maturity of individuals over time (see Chapter 2 and 3), and third, dynamics related to 
interactions and feedback situations with corporate shareholders (see Chapter 4). Each 
chapter’s motivation, contribution and main findings are outlined and summarized below. 
Starting with Bertrand and Schoar (2003), a vast literature documents that heterogeneity in the 
characteristics and attributes across managers, such as differences in age, gender, education, 
work experience or personality traits, help explain differences in corporate policies and 
financial performance value across firms. Despite the increasing trend towards the separation 
of the CEO and chairman position in many countries with unitary boards, such as the United 
                                                 
1 The dissertation does not focus on the dynamic, reverse nature of the internal governance-performance relation, 
i.e., that certain governance structures might improve performance and past performance in turn might lead to the 




Kingdom or the United States of America2 and the fact that major countries like Germany have 
mandatory two-tier boards, the role and characteristics of the chairman of the board has gained 
surprisingly less attention in the academic literature. The discussions on the role of the 
chairman have so far predominantly focused on either the existence of a separate chairman or 
the independence of the chairman (Coles and Hesterly, 2000). Empirical studies on the 
characteristics of the chairman and how these characteristics might affect the monitoring 
effectiveness and the performance of the firm are almost non-existent. Given the importance 
and particular nature of the CEO and the chairman’s monitoring role, it is critical to understand 
how similarity and dissimilarity in the characteristics of the chair and the CEO might impact 
the optimal CEO-chair relation and, most importantly, whether and how the relation and the 
interaction between the two changes with the dynamics of the economic environment.  
Chapter 2 of this dissertation attempts to address the aforementioned open research question. 
The chapter examines the relation between the chair of the board and the CEO, and how the 
relation is affected by sudden changes in the economic environmental conditions during the 
financial crisis. Building on the psychological and sociological literature, the chapter focuses 
on the age relation between the CEO and the chair and investigates whether substantial age 
dissimilarity between the two, which gives rise to cognitive conflict, increases board 
monitoring and ultimately firm value for firms with greater monitoring needs. The analysis is 
based on a sample of the 130 largest German public companies listed on the DAX, MDAX or 
SDAX during the time period from 2005 to 2010. Because German law and the mandatory 
two-tier board structure prevents CEO duality and also restricts CEO power in other ways, 
using data on German companies considerably mitigates endogeneity concerns. Overall, the 
chapter documents robust empirical evidence for a positive relation between substantial chair-
                                                 
2 The UK’s Financial Reporting Council (2016) reports that today 99 percent of the UK FTSE 350 companies 
separate the CEO-chairman positions. Spencer Stuart (2016) report that about 48 percent of the S&P 500 




CEO age dissimilarity and the number of board meetings as well as firm value (Tobin’s Q). 
Using the 2007 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to the monitoring needs of firms, the 
chapter shows that during the crisis, when fast decision making and managerial discretion were 
needed, the relation between age dissimilarity and firm value reverses entirely and substantial 
age dissimilarity is associated with significant value destruction during the crisis. The negative 
relation almost cancels out the positive effect observed during economic good times, i.e., non-
crisis years. Hence, the chapter’s findings therefore suggest that firms should mind the gap. 
Given the aforementioned importance of top executives for corporate policies and financial 
performance, particularly of CEOs, it is of major interest to understand how CEOs evolve over 
their time in office and whether the effect of CEOs on the firms they run varies over their 
tenure. Theoretical models of entrenchment and CEO-job match make ambiguous or even no 
prediction regarding the relation between CEO tenure and firm value. Economic models in the 
finance literature that are based on agency theory and CEO entrenchment argue that as CEOs 
become more entrenched in their positions over time and are therefore less likely to be replaced, 
firm performance is expected to deteriorate over the CEOs’ time in office. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989), for example, argue that CEOs attempt to reduce the probability of dismissal by 
conducting manager-specific investments that are more profitable under them than any 
replacement CEO. Although such manager-specific investment behavior might improve the 
match between the CEO and the firm, it is not necessarily value-maximizing for the firm. 
Models related to job match theory suggest that CEO dismissals are less likely for CEOs who 
constitute good matches for the firm because they are characterized by superior productivity 
and therefore better firm performance over their tenure (Jovanovic, 1979; Fee and Hadlock, 
2000; Allgood and Farrell, 2003). Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) develop a theoretical model 
that incorporates both uncertain match quality and agency costs, i.e., monitoring. According to 




endogenous outcomes of a negotiation process between the CEO and the board. More 
specifically, CEO tenure and board independence are the result of the board’s estimate about 
the ability of the CEO and the future CEO-firm match. The model predicts that firms with long-
tenured CEOs may be associated with either continuous high performance due to superior 
match quality or alternatively with deteriorating firm performance due to agency costs of 
reduced monitoring which offset the positive effects of a high match quality. The management 
literature, in particular Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991), proposes an alternative conceptual 
framework on the dynamics of CEO tenure which is based on five distinct seasons that CEOs 
typically go through over their time in office. According to the framework, CEO tenure and 
firm performance are expected to exhibit a hump-shaped relation over time which arises 
dynamically over time as the net effect of potential benefits of tenure, e.g., gaining experience 
and on-the-job learning, and potential costs of tenure, e.g., increasing CEO power, a fixed CEO 
paradigm and the costs of an increasing probability of a CEO-firm mismatch (see also Miller, 
1991; Prendergast and Stole, 1996). Consistent with this descriptive framework, Miller and 
Shamsie (1991) find empirical evidence for an inverse U-shaped relation between executive 
tenure and the financial performance for firms in the film industry. Henderson, Miller, and 
Hambrick (2006) provide similar evidence on the tenure-performance relation for 98 CEOs in 
the food industry from 1955 to 1994. Analyzing 228 CEOs in the computer industry, the 
authors document that CEO tenure exhibits a negative relation with organizational profitability. 
Although the empirical literature already provides some evidence on the relation between CEO 
tenure and firm performance, the studies typically focus solely on single industries and do not 
generally address whether and how CEOs matter for firm performance over their tenure. In 
addition, only few studies investigate the potential channels and factors that might dynamically 




valuable for the firm. In addition, there is no empirical study that incorporates theoretical 
aspects of both CEO-firm match quality and CEO entrenchment. 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation takes an empirical approach to investigate the dynamics of the 
relation how CEOs perform over their time in office and how the tenure-performance relation 
is dynamically influenced by the characteristics of the firms’ economic environment. Using a 
large sample of S&P1500 companies from 1998 to 2011, the chapter documents that, on 
average, CEO tenure and firm performance exhibits a hump-shaped relation. Several tests for 
various alternative explanations, semi-parametric estimations and the analysis of 
announcement returns to sudden CEO deaths support the finding. However, the chapter shows 
that the hump-shaped relation is subject to meaningful variation depending on the dynamics of 
the industry and the conditions of the firm’s economic environment, i.e., the macroeconomic 
business cycle and the exogenous takeover threat. Further, the empirical results also suggest 
that the relation strongly depends on the CEO’s ability to adapt to change which counteracts 
the deterioration in the match quality between the CEO and the firm over time. The findings of 
the chapter are most consistent with a decline in CEO-firm match quality and increasing CEO 
entrenchment over time which are both expected to induce a decline in firm value, especially 
during the late years of the CEOs’ time in office. 
Finally, one of the probably most controversial issues in corporate governance is whether the 
CEO of the company should also serve as the chairman of the board. Despite a significant trend 
towards the separation of the two roles over the last decade, today, still more than half of the 
largest public U.S. companies combine the principal roles of the CEO and the chairman of the 
board (see e.g., Spencer Stuart, 2016). Extensive research on the effects of board leadership 
structure, in particular CEO duality, on managerial entrenchment, risk taking, and whether 




evidence (see e.g., Dalton et al., 1998; Krause, Semandeni, and Cannella, 2014). Although 
there is little empirical support for requiring a separation of the two roles, shareholder activists, 
institutional investors, and proxy advisory firms urge companies to separate their leadership 
roles. For example, the chief executive officer of the Norwegian oil fund, the world’s largest 
sovereign wealth fund and one of the largest shareholder in many U.S. banks, officially 
criticized U.S. financial institutions for their leadership practices given the history of the 2007 
financial crisis and pressures them to split the dual leadership structure (Milne, 2016). In 2015, 
the fund used its ownership stake to initiate and vote for shareholder proposals against 
combining the roles at many large U.S. companies, such as the Bank or America, JPMorgan, 
Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo, General Electric or ExxonMobil. A major concern in the 
academic literature is that endogeneity issues involved in the selection of governance structures 
exacerbate reliable inference about the effects and the quality of board leadership structure 
choices (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Roberts and Whited, 2013). Hence, understanding the 
rationales behind the decision of corporate boards to combine or separate the CEO and 
chairman position is an essential and integral part in assessing firms’ choices of governance 
and leadership structure. Although the existing literature provides evidence on the determinants 
that are correlated with the observable board leadership structure choices of companies (see 
e.g., Faleye, 2007; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008; Wintoki, Linck, and Netter, 2012), so far, 
there is no research on the qualitative determinants and rationales behind the firms’ decision to 
combine or separate the CEO and chairman position. It is an open empirical research question 
whether and to what extent the qualitative rationales for the decision matter for investors and 
shareholders and whether they help assessing the governance quality of the firm.  
Using the dynamic nature of the 2009 change in the SEC disclosure regulation which required 
firms to disclose the reasons for combining or separating the CEO and chairman positions, 




firms’ board leadership structure. By systematically identifying the disclosed rationales and the 
analysis of investors’ stock market reactions to the disclosure of yet unobserved qualitative 
board leadership reasons for a sample of S&P 500 companies, the chapter presents a novel 
approach to study the decision of board leadership structure of large public companies. The 
results from analyzing two-day abnormal returns to equity holders following the disclosure of 
firms’ rationales indicate differences in the information value of individual leadership reasons 
for market participants. Heterogeneity in investors’ stock market reactions to the disclosed 
rationales for both board leadership types suggests that investors likely evaluate the disclosed 
reasons conditional on the specific circumstances and characteristics of the firm. Overall, 
shareholder reactions are largely consistent with potential benefits and costs of both board 
leadership types which are based on agency and organization theory, respectively. Analyzing 
textual similarity of firms’ current and subsequent year disclosures on board leadership 
structure indicates that firms change their sections over time but the empirical results do not 
support the notion that firms disclose leadership rationales strategically. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 (“Mind the Gap: The Age 
Dissimilarity between the Chair and the CEO”) focuses on the relation between the CEO and 
chairman by focusing on the effects and dynamics of significant age dissimilarity between the 
two for a sample of the largest German listed firms. Chapter 3 (“Do CEOs Matter? Corporate 
Performance and the CEO life cycle) investigates whether CEOs’ impact on the firms they run 
varies over their time in office and which factors dynamically render CEOs more or less 
valuable over time. Chapter 4 (“On the Choice of Board Leadership Structure: Evidence from 
a Mandatory Disclosure Regulation”) deals with the endogenous choice of board leadership 
structure of public companies and analyzes stock market reactions following the disclosure of 
the qualitative rationales of corporate boards for the decision to combine or separate the CEO 




Chapter 2 - Mind the Gap: The Age Dissimilarity between the 
Chair and the CEO3 
 
2.1. Introduction  
To date, very little is known about the impact on corporate governance of the chair’s 
characteristics and the interaction between non-executive and executive directors via the chair 
and CEO. Yet, there is a great need for a sound understanding of the chair’s impact on 
governance and the form of the optimal chair-CEO relation. This need arises not only because 
many countries have a two-tier board system under which the roles of the chair and CEO are 
separated, but also because an increasing fraction of firms operating under the single-tier board 
system are abandoning CEO duality.4 We address this gap in the literature by studying the 
relationship between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO under the German two-
tier board system.  
Under the German system, the chair plays a key role as he or she presides over the supervisory 
board, schedules its meetings, sets the meeting agendas, distributes material in advance of 
meetings, leads the board’s discussions, and is expected to be kept informed by the CEO about 
any relevant firm issues (see the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), paragraphs 95-116, 
and the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC), section 5.2). According to German Co-
determination law (paragraph 29(2), MitbestG), which applies to firms with at least 2,000 
                                                 
3 This chapter is joint work with Prof. Dr. Marc Goergen (Cardiff School of Business) and Dr. Peter Limbach 
(Karlsruhe Institute of Technology). 
4 The 2014 U.S. Spencer Stuart Board Index reports that 47% of S&P 500 companies split the role of the CEO 
and the chair, and another 24% have planned a split of these two roles over the following five years. For the U.K., 





employees, the chair is also the only member of the supervisory board who has two voting 
rights in case of a voting tie.  
We suggest that the relation between the chair and the CEO is shaped by the age similarity 
between the two. Age affects an individual’s attitude, behavior, and thinking, (see, e.g., 
Rhodes, 1983; Serfling, 2014; Taylor, 1975). Hence, directors of a similar age are likely to 
hold similar attitudes, opinions and beliefs (Wagner et al., 1984; Westphal and Zajac, 1995a) 
as they have witnessed the same historical events and social trends. In other words, directors 
of a similar age are likely to be mentally connected and similarly minded. 
We therefore hypothesize that increasing age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO 
reduces mutual attraction between the two and thereby fosters the chair’s cognitive 
independence and gives rise to cognitive conflict (Amason, 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
McPherson et al., 2001). This leads to more intensive monitoring in the form of more 
scrutinizing and critical judgment of the CEO’s decisions and proposed actions. In addition, 
more scrutinizing forces the CEO to provide more information to convince the chair and the 
board of her plans, which makes the chair and the board better informed and hence even better 
able to monitor the CEO more intensively (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). The positive relation 
between chair-CEO age dissimilarity and monitoring intensity is expected to increase firm 
value. As age-induced dissimilarities between individuals are most evident across different 
generations (e.g., Pilcher, 1994), we argue that a generational difference, i.e., a generational 
age gap, between the chair and the CEO has the strongest impact on monitoring intensity and 
ultimately firm value. 
We find strong empirical support for the hypothesis about the effects of chair-CEO age 
dissimilarity on monitoring intensity and firm value. The two key results are as follows. First, 




measured by Tobin’s Q, particularly when there is a generational age gap. Second, we find that 
substantial age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO increases the number of board 
meetings, which likely proxies for the level of monitoring (see Adams, 2005; Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2010).5 In line with Adams and Ferreira (2007) who argue that the optimal level 
of board monitoring varies across firms, we only observe the aforementioned positive effects 
of the number of board meetings on firm value for firms with greater monitoring needs (i.e., 
those with high free cash flows, dispersed control, and low intangibles). 
Importantly, all regressions control for other dissimilarities between the chair and the CEO, 
including differences in education, gender and nationality. They also control for similarities 
such as those stemming from the time the two have been working together and family relations. 
They also adjust, among others, for the chair’s and the CEO’s experience and power as 
measured by, e.g., their tenure and whether they have founded the firm.  
As we use data on German two-tier boards, the results are also less likely to suffer from 
endogeneity caused by CEO power. Importantly, they do not suffer from endogeneity caused 
by CEO duality. This is the case as, according to German law (paragraph 105, AktG), the duties 
of the management board (“Vorstand”) are clearly delineated from decision control and 
monitoring as well as nominating activities that are performed by the supervisory board 
(“Aufsichtsrat”). The supervisory board’s independence is further strengthened as German law 
prohibits membership by the same individual of both boards, thereby enforcing a strict 
separation of the roles of the chair and the CEO. Importantly, the CEO is not allowed to be 
involved with the nomination and appointment of members of the supervisory board.6 In 
                                                 
5 Under the German two-tier governance system, board meetings are particularly likely to reflect (board) 
monitoring intensity because the supervisory board’s main responsibility is to monitor management on behalf of 
the shareholders as prescribed by German law (see paragraph 111(1), AktG, and, e.g., Andres et al., 2014).  
6 Paragraph 124(3) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) prohibits executives from nominating members 
of the supervisory board. The firm’s nomination committee nominates candidates for the supervisory board as 




contrast, evidence for the U.S. one-tier system suggests that CEOs typically influence the 
composition of the board of directors (Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; 
Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999), leading to increased demographic similarity (Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995a).  
Although the use of German data mitigates endogeneity caused by CEO power and prevents 
endogeneity caused by CEO duality, we nevertheless use CEO-firm as well as chair-firm fixed 
effects and dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regressions to address 
potential endogeneity. Furthermore, we use the return on assets (ROA), a measure of firm 
performance, as an alternative to firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q. All of these robustness 
tests confirm the results. Further, the hypothesis is confirmed when age dissimilarity is 
measured more broadly, i.e., when we consider age dissimilarity between the chair and the 
entire management board or between the CEO and the entire supervisory board. 
The most important endogeneity test consists of treating the 2007 financial crisis as an 
exogenous shock, altering the optimal levels of monitoring. The results indicate that chair-CEO 
age dissimilarity has a causal relation, as hypothesized, with monitoring intensity and firm 
value. Specifically, we find that firms with substantial chair-CEO age dissimilarity hold 
significantly fewer board meetings, i.e., they reduce their monitoring levels during the crisis. 
We further find that during the crisis substantial chair-CEO age dissimilarity destroys firm 
value, consistent with the increased need for managerial discretion and fast decision making 
(see, e.g., De Jonghe and Öztekin, 2015; Faleye et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017). Importantly, the 
negative effect on firm value during the crisis almost cancels out the positive effect observed 
during the non-crisis years. We hence conclude that firms should mind the gap. 
Importantly, the dataset benefits from sufficient time-series variation, necessary for parameter 




During the financial crisis, a change of either the CEO or the chair (or both) occurs in 29% of 
the firm-year observations. This percentage varies between 22% and 25% for the sub-samples 
of firms with high and those with low monitoring needs. Further, the use of random effects as 
an alternative to firm-fixed effects, as one way to address potentially low time-series variation 
(see, e.g., Andres, 2008), confirms the results. 
This chapter makes a major contribution to the as yet very limited literature about the effects 
of the chair’s characteristics on firm value. To the best of our knowledge, the only other study 
that explicitly examines the role of the chair is Waelchli and Zeller (2013). They use survey 
data on unlisted Swiss firms and report that chair age is negatively related to firm performance. 
They argue that this reduction in performance is caused by a drop in the chair’s cognitive 
abilities and motivation. However, they do not find such a relation for their control sample of 
listed firms. Likewise, we do not find an impact of chair age on firm value and on the number 
of board meetings for the sample of listed German firms.  
We also contribute to the emerging literature on the effects of (dis)similarities between the 
CEO and the board of directors. For the U.S., Fracassi and Tate (2012), Hwang and Kim (2009), 
and Lee et al. (2014) provide evidence that social ties between the CEO and the other directors 
reduce firm value as they weaken the intensity of monitoring by the board. Ngyuen (2012) 
finds similar results for large French firms. While the aforementioned studies focus on the 
entire board as well as similarity stemming from social ties, this chapter is concerned with 
demographic similarity and focuses on the important relation between the chair and the CEO.  
This chapter has policy implications for regulation pertaining to the composition of the board 
of directors, with particular reference to the age of the chair. Indeed, the results on the effect of 
age dissimilarity between the chair and CEO on monitoring intensity and firm value suggest 




contrast with recommendations from corporate governance codes to limit the age of corporate 
board members.  
The results are not only relevant to the two-tier governance system, but also to an already large 
and still increasing fraction of firms operating under the single-tier board system, which have 
moved towards the separation of the roles of the chair and the CEO. Hence, there is an 
increasing need to understand the relation between the chair and the CEO. We provide evidence 
that demographic characteristics, age in particular, significantly shape this relation and, 
importantly, that this relation matters for firm value.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section reviews the existing 
literature and derives the main hypothesis. Section 2.3 discusses the methodology and presents 
the data. Section 2.4 provides the results of the regressions on firm value. Section 2.5 addresses 
the following two important questions. First, does substantial age dissimilarity between the 
chair and CEO indeed result in more monitoring? Second, is the positive effect of chair-CEO 
age dissimilarity on monitoring and firm value limited to firms with greater monitoring needs? 
Section 2.6 tests the robustness of the results. Conclusions follow. 
2.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1. Age and age similarity 
Demographic attributes  including age, educational level, ethnicity and gender  affect 
individual behavior, decision-making, thinking, etc. (Pfeffer, 1983). Among these 
demographic attributes, age and gender are the most clearly discernible ones. Contrary to 
gender and most other demographic attributes, age is a multifarious and dynamic collection of 
personal characteristics which encompass the experiences that have been made during an 




personality of a human being (Medawar, 1952), thereby continuously affecting behavior, 
communication, (strategic) decision making, information processing and usage, risk-taking, 
thinking and commitment to work (e.g., Child, 1974; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Rhodes, 
1983; Serfling, 2014; Taylor, 1975; Verhaeghen and Salthouse, 1997; Vroom and Pahl, 1971; 
Zenger and Lawrence, 1989).7 
Further, Stangor et al. (1992) find that age per se constitutes a salient basis for group 
categorization, independent of whether there are underlying attitudinal or behavioral 
differences. In this regard, Ferris et al. (1991) argue that “age plays a major role in establishing 
the social context in which organizational members interact” (p. 617). Wagner et al. (1984) 
extend this to members of boards of directors. Directors of a similar age are likely to share 
experiences, and are hence likely to hold similar attitudes, opinions and beliefs. Moreover, as 
they have witnessed the same historical events and social trends, which have shaped their life 
experiences and moral values, directors and managers of a similar age are likely to be mentally 
connected and similarly minded. 
2.2.2. Similarities among directors and corporate governance 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) argue that, to ensure its effectiveness, the board should be 
cognitively independent and critically minded such that different points of views are able to 
emerge and the decisions proposed by the executives are scrutinized sufficiently. However, 
this is unlikely to be the case if board members  particularly the chair and the CEO  are 
demographically similar, such as of similar age. 
                                                 
7 For example, older directors and executives have been found to use more information in their decision making 
process and to provide a more accurate assessment of that information (Taylor, 1975). They are also associated 
with less risk-taking behavior, while younger directors and executives tend to take more and partly excessive risks 




This can be explained by the “similar attraction” phenomenon or homophily (e.g., Byrne, 1971; 
Byrne and Griffitt, 1973; see also McPherson et al., 2001). Human beings prefer to interact and 
communicate with individuals that are similar to them. The reason is that similarity ensures 
more affirmative feedback while limiting disagreement as well as the emergence of alternative 
opinions. As a consequence, (demographic or social) similarity between the CEO and board 
members can lead to less effective corporate governance. 
In support of this argument, Fracassi and Tate (2012), Hwang and Kim (2009), and Lee et al. 
(2014) find that U.S. boards where the CEO has social ties with the other directors – in the 
form of shared networks, similar regional or educational background or similar political 
orientation – are associated with weaker corporate governance and reduced firm value. Ngyuen 
(2012) finds comparable results for large French firms. Furthermore, Westphal and Zajac 
(1995a) find that CEOs who are able to influence the nomination process tend to appoint 
directors with similar demographic characteristics.8 They find that demographic similarity is 
associated with increased CEO compensation. Westphal and Zajac (1995b) find that, when the 
board is demographically similar to the CEO, it is more likely to use human-resource based 
explanations (i.e., attracting and retaining managerial talent) rather than agency based 
explanations (i.e., alignment of interest) to justify the adoption of long-term incentive plans for 
the CEO. 
2.2.3. Age dissimilarity, monitoring intensity and firm value 
We hypothesize that substantial age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO 
increases board monitoring effectiveness, and ultimately firm value. Specifically, we argue that 
greater age dissimilarity increases cognitive independence of the chair and gives rise to 
                                                 
8 In a related study concerned with executive careers in German banks, Berger et al. (2013) find that homophily, 
based on age and gender as well as social ties, increases the chances of an outsider appointment to banks’ 




cognitive conflicts between the chair and the CEO. This should lead to more scrutinizing and 
critical judgment of the actions and decisions proposed by the latter, forcing the CEO to provide 
more information to convince the chair and the board of her plans. Put differently, the CEO is 
forced to increase transparency by providing more detailed and value-relevant information 
regarding her proposed actions (Amason, 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 9  
We expect a certain level of age dissimilarity between individuals to be necessary for cognitive 
conflict to arise. In other words, we expect the relation between age dissimilarity on the one 
side and monitoring intensity and firm value on the other side to be strongest for large chair-
CEO age differences. Particularly, as age-induced dissimilarities between individuals (such as 
the chair and the CEO) are most evident across different generations (e.g., Pilcher, 1994), we 
argue that a generational difference, i.e., a generational age gap, between the chair and the CEO 
has the strongest impact on monitoring intensity and firm value.  
2.3. Methodology, Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics  
2.3.1. Methodology and measures for the chair-CEO age dissimilarity 
The main model is as follows: 
yit   =   α  + β1* Gap20 chair-CEOit + β2* other chair-CEO dissimilaritiesit  
               + β3* CEO characteristicsit + β4* chair characteristicsit  
               + β5* supervisory board characteristicsit + β6* firm characteristicsit  
               + year dummies + μi + εit                          
(1) 
                                                 
9 Consistent with the importance of cognitive conflict and critical questions, the 2012 U.S. Business Roundtable’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance state: “Board independence depends not only on directors’ individual 
relationships and outlook but also on their ability to question management, exercise constructive skepticism and 




As dependent variables, we use Tobin’s Q to measure firm value and the number of supervisory 
board meetings (Board meetings) to measure monitoring intensity. 
Gap20 chair-CEO is the primary measure for the chair-CEO age dissimilarity. This dummy 
variable is set to one if the age difference between the chair and the CEO is a generational gap. 
In line with the sociology literature (e.g., Strauss and Howe, 1997), we define a generational 
age gap as an age difference of at least 20 years. Again, the rationale for using a generational 
age gap is that cognitive conflict between the chair and the CEO should be strongest if both are 
from different generations.  
In addition, we also use Chair-CEO age difference (+/-), which is the age of the chair minus 
the age of the CEO, and its square, i.e., Squared chair-CEO age difference. In this regard, it is 
important to note that cognitive conflict, but also communication problems, between the chair 
and the CEO may not only arise if the former is considerably older than the latter, but also if 
the former is younger than the latter. If the relation between age difference and firm value is 
non-linear, as suggested, and if the sign of the age difference does not matter, only the squared 
term of this functional form (i.e., the second-order polynomial) is expected to be significant. 
Alternatively, we use Chair-CEO age difference absolute, which is the absolute value of the 
age difference between the chair and the CEO. This alternative measure is used in conjunction 
with Chair younger, a dummy variable, which is set to one if the chair is younger than the 
CEO, and zero otherwise. Based on the above argument, we do not expect this dummy variable 
to be significantly different from zero. Finally, whenever we use Chair-CEO age difference 
absolute, we use the natural logarithm of the dependent variable given that we postulate a non-
equidistant (i.e., a non-uniform) effect of each year of age difference. 
All of the regressions include the following five sets of control variables. All these variables 




than age, i.e., education, gender and nationality, as well as chair-CEO similarities, i.e., the 
number of years the chair and CEO have been working together in their respective positions 
(Chair-CEO joint tenure) and a dummy variable equaling one if the chair and CEO are from 
the same family (Chair-CEO same family). All of these variables may affect cognitive 
dissonance and communication between the chair and the CEO, in addition to age dissimilarity.  
The following four sets of control variables include CEO characteristics, chair characteristics, 
supervisory board characteristics and firm characteristics. CEO characteristics include the 
variables CEO tenure, i.e., the number of years the CEO has been serving as the firm’s CEO, 
and Founder CEO, a dummy variable equaling one if the CEO founded the firm. These two 
variables serve as proxies for the CEO’s experience and power (see, e.g., Adams et al., 2005). 
Chair characteristics include Busy chair, a dummy variable set to one if the chair holds three 
or more directorships (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), Chair tenure and Founder chair (both 
defined as above for CEOs) and a dummy variable Chair is former firm executive, which is set 
to one if the chair was an executive of the firm earlier in her career (in the spirit of Fahlenbrach 
et al., 2011, and Andres et al., 2014). The last three variables attempt to capture the chair’s 
experience and power. 
The two dummy variables CEO change and Chair change, which are set to one for years with 
a CEO and chair change, respectively, are also included in this set of controls. As the chair-
CEO age difference may change due to chair and CEO changes, which are likely to correlate 
with the firm’s performance and number of board meetings, these two controls are necessary 
to separate the (persistent) effect of the variables measuring the chair-CEO age dissimilarity 
from the (one-off) effects of changes at the top of the firm.  
Supervisory board characteristics include Board age, which is the average age of the 




Shivdasani, 2006,) and CV board age.10 The latter is the coefficient of variation calculated as 
the standard deviation of the age of shareholder representatives on the supervisory board 
divided by Board age. CV board age controls for age diversity on the supervisory board, which 
might correlate with the age of the chair and thus with the measures of chair-CEO age 
dissimilarity. 
Firm characteristics include Book leverage (i.e., total debt over total assets), the number of a 
firm’s business segments generating at least 10% of the firm’s total revenues (Business 
segments), capital expenditures as a fraction of total assets (CapEx/TA), a dummy variable 
Family firm (we use the definition from Andres, 2008), Firm age (since foundation), Free float 
(of the firm’s voting shares), R&D expenses as a fraction of total revenues (R&D/Sales), return 
on equity (ROE), Sales growth (i.e., the nominal growth rate over the past two years), Stock 
volatility (i.e., the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the past two years) and Total 
assets as used in the existing literature (e.g., Andres, 2008; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008, Custódio and Metzger, 2014).  
Some of the regressions in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 examine the effects of chair and CEO age 
(Chair age and CEO age) on firm value and monitoring intensity, with and without chair and 
CEO age and the main variable Gap20 chair-CEO. This allows us to investigate whether age 
itself matters and whether the results for age dissimilarity are only reflecting age effects. 
The main estimation technique we use is firm-fixed effects regressions. As robustness checks 
(see Section 2.6.2), we use CEO-firm fixed effects and chair-firm fixed effects as well as 
                                                 
10 As information about the age of the employee representatives on the supervisory board is not available, we have 




random effects.11 All the regressions are based on an unbalanced panel of data covering the 
years 2005 to 2010. We describe this panel in the following sub-sections. 
2.3.2. Sample selection 
We start by gathering information on all firms that are members of the three largest 
German stock exchange indices  the DAX, MDAX and SDAX  for each year during 2005 
and 2010.12 This results in an unbalanced panel of 780 firm-year observations for 172 firms. 
We exclude 31 firm-year observations for 7 firms that are not incorporated under German law 
(e.g., Air Berlin plc and EADS N.V.). For the remaining 165 firms we collect information for 
the CEO and each shareholder representative on the supervisory board. Following Westphal 
and Zajac (1995a), we exclude firm-year observations for which the age of more than 25% of 
the supervisory board members is not available. This leads to the exclusion of 36 firm-year 
observations. Finally, we exclude another 10 firm-year observations due to missing data. This 
leaves us with a final unbalanced panel comprising 700 firm-year observations for 150 firms, 
covering approximately 86% of the market capitalization of all German firms at the end of 
2006.  
Most of the non-financial information is collected from the annual reports, company filings 
(e.g., security prospectuses or governance reports) and company websites, Hoppenstedt 
Aktienführer, Munzinger Biographien, and Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database. Any 
remaining gaps in the data (particularly age) are filled by contacting the investor relations 
                                                 
11 Due to changes in CEOs and chairs during the sample period, we have more CEOs (234 distinct CEOs) and 
more chairs (214 distinct chairs) than sample firms (150 distinct firms).  
12 We include firms from regulated industries (i.e., SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999). The results do not 




departments of the firms concerned.13 Accounting data is retrieved from S&P Capital IQ. Data 
on stock prices is from Datastream.  
2.3.3. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for the dataset. Panel A focuses on the age 
characteristics of the chair and the CEO, the other chair-CEO dissimilarities as well as the CEO 
characteristics and chair characteristics. The age gap between the chair and the CEO is at least 
20 years for 15.2% of all observations. Importantly, for all such cases the chair is older than 
the CEO. The average CEO age is 54 years, while the average chair age is 63 years. On average, 
the absolute age difference between the chair and the CEO is 11.3 years. The chair is younger 















                                                 
13 Despite the best efforts, we are not able to gather data on all of the variables for all of the sample firms. In 
particular, we are not able to obtain information about the chair’s age for three firms. We are also not able to 
obtain full information about board meetings for two firm-year observations and information about active board 
committees for four firm-year observations.  
14 For chairs that are younger than the CEO, the mean age difference is 6 years with a maximum of 18 years (not 




Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX 
or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.A. 
 
Variable mean 1. quart. median 3. quart. SD min max N 
Panel A - CEO and chair characteristics        
Age characteristics         
Gap20 chair-CEO 0.152       697 
Chair-CEO age difference absolute 11.28 5.00 10.00 16.00 7.87 0.00 40.00 697 
Chair-CEO age difference (+/-) 9.68 3.00 10.00 16.00 9.77 -15.00 40.00 697 
Squared chair-CEO age difference 189.02 25.00 100.00 256.00 233.00 0.00 1,600 697 
CEO age (yrs) 53.68 49.00 54.00 59.00 7.11 33.00 71.00 700 
Chair age (yrs) 63.37 59.00 65.00 68.00 7.67 31.00 82.00 697 
Chair younger  0.13       697 
Other chair-CEO dissimilarities         
Chair-CEO different education 0.58       700 
Chair-CEO different gender 0.003       700 
Chair-CEO different nationality 0.17       700 
Chair-CEO joint tenure  3.85 2.00 3.00 5.00 2.87 1.00 16.00 700 
Chair-CEO same family 0.02       700 
CEO characteristics         
CEO change  0.14       700 
CEO tenure 6.36 3.00 5.00 9.00 5.29 1.00 38.00 700 
Founder CEO 0.05       700 
Chair characteristics         
Busy chair 0.76       700 
Chair change 0.15       700 
Chair tenure  5.06 2.00 4.00 7.00 3.90 1.00 28.00 700 
Chair is former firm executive  0.29       700 












Panel B - Supervisory board characteristics 
Variable mean 1. quart. median 3. quart. SD min max N 
Board age  59.91 57.17 60.67 63.33 4.80 44.30 71.40 700 
Board meetings 5.79 4.00 5.00 17.00 2.40 4.00 34.00 698 
Board size 12.38 6.00 12.00 17.00 5.67 3.00 21.00 700 
Busy board  0.81       700 
CV board age 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.01 0.34 700 
Avg. tenure SB members  5.24 4.16 5.33 6.25 1.68 1.00 11.83 700 
No. of active committees   3.07 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.66 0.00 8.00 696 




Table 2.1: Summary statistics (cont’d) 
 
 
In terms of other chair-CEO dissimilarities, the chair and CEO have a different educational 
background for 58% of the observations and are of different genders for only two observations 
as virtually all chairs and CEOs are male. Further, the chair and CEO are of a different 
nationality for 16.7% of all observations. The average length of the (firm-specific) relation 
between the chair and the CEO (Chair-CEO joint tenure) is almost 4 years. Finally, the chair 
and CEO are from the same family for 2% of all observations.  
Moving on to the CEO and chair characteristics, average CEO tenure is about 6 years. The 
percentage of founder CEOs is 5%, and this is in line with Andres (2008). Turning to the chair 
characteristics, for 76% of all observations the chair is busy. Average chair tenure is 5 years. 
The chair is the firm’s founder for 5.1% and a former firm executive for 29% of all 
observations, respectively. There are no cases of deaths of CEOs or chairs in the sample.  
Panel C - Firm characteristics 
Variable mean 1. quart. median 3. quart. SD min max N 
Book leverage 0.25 0.11 0.22 0.35 1.90 0.00 0.89 700 
Business segments 2.27 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.03 1.00 6.00 700 
CapEx/TA 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.22 700 
Family firm 0.32       700 
FCF/Sales 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.17 -0.78 1.34 651 
Firm age (foundation) 87.43 35.00 87.00 130.00 56.68 1.00 262.00 700 
Free float (%) 47.82 28.99 47.56 66.36 24.55 0.00 100.00 698 
Herf. control 0.17 0.02 0.10 0.27 0.20 0.00 0.97 699 
Intangible assets 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.21 0.16 0.00 0.74 700 
R&D/sales 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.26 700 
ROA 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.08 -0.25 0.40 651 
ROE  0.10 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.27 -2.73 3.62 700 
Sales growth 1.19 0.97 1.12 1.26 0.64 -5.38 7.42 700 
Tobin’s Q 1.46 1.01 1.20 1.54 0.84 0.59 8.46 699 
Total assets  49,263 936.2 2,575 13,565 184,648 50.9 2,202,423 700 
Panel D – Management board characteristics 
Variable mean 1. quart. median 3. quart. SD min max N 
CV management board age 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.32 618 
Management board age 49.91 46.67 50.18 53.50 4.91 30.00 63.00 698 
Management board size 4.59 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.86 2.00 13.00 700 




Turning to supervisory board characteristics in Panel B, average board size is about 12, with 
approximately 7 shareholder representatives. Note that, in Germany, board size depends on 
firm size as prescribed by law (see paragraph 95, AktG). Average board tenure (traced back to 
1998) is about 5 years. Average board age (based on shareholder representatives) is about 60 
years. The average annual number of board meetings is about 6. Sample firms typically have 
about 3 active board committees. All supervisory board (and chair) characteristics have values 
in line with those reported by the Spencer Stuart Board Index for 2007 and 2009.  
Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the firm characteristics. On average, book leverage is 
25%, the number of business segments is 2.27, capital expenditures amount to 4% of total 
assets, firm age (since foundation) is 87 years, R&D expenditures are 1.3% of sales, return on 
equity is 10%, and Tobin’s Q is 1.46. The average (median) book value of total assets is 49,263 
(2,575) million EUR. Regarding control and ownership, average free float is approximately 
48%. About one third of all firm-year observations relate to family firms.15 These descriptive 
statistics are similar to those from other studies on Germany, such as Andres (2008), Bermig 
and Frick (2010), and Dittmann et al. (2010). 
Finally, Panel D contains descriptive statistics for the management board characteristics. The 
management board is younger on average, smaller in size and has lower tenure as compared to 
the supervisory board (see Panel B). 
                                                 
15 Compared to Andres (2008), we find a lower percentage of family firms. There are at least two reasons for this. 
First, Andres (2008) does not restrict his sample to the largest stock listed firms (DAX, MDAX and SDAX) as he 
uses all firms listed on the Official Market (“Amtlicher Handel”) of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange at December 
31, 1998. It is then not surprising that we find a lower fraction of family firms given the focus on the largest 





2.4. Chair-CEO Age Dissimilarity and Firm Value  
We now turn to the regression results for the link between chair-CEO age dissimilarity 
and firm value (i.e., Tobin’s Q) shown in Table 2.2. All regressions adjust for firm-fixed and 
year-fixed effects and include the sets of control variables introduced in Section 2.3.1. The 
regressions vary in terms of the measure of chair-CEO age dissimilarity. When we use Chair-
CEO age difference absolute, we use the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q as the dependent 
variable, as motivated in Section 2.3.1.16  
Table 2.2: Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm value (Tobin’s Q) 
This table reports firm-fixed effects panel regression results of Tobin’s Q on measures of age 
dissimilarity between the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board, other CEO-chair characteristics, 
CEO characteristics, chair characteristics, supervisory board characteristics, and firm characteristics for 
German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX between the sample period 2005 to 2010. Tobin's 
Q is calculated as sum of the firm's market capitalization and the difference between the book value of 
total assets and the book value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets. Specifications (1) to 
(4) and (7) use Tobin's Q as the dependent variable, while specifications (5) and (6) use the natural 
logarithm of Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 years, 
and zero otherwise. Chair-CEO age difference (+/-) is the age difference between the chair and the 
CEO, calculated as the chair's age minus the age of the CEO. Chair-CEO age difference absolute is the 
absolute value of the age difference between the chair and the CEO. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix 2.A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by industry (4-
digit SIC codes) and year. The constant is included in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote 















                                                 





 Tobin’s Q ln(Tobin’s Q) Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 










   -0.0042 
(-1.400) 
   
Squared chair-CEO  
age difference 
   0.0004*** 
(3.371) 
   
Chair-CEO age 
difference absolute 
     0.0041** 
(2.193) 
 
Chair younger      -0.0114 
(-0.335) 
 




    




    
Other chair-CEO 
dissimilarities 

















































































CEO characteristics        










































Chair characteristics        








































































Supervisory board char.        










































Firm characteristics        













































Table 2.2: Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm value (Tobin’s Q) (cont’d) 
















































































































Management board char.        
CV management board 
age 
      1.3902** 
(2.471) 








      0.0150 
(1.476) 
Number of obs. 694 694 694 694 694 694 599 
Fixed effects Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Within R-squared 0.286 0.301 0.304 0.293 0.438 0.425 0.374 
Regression (1) does not include any measure of chair-CEO age dissimilarity, but includes CEO 
age and chair age. Neither of these two variables is significant at any of the conventional 
levels.17 In contrast, any of the four measures of chair-CEO age dissimilarity (see regressions 
(2) to (6)) is significant at the 5% level or better. In detail, the main measure of chair-CEO age 
dissimilarity, i.e., Gap20 chair-CEO, is significant at the 1% level in all regressions that include 
this variable (regressions (2), (3), and (5)), independent of whether we control for the age of 
the chair and the CEO (regression (3)) or whether we use the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q 
(ln(Tobin’s Q)) as the dependent variable (in regression (5)).  
                                                 
17 This finding is in line with the recent literature. For example, Custódio and Metzger (2014) report that CEO age 
is not associated with firm value in the U.S. Waelchli and Zeller (2013) find that chair age is not associated with 




Regressions (4) and (6) include the signed age difference as well as its square and the absolute 
age difference, respectively, as alternative measures of age dissimilarity. In regression (4), the 
square of the signed age difference is significant (at the 1% level), while the simple chair-CEO 
age difference is not significant, as expected. This further supports the reasoning that only the 
large age differences rather than all age differences create value and that the sign of the age 
difference does not matter. Regression (6) confirms this conclusion. The regression coefficient 
on Chair-CEO age difference absolute is positive and significant at the 5% level. In contrast, 
the Chair younger dummy variable is not significant. This confirms the argument that what 
matters is age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO and not whether the former is older 
than the latter (or vice-versa). When we interact the variable Chair-CEO age difference 
absolute with the dummy variable Chair younger in unreported regressions, we find that the 
coefficient on the interaction term is not significant, while the coefficient on Chair-CEO age 
difference absolute remains significant. This constitutes another test, in addition to the use of 
the second-order polynomial of the signed age difference between the chair and the CEO, of 
the validity of the argument that the age difference between the chair and the CEO, but not the 
sign of this difference, matters. 
Regression (7) of Table 2.2 controls for additional important characteristics of the management 
board, which capture age variation and experience and are thus likely to correlate with chair-
CEO age dissimilarity. These characteristics are the size of the management board, the average 
age and tenure of its members, and the coefficient of variation (CV) of the ages of its members. 
These variables, except for management board size, are calculated excluding the CEO (for 
whose characteristics we control separately). The results remain qualitatively similar when we 




To sum up, there is consistent evidence across all seven regressions that chair-CEO age 
dissimilarity is associated with significantly higher firm value. Importantly and in line with the 
main hypothesis, differences in firm value are associated with differences in age between the 
chair and CEO, and not with their age levels. Finally, it is the greater age differences  such as 
a generational age gap  and not age differences of any size that are associated with higher firm 
value. 
As to the different sets of control variables, the regression results confirm the results from 
previous studies. More specifically, we find that founder CEOs and founder chairs (to a lesser 
extent) are associated with higher firm value, confirming the results of Andres (2008). Yet, we 
do not find that the chair and CEO being from the same family has any consistent effect on 
firm value. We shall return to this result below, when reviewing the regressions on the number 
of board meetings. As expected, free float and a change in the CEO are associated with lower 
firm value. Finally and in line with existing research, we find that firm size, leverage and the 
number of business segments are associated with lower firm value (see, e.g., Andres, 2008; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009; Custódio and Metzger, 2014; Dittmann et al., 2010).  
2.5. Chair-CEO Age Dissimilarity, Monitoring Intensity and the Need for Monitoring  
We now focus on the following two questions that arise from the previous analysis. 
First, is the positive relation between chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm value indeed a 
reflection of greater monitoring? Second, is the positive relation between chair-CEO age 
dissimilarity and firm value mainly observed for firms requiring greater monitoring? If the 





2.5.1. Does greater age dissimilarity between the chair and CEO result in more 
monitoring? 
In order to answer this question, we check whether greater age dissimilarity between 
the chair and CEO results in more board meetings. The number of board meetings is an 
appropriate metric for the amount of board monitoring as argued, for example, by Adams 
(2005) and Brick and Chidambaran (2010). In support of this argument, Schwartz-Ziv and 
Weisbach (2013) document that board meetings devote most of their time to monitoring 
management. It is important to note that, in what follows, board meetings refer to supervisory 
board meetings. 
The monitoring focus of board meetings is particularly emphasized under the German two-tier 
board system, where the supervisory board’s main responsibility is to monitor the firm’s 
management board on behalf of the shareholders, as prescribed by paragraph 111(1), AktG (see 
also Adams and Ferreira, 2007). The monitoring responsibilities of the German supervisory 
board are similar to those of the U.S. board of directors (see paragraphs 84, 87 and 111, AktG). 
However, according to section 3.6 of the German Corporate Governance Code, board meetings 
should (and predominantly do) take place without any member of the management board 
(including the CEO). This is in contrast to the U.S. corporate governance system where SOX 
mandates only one board meeting without the executive directors per year (see Larcker and 
Tayan, 2013).  
The results from the regression analysis are shown in Table 2.3. We run two types of 
regressions, both include firm-fixed and year-fixed effects. The first type (regressions (1) to 
(4)) is fixed-effects Poisson count regressions with the number of board meetings as the 




with the natural logarithm of the number of board meetings (i.e., ln(Board meetings)) as the 
dependent variable.  
We use the same sets of control variables as for the regressions on Tobin’s Q in Table 2.2 and 
include the following four additional controls. First, we include the number of active board 
committees (No. of active committees) as in Vafeas (1999) to explain board meetings. Ex ante 
it is not clear how the number of active committees affects board meetings. On the one side, a 
greater number of active committees will take away some of the business from the board, hence 
reducing the need for board meetings. On the other side, a greater number of active committees 
may be a reflection of the greater complexity of the organization, and hence may be positively 
correlated with the number of board meetings. Second, we add average tenure of the 
supervisory board members (Avg. tenure SB members). Board members who have longer 
(joint) tenure are likely to require fewer board meetings. There are at least two reasons for this: 
experience, and hence more efficient decision making, as well as “groupthink”, the latter 
referring to avoidance of conflict by actively foregoing critical questions (Coles et al., 2015; 
Janis, 1972). Third, we include the fraction of union representatives among the employee 
representatives (Union representatives). This fraction is likely to increase the number of board 
meetings as union representatives pursue employee interests but tend to have less firm-specific, 
operational knowledge as they do not work for the firm (e.g., Fauver and Fuerst, 2006). Finally, 
we also include the Tobin’s Q from the previous year to account for past performance as firms 
with weak performance are likely to hold more board meetings. The regression results shown 







Table 2.3: Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and board monitoring (number of meetings) 
This table reports firm-fixed effects panel regression results of board meetings on measures of age 
dissimilarity between the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board, other CEO-chair characteristics, 
CEO characteristics, chair characteristics, supervisory board characteristics, and firm characteristics for 
German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. Board meetings 
is the number of board meetings held by the supervisory board during the fiscal year. Specifications (1) 
to (4) use Board meetings as the dependent variable, while specifications (5) to (7) use the natural 
logarithm of Board meetings as the dependent variable. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 
years, and zero otherwise. Chair-CEO age difference (+/-) is the age difference between the chair and 
the CEO, calculated as the chair’s age minus the age of the CEO. Chair-CEO age difference absolute is 
the absolute value of the age difference between the chair and the CEO. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix 2.A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) in specifications (1) to (4) are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm. Standard errors in regressions (5) to (7) are based on industry (4-digit SIC 
codes) and year clustering. The constant is included in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Poisson  OLS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 










   -0.0030 
(-1.012) 
    
Squared chair-CEO 
age difference 
   0.0003** 
(2.192) 
    
Chair-CEO age 
difference absolute 
      0.0055** 
(2.421) 
 
Chair younger       0.0174 
(0.399) 
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Table 2.3: Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and board monitoring (number of meetings) (cont’d) 
Chair characteristics         
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Table 2.3: Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and board monitoring (number of meetings) (cont’d) 
Management board 
tenure 
       -0.0056 
(-0.921) 
Number of obs. 680 680 680 680  690 690 598 
Fixed effects Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Within R-squared      0.223 0.226 0.278 
We find no evidence in regressions (1) and (3) that CEO age and chair age per se affect board 
meeting frequency. However, we find that Gap20 chair-CEO has a significant (at the 5% level) 
and positive impact on the number of board meetings. This is the case for all three regressions, 
which contain this dummy variable, i.e., regressions (2), (3) and (5). We further find that the 
squared chair-CEO age difference (see regression (4)) and the absolute chair-CEO age 
difference (see regression (6)) have a significant (at the 5% level) and positive effect on the 
number of board meetings. Finally, we obtain similar results when we include the additional 
controls for management board characteristics (see regression (7)). 
We now turn to the control variables. In line with the argument that more board meetings mean 
more intensive monitoring, we find that firms with a founder CEO as well as those with their 
CEO being related to the chair hold fewer board meetings. This suggests that a chair who is 
related to the CEO is less likely to monitor the latter. In contrast, a change in the CEO increases 
the number of board meetings. As per the expectations, we also find that supervisory boards 
with greater average tenure meet less frequently, whereas boards with more union 
representatives as well as more active committees meet more frequently. Finally and similar to 
Adams (2005), more complex organizations, as reflected by greater firm size, and more 
business segments hold more board meetings. We also find a positive effect of stock volatility 
on the number of board meetings.  
To sum up, we find strong evidence that age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO is 




general argument and the results for firm value shown in Section 2.4. The results also suggest 
that what matters is the age difference between the chair and the CEO, and not the actual chair 
and CEO ages. Similar to the regressions on firm value, we find that only the large age 
differences matter in terms of the number of board meetings.  
2.5.2. The need for monitoring 
While the results so far suggest that greater monitoring creates value, Adams and 
Ferreira (2007) predict that too much monitoring may destroy firm value. They argue that less 
monitoring, or more “friendly boards”, may be optimal for firms whose CEO needs advice 
rather than monitoring. In turn, this suggests that greater age dissimilarity between the chair 
and CEO only creates value in firms with relatively high monitoring needs. We investigate the 
validity of this conjecture by conducting a sub-sample analysis where we attempt to distinguish 
between firms with relatively high and firms with relatively low monitoring needs. We expect 
that firms with greater free cash flows relative to their sales (measured by the variable 
FCF/Sales), more dispersed control (as reflected by a below average Herfindahl index of 
ownership of voting stock (Herf. control) and the absence of a majority shareholder (the 
dummy variable Blockholder 50% being equal to zero)), and below average intangible assets 
as a fraction of total assets (measured by the variable Intangible assets) are more likely to 
require more monitoring than other firms. 
The regressions for each sub-sample are identical to those in Table 2.2. The results are reported 
in Table 2.4. For brevity, we only report the regression coefficient on the main variable of 
interest, Gap20 chair-CEO. The regressions suggest that the positive effect of the chair-CEO 
age dissimilarity is only observed for those firms that are likely to have more monitoring needs. 
These are the firms with above average free cash flows (regression (2)), with a below average 




and with below average intangibles (regression (7)). The coefficient on the variable Gap20 
chair-CEO is significant at the 1% level in all of these regressions, while it is statistically 
insignificant – as expected – in the four regressions for the sub-samples of firms with relatively 
low monitoring needs.  
For the same sub-samples, we also repeat the regression analysis from Table 2.3, which focused 
on the link between the chair-CEO age dissimilarity and the number of board meetings. This 
analysis can be found in Table 2.5. In line with the previous table, we find that Gap20 chair-
CEO has a positive and significant effect (at the 10% level or better) on the number of board 
meetings for firms with above average free cash flows (regression (2)), a lower control 
concentration (regressions (3)) and (5)) and below average intangibles (regression (7)). It is 
insignificant for firms with lower monitoring needs. 
To conclude, the results shown in both Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 provide strong support for the 
main hypothesis that a considerable age difference between the chair and the CEO positively 
affects firm value as it leads to more intensive monitoring. Importantly, the positive relation 
between chair-CEO age dissimilarity on the one side and firm value and board meetings on the 










Table 2.4: Need for Monitoring - Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm value (sub-sample analysis) 
This table shows firm-fixed effects panel sub-sample regression results of Tobin’s Q on the indicator variable Gap20 chair-CEO and control variables as in Table 
2.2 for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. Tobin's Q is calculated as the sum of the firm's market capitalization 
and the difference between the book value of total assets and the book value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. All other variables 
are defined in Appendix 2.A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by industry (4-digit SIC codes) and year. The constant is 
included in all the regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Tobin’s Q 

















Intangible assets  
≤ mean 
Intangible assets  
> mean 
















Other chair-CEO dissimilarities Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Supervisory board characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 398 248  438 256  503 191  458 236 
















Table 2.5: Need for Monitoring - Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and board meetings (sub-sample analysis) 
This table contains Poisson firm-fixed effects panel sub-sample regression results Board meetings on the indicator variable Gap20 chair-CEO and control 
variables as in Table 2.3 for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. Board meetings is the number of board 
meetings held by the supervisory board during the fiscal year. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the age difference between the chair of 
the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2.A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are based on standard errors clustered by firm. The constant is included in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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≤ mean 









assets ≤ mean 
Intangible 
assets > mean 
















Other chair-CEO dissimilarities Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Supervisory board characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 379 230  428 225  493 170  446 226 









2.6. Identification and Robustness 
This section tests the robustness of the previous results. In Section 2.6.1, we present an 
identification strategy, using the 2007 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to optimal 
monitoring levels, to provide results that allow for causal inference with respect to the main 
hypothesis stating that considerable age differences between the chair and the CEO lead to 
more monitoring of the latter. Section 2.6.2 raises and addresses several endogeneity concerns. 
Section 2.6.3 contains additional robustness tests. 
2.6.1. The financial crisis and the reduced need for monitoring 
In this section, we investigate whether and how the 2007 financial crisis affected the 
link between chair-CEO age dissimilarity and the number of board meetings. We repeat the 
same exercise for the link between the chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm value. The 2007 
financial crisis constitutes an exogenous shock (see, e.g., Erkens et al., 2012). We expect that 
in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, i.e., in the years 2008 and 2009, there was 
considerably less need for monitoring, more need for fast decision making (De Jonghe and 
Öztekin, 2015, provide evidence in support of this), including an increased need for managerial 
discretion (see e.g., Li et al., 2017, for empirical evidence on this), as well as potentially more 
advice seeking from the CEO. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that banks with more shareholder-
friendly boards performed worse during the 2007 crisis. In other words, while the work load of 
both the management and the supervisory board was likely to be greater during the crisis (for 
example, due to strategy changes and an increased need for communication with banks and 
suppliers), the need to monitor the CEO was likely to be lower. The reason is that in the 
recession years 2008 and 2009 the agency problem of managerial discretion over free cash flow 




and cash flows declined significantly, leaving less cash in the hands of the CEO.18 On the other 
hand, there was less corporate investment during the crisis (see, e.g., Campello, Graham, and 
Harvey, 2010).  
We test the above conjecture by including the interaction between Gap20 chair-CEO and 
Financial crisis, a dummy variable, which equals one for the years 2008 and 2009, and zero 
otherwise. We expect this interaction to have a negative impact on the number of board 
meetings. In particular, the negative coefficient should (more or less) cancel out the positive 
effect from chair-CEO age dissimilarity observed during the non-crisis years. Put differently, 
if the main hypothesis is correct and chair-CEO age dissimilarity intensifies monitoring, then 
there will be a significant reduction in board meetings when the need for monitoring declines.  
Yet, while it is possible to reduce the number of board meetings at relatively short notice (down 
to a minimum of four meetings per year as prescribed by German law), it likely takes longer to 
change chair-CEO age dissimilarity. Thus, at the start of the crisis the cognitive dissonance 
between the chair and the CEO is likely to remain for firms where there is a considerable age 
difference pre-crisis. It is unlikely that two persons with a (very) different age – reflecting, e.g., 
different experiences that may conflict with each other and a different language – can simply 
adjust their behavior and way of thinking given the exogenous shock caused by the crisis. 
Consequently, the chair may reduce his or her monitoring as much as possible, but cognitive 
conflicts and communication problems (or the greater effort to communicate) will likely 
remain. This may in turn hamper fast decision making and advice giving/seeking as argued in 
the literature (see, e.g., Westphal 1999; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Li, Lu, and Phillips, 2017). 
                                                 
18 This assertion is backed up by the data as we find that the percentage of firm-year observations with negative 
net income during the crisis years is 27% compared to only 8% during the non-crisis years. Further, (EBITDA-
based) ROA during the crisis years is lower by -2.4% (i.e., a decline of -22% relative to the sample mean). These 




Given the particular importance of fast decision making and advice during crises, we expect 
the interaction to have a negative impact on firm value.  
Given the exogeneity of the 2007 financial crisis, the results of this analysis allow for causal 
inferences. Table 2.6 reports the regressions on the number of board meetings. The results 
confirm the previous finding of a positive and significant effect of Gap20 chair-CEO on the 
number of board meetings. In support of the above argumentation, the interaction between 
Gap20 chair-CEO and Financial crisis is also significant, and has a negative sign. The 
normally positive effect of chair-CEO age dissimilarity is now virtually cancelled out, or to the 
very least heavily reduced, during the financial crisis. This is the case not only for the full 
sample (regression (1)), but also for the sub-samples of firms with greater monitoring needs as 
reflected by above average free cash flows (regression (3)), a below average Herfindahl index 
of control (regression (4)), and without a majority shareholder (regression (6)). The results are 
somewhat more nuanced for the sub-samples of firms with below average intangibles 
(regression (8)) and those with above average intangibles (regression (9)). For the former, we 
find that the interaction term is negative but not significant, while it is significantly negative 






Table 2.6: Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and board meetings during the financial crisis 
This table contains Poisson firm-fixed effects panel sub-sample regression results of Board meetings on the indicator variable Gap20 chair-CEO and control 
variables as in Table 2.3 for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. Board meetings is the number of board 
meetings held by the supervisory board during the fiscal year. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the age difference between the chair of 
the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. Financial crisis is an indicator variable set to one if the observation year is either the 
year 2008 or the year 2009, and zero otherwise. All regression specifications include year dummies for each of the non-crisis years, i.e., 2005, 2006, 2007, and 
2010. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2.A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by firm. The constant is included 
in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Intangible 
assets > mean 
























































Other chair-CEO dissimilarities Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Supervisory board charac. Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 680  379 230  428 225  493 170  446 226 








Table 2.7: Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm value during the financial crisis 
This table shows firm-fixed effects panel sub-sample regression results of Tobin’s Q on the indicator variable Gap20 chair-CEO and control variables as in Table 
2.2 for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010. Tobin's Q is calculated as the sum of the firm's market capitalization 
and the difference between the book value of total assets and the book value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. Financial crisis is 
an indicator variable set to one if the observation year is either the year 2008 or the year 2009, and zero otherwise. All regression specifications include year 
dummies for each of the non-crisis years, i.e., 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2010. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2.A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are based on standard errors clustered by industry (4-digit SIC codes) and year. The constant is included in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * denote 
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Other chair-CEO dissimilarities Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Supervisory board charac. Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 694  398 248  438 256  503 191  458 236 








Table 2.7, which reports the equivalent regressions on Tobin’s Q, suggests a similar effect of 
the financial crisis on firm value. The table confirms the previous result of a positive and 
significant effect of Gap20 chair-CEO on Tobin’s Q. As expected, the interaction between 
Gap20 chair-CEO and Financial crisis is significantly negative. The normally positive effect 
of chair-CEO age dissimilarity is heavily reduced during the financial crisis for both the full 
sample (regression (1)) and the sub-samples with greater monitoring needs (regressions (3), 
(4), (6) and (8)). The only exception to the rule is observations with a below average Herfindahl 
index of control (regression (4)) where the coefficient on Gap20 chair-CEO is positive and 
significant, but the interaction of the former with Financial crisis is not significant. The overall 
effect of chair-CEO age dissimilarity, i.e., Gap20 chair-CEO + Gap 20 chair-CEO*Financial 
crisis, is still positive as suggested by regression (1) and regressions (3), (4), (6) and (8), i.e., 
for those firms (with high monitoring needs) for which the age gap is generally expected to 
have a positive effect on firm value. We find that the interaction term and hence also the overall 
effect are significantly negative for the sub-sample of firms with a high fraction of intangible 
assets (regression (9)), consistent with regression (9) in Table 2.6, and for those firms which 
have already a potentially high monitoring level due to their concentrated control structure 
(regressions (5) and (7)). These results further suggest that considerable age dissimilarity 
between the chair and the CEO destroys firm value when firms have particularly high needs 
for advice or when their needs for additional monitoring are low. This conclusion is consistent 
with the literature that shows that (too) intensive board monitoring can be costly (see, e.g., 
Faleye et al., 2011). 19 
 
                                                 
19 We note that for the firms with concentrated control age dissimilarity between the chair and CEO is greatest. 
Indeed, the 95th percentile for the variable Chair-CEO age difference (+/-) has a value of 39 for these firms, while 
it is only 32 for the full sample. As the disadvantages of age dissimilarity are more likely to kick in at very high 




Figure 2.1: Gap20 chair-CEO and firm value (Tobin’s Q) over time 
This figure shows a plot of annual average values of Tobin’s Q for firms with and without an age 




Figure 2.1 visualizes the effects of the financial crisis on Tobin’s Q. The figure shows that there 
was a decrease in the average Tobin’s Q for firms with a generational age gap between the 
chair and CEO during 2008, which was greater than that for firms without such a gap. This 
would suggest that, during a major economic crisis, management-friendlier boards create more 
value than less friendly boards. This is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012).  
To sum up, as conjectured we find evidence that the 2007 financial crisis reduced the emphasis 
on board monitoring. This is reflected by the significant reduction in the positive effect of age 
dissimilarity between the chair and CEO during the crisis for those firms with greater 
monitoring needs and, for firms with lower monitoring needs, the emergence of a negative 
effect of age dissimilarity on firm value during the crisis. These results suggest the following 
three important conclusions. First, firms should mind the gap as one size does not clearly fit 
all. While considerable age dissimilarity between the chair and CEO creates value for firms 
Gap20 chair-CEO = 1






















with greater monitoring needs, intensive monitoring may destroy firm value when firms need 
more managerial discretion and advice to react to shocks. Second, the full-sample results (see 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3) tend to misrepresent the true effects of age dissimilarity on board 
monitoring and firm value. Finally, the fact that the financial crisis  an exogenous shock  
had a significant impact on the relationship between age dissimilarity on the one side and 
monitoring and firm value on the other side suggests that the relationship is unlikely to be 
spurious. Nevertheless, we perform additional endogeneity tests in the next sub-section to 
further test the robustness of the results.  
2.6.2. Potential endogeneity concerns 
This sub-section addresses two types of endogeneity concerns. The first is unobserved 
CEO and chair heterogeneity. Specifically, certain CEO and/or chair characteristics might be 
significantly correlated with the measures of chair-CEO age dissimilarity, leading to spurious 
regression results. For example, the Gap20 chair-CEO dummy variable might be correlated 
with the chair’s or the CEO’s prior industry and/or management experience. While the analyses 
in Sections 2.5 and 2.6 include some measures of the chair’s and the CEO’s experience, such 
as tenure and whether one of them is the founder of the company, we do not fully adjust for 
experience and other time-invariant heterogeneity.20  
We use CEO-firm and chair-firm fixed effects to address potential unobserved heterogeneity 
and endogenous matching. We proceed by rerunning the regressions from Table 2.2 (Tobin’s 
Q) and Table 2.3 (board meetings). The results are reported in Table 2.8. Both the regressions 
adjusting for CEO-firm fixed effects (see regressions (1) and (2)) and the regressions adjusting 
                                                 
20 In earlier analyses, we used a number of dummy variables indicating whether the CEO and chair have a degree 
in law, economics or sciences, and/or have a doctorate. We also included another set of variables, which measured 
the fraction of supervisory board members with a background in academia, finance, auditing, law, and 
manufacturing. While some of these variables were significant, importantly they did not qualitatively affect the 




for chair-firm fixed effects (see regressions (3) and (4)) confirm the previous results. There is 
a positive and significant effect of Gap20 chair-CEO on both Tobin’s Q and the number of 
board meetings. Hence, it seems very unlikely that the results can be attributed to unobserved 
heterogeneity or endogenous matching. 
The second endogeneity concern is dynamic endogeneity. To address this issue, we use the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regression technique (e.g., Blundell and Bond, 
1998). As Wintoki et al. (2012) argue, dynamic endogeneity is a major issue in corporate 
governance research. It consists of previous realizations of the dependent variable affecting 
current levels of some or all of the independent variables. Wintoki et al. illustrate this via the 
link between firm value and board structure. While past board structure may have an impact 
on current firm performance, current board structure may also be the result of past firm 
performance. Indeed, poor past performance may cause changes to the board of directors. Why 
might dynamic endogeneity be an issue? It may be the case that shareholders of 
underperforming companies call for changes to the board. Such changes might be in the form 
of replacing the incumbent chair with an older individual, which would then increase age 
dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO, which in turn would intensify board monitoring 








Table 2.8: Unobserved CEO or chair heterogeneity  CEO-firm and chair-firm fixed effects 
This table shows panel regression results for the indicator variable Gap20 chair-CEO and control 
variables for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in the sample period 2005 to 2010 
using CEO-firm-fixed effects (specification (1) and (2)) or chair-firm-fixed effects (specification (3) and 
(4)). Tobin's Q is calculated as the sum of the firm's market capitalization and the difference between 
the book value of total assets and the book value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets. 
Board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the supervisory board during the fiscal year. 
The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (3) is Tobin’s Q, specification (2) and (4) use the natural 
logarithm of Board meetings as the dependent variable. Gap20 chair-CEO is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO is at least 20 
years, and zero otherwise. If not stated otherwise, control variables in specification (1) and (3) follow 
Table 2.2, controls in specification (2) and (4) are identical to Table 2.3. Differences in the set of control 
variables result from omitting time invariant variables for the CEO (i.e., Founder CEO) or the chair of 
the supervisory board (i.e., Founder chair, Chair is former firm executive), respectively. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix 2.A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors 
clustered by industry (4-digit SIC codes) and year. The constant is included in all regressions, but not 
reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Tobin’s Q Board meetings  Tobin’s Q Board meetings 
 CEO-firm FE  Chair-firm FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 








Other chair-CEO dissimilarities Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics 
CEO change,  
CEO tenure 
CEO change, 
 CEO tenure 
 Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes Yes  
Busy chair,  
Chair change, 
Chair tenure 
Busy chair,  
Chair change, 
Chair tenure 
Supervisory board characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 











The results from the GMM regressions are shown in Table 2.9. We still find that Gap20 chair-
CEO has a positive and significant impact (at the 5% level or better) on both firm value and 
the number of board meetings. Chair-CEO age difference absolute also has a positive and 
significant (at the 5% level) impact on both dependent variables. Hence, the main results are 





Table 2.9: Dynamic panel data models (system GMM estimations) 
This table contains results of the dynamic, system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regressions 
of Tobin’s Q, ln(Tobin’s Q), and Board meetings on measures of age dissimilarity between the CEO and 
the chair of the supervisory board for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX and SDAX in 2005 and 
2010. Tobin's Q is calculated as the sum of the firm's market capitalization and the difference between 
the book value of total assets and the book value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets. 
Board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the supervisory board during the fiscal year. 
Board meetings used in regression (4) and (5) is the natural logarithm of the number of firm’s board 
meetings in a given year. Control variables for the specifications (1) to (3) are identical to Table 2.2, 
while control variables for specification (4) and (5) follow those used in Table 2.3. Gap20 chair-CEO 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory board and 
the CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2.A. The 
system GMM includes two sets of regressions: (i) regressions in levels with the lagged differences (t-2) 
of the dependent and independent variables as instruments and (ii) regressions in first differences with 
the lagged levels (t-3) of the dependent and independent variables as instruments. We use the year 
dummies as strictly exogenous variables. The GMM style variables are the respective dependent variable 
as well as Gap20 chair-CEO, CEO-chair different education, CEO-chair different gender, CEO-chair 
different nationality, Board age, Free float, Book leverage, CapEx/TA, R&D/sales, ROE, Sales growth, 
Stock volatility, and Total assets. We use the small sample option (similar to Wintoki et al., 2012). 
Running the dynamic panel estimations without this option, all results remain significant. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively, in the first differenced 
residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is based on the 
null that all instruments are valid. The Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is based on the null that the 
instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous. The constant is included in all regressions, 
but not reported. All t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  ***, **, 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Tobin’s Q  ln(Tobin’s Q) ln(Tobin’s Q)  Board meetings Board meetings 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) 




  0.4227*** 
(2.912) 
 
Chair-CEO age difference 
absolute 
   0.0077** 
(2.127) 
  0.0157** 
(2.381) 
Chair younger    -0.0252 
(-0.335) 
  0.0298 
(0.299) 








   
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.3532** 
(2.112) 
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Table 2.9: Dynamic panel data models (system GMM estimations) (cont’d) 
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Firm characteristics        














































































































Year controls Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 




Table 2.9: Dynamic panel data models (system GMM estimations) (cont’d) 
Arellano-Bond test for  
AR(1) (p-value) 
0.019  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for  
AR(2) (p-value) 
0.644  0.460 0.459  0.528 0.525 
Hansen test for 
overidentification restrictions 
(p-value) 
0.467  0.593 0.523  0.568 0.416 
Diff-in-Hansen test GMM  
(p-value) 
0.249  0.400 0.346  0.611 0.403 
 
2.6.3. Additional robustness tests 
In the following, we discuss the results of additional robustness tests. For brevity, most 
of these tests are not reported in tabular form. First, despite sufficient time-series variation in 
the data (see the introduction of this chapter), we use random effects, as motivated and used in 
Andres (2008), to address the potential concern that parameter identification may be limited 
given that chair-CEO age dissimilarity only changes when the CEO or the chair (or both) 
change. When we rerun all of the regressions using random instead of firm-fixed effects, the 
results are confirmed. Table 2.10 shows the results of these regressions for the main analyses. 
The results for the sub-samples are not shown for the sake of brevity. In additional unreported 
regressions, we restrict the sample to observations for which CEO change or Chair change or 
both dummy variables equal one and then consider the effect of the main variable, Gap20 chair-
CEO, on firm value and the number of board meetings. We also consider the effect of this 
variable when we focus on those observations without CEO and chair changes. The regression 
coefficient on the Gap20 chair-CEO dummy variable remains positive and statistically 
significant in all regressions, independent of whether we focus on CEO and chair changes or 
whether we exclude them.  
Second, we use the return on assets (ROA), a measure of firm performance, as an alternative 




Table 2.2 and Table 2.8 using ROA instead of Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. The results 
(shown in Appendix 2.C) strongly support the previous results. We find a consistently positive 
relation between chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm profitability. This relation remains 
significant even when we control for CEO-firm and chair-firm fixed effects and also when we 
run dynamic panel system GMM estimations. It also remains significant when we use random 
effects (not reported). 
Table 2.10: Random effects regressions 
This table reports random effects panel regression results of Tobin’s Q and Board meetings on measures 
of age dissimilarity between the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board, other CEO-chair 
characteristics, CEO characteristics, chair characteristics, supervisory board characteristics, and firm 
characteristics for German firms listed on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX between the sample period 2005 
to 2010. Specifications (1) and (2) use Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. Specification (3) uses the 
natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. Specifications (4) and (5) use Board meetings as the dependent variable. 
Specification (6) uses the natural logarithm of Board meetings as the dependent variable. Gap20 chair-
CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the age difference between the chair of the supervisory 
board and the CEO is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. Chair-CEO age difference (+/-) is the age 
difference between the chair and the CEO, calculated as the chair's age minus the age of the CEO. 
Chair-CEO age difference absolute is the absolute value of the age difference between the chair and 
the CEO. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2.A. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based 
on standard errors clustered by industry (4-digit SIC codes) and year. The constant is included in all 
regressions, but not reported. Specifications (2) and (5) include year dummies for each of the non-crisis 
years, i.e., 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2010. Industry-fixed effects are based on the Fama and French 12 
industries. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.    
 
 Tobin’s Q  Board meetings 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 













   -0.1479* 
(-1.680) 
 
Financial crisis  -0.1618*** 
(-3.320) 
   -0.0519 
(-1.053) 
 
Chair-CEO age difference 
absolute 
  0.0051*** 
(3.031) 
   0.0045** 
(2.152) 
Chair younger   -0.0015 
(-0.042) 
   -0.0073 
(-0.191) 
Other chair-CEO dissimilarities Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Supervisory board characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 


















Third, in unreported regressions we examine whether the positive relation between age 
dissimilarity and firm value also holds when we consider age dissimilarities more broadly. 
More specifically, we use the variable Gap20 chair-management board, which equals one if 
there is a generational age gap between the chair and the entire management board (based on 
the average age of its members), and the variable Gap20 supervisory board-CEO, which equals 
one if there is a generational gap between the entire supervisory board (based on the average 
age of the shareholder representatives) and the CEO. When we use either of these variables 
instead of Gap20 chair-CEO as well as the same control variables as in Table 2.2, we find that 
the corresponding regression coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% and 5% level, 
respectively. However, when we add Gap20 chair-CEO to these regressions, neither of the two 
broader measures of age dissimilarity remains significant, while the coefficient on Gap20 
chair-CEO is significant at the 1% level. Overall, these results provide further support for the 
reasoning that age dissimilarities create value and suggest that age dissimilarity between the 
chair and the CEO matters most. 
Fourth, we perform several additional analyses to check the robustness of the findings. The 
corresponding regression results are not shown for the sake of brevity. We control for firms 
which are majority-controlled by other firms. The majority shareholder is likely to be 
represented on the supervisory board and may influence the choice of its chair. Using both 
fixed effects and random effects, the results for the measures of chair-CEO age dissimilarity 
remain qualitatively similar, while the coefficient on the added dummy variable for majority-
controlled firms is statistically insignificant. Next, when we substitute the variable Chair is 
former firm CEO for the variable Chair is former firm executive, the results remain qualitatively 
similar. This is also the case when we exclude either those chairs who were CEOs or, more 
generally, those chairs who were executives of the firms they now oversee. Finally, the results 




we exclude all firms from regulated industries (i.e., firms with SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-
6999), or when we exclude firms with less than four firm-year observations. 
2.7. Conclusion 
Despite the importance of the chair on corporate boards under both the one-tier and the 
two-tier governance systems, the literature has remained relatively silent about how chair 
characteristics affect corporate governance effectiveness. Also, little is known about the 
determinants of the important relation between the chair and the CEO. 
This chapter focuses on the chair-CEO relation and how it affects monitoring and firm value. 
We hypothesize that substantial age dissimilarity leads to cognitive conflict between the chair 
and the CEO, which results in more intensive monitoring of the latter and ultimately higher 
firm value and performance. To test the hypothesis, we examine the relation between the chair 
of the supervisory board and the CEO in the German two-tier board system. Using Germany 
as a laboratory considerably mitigates endogeneity problems as German law prohibits CEO 
duality as well as the CEO’s involvement with the nomination and appointment of the members 
of the supervisory board.  
We provide evidence that greater age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO, particularly 
in the form of a generational age gap, leads to more intensive monitoring and higher firm value. 
Specifically, substantial age dissimilarity creates value in firms expected to rely more heavily 
on monitoring. These are firms with greater free cash flows, less concentrated control and fewer 
intangibles. We find that these firms also hold significantly more board meetings. Thus, we 
find strong support for the hypothesis. 
The findings are robust to a variety of robustness tests including CEO- and chair-firm fixed 




Most importantly, we employ the 2007 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to the optimal 
levels of monitoring. We find that firms with substantial chair-CEO age dissimilarity 
significantly reduce the number of board meetings in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. We 
further find that during the crisis substantial chair-CEO age dissimilarity destroys firm value, 
consistent with the increased need for managerial discretion and fast decision making during 
the crisis. The negative effect during the crisis almost cancels out the positive effect during the 
non-crisis years. We hence conclude that firms should mind the gap. 
The results of the effect of chair-CEO age dissimilarity on the number of board meetings and 
firm value suggest that in terms of corporate governance regulation one size does not fit all. 
The findings can be interpreted as evidence that is in contrast with corporate governance codes, 
which recommend age limits for the members of corporate boards. In fact, the results suggest 
that for some firms age limits might be suboptimal as they prevent such firms from achieving 
the optimal age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO.  
Finally, we believe that the insights from this chapter are not only relevant for the two-tier 
board system, but also for the one-tier board system prevailing, for example, in the U.K. and 
the U.S., where a steadily increasing number of firms are abandoning CEO duality. For these 
firms as well as for their shareholders, a sound understanding of the optimal chair-CEO relation 




Chapter 3 – Do CEOs Matter? Corporate Performance and the 
CEO Life Cycle21 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Starting with Bertrand and Schoar (2003), a vast literature suggests that differences 
across CEOs explain differences in firm policies and value. A similarly important, but so far 
largely neglected, question is whether CEOs’ impact on the firms they run varies over time. 
Specifically, are CEO fit and performance conditional on the tenure at the firm? And which 
factors render CEOs more or less valuable over time? This chapter addresses these questions 
by analyzing the relation between CEO tenure, firm value, and environmental dynamics. We 
provide novel evidence on how CEOs matter for firm value and present insights that add to the 
ongoing debate about CEO term limits.22 The results help explain why even very successful 
CEOs can be associated with declining firm value over the later course of their tenure.  
In theory, the board of directors hires the best available CEO whose skill set is expected to 
maximize firm value given its estimated fit with the managerial skill needs of the firm which 
depend on the firm’s industry and technology (e.g., Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013). While 
uncertainty about the CEO’s skills resolves over her tenure as the board learns about the CEO, 
the likelihood that the firm’s skill needs change (as its environment evolves), rendering the 
CEO’s skill set less optimal, increases (Miller, 1991; Garrett and Pavan, 2012). Each period 
the board decides whether to fire or keep the incumbent CEO following a simple decision rule: 
                                                 
21 This chapter is joint work with Prof. Dr. Markus Schmid (University of St. Gallen) and Dr. Peter Limbach 
(University of Cologne). 
22 See, e.g., “The case for CEO term limits” (Fortune, June 23, 2014), “How long is too long to be CEO?” (The 
Washington Post, April 16, 2014), “CEO term limits” (The Washington Post, May 26, 2009), and “Been a CEO 
for ten years? Your time’s about up?” (Business Insider, April 16, 2007). For the discussion about CEO term 




it fires the CEO if future firm value under the CEO is expected to be lower than under the best 
alternative CEO less adjustment costs (e.g., search costs, severance pay). However, due to 
horizontal and vertical differentiation across managers and competition for talent, each period 
only a limited number of CEO candidates, if any, represent appropriate matches for a firm. 
Thus, even absent adjustment costs or labor market frictions a candidate under whom the firm 
would be worth more may not always be available. In fact, CEOs may remain in office although 
they are associated with declining firm value. 
According to this general framework, the relation between CEO tenure and firm value will be 
either positive or hump shaped. Yet, as industries and technologies evolve over time leading to 
changes in firms’ skill needs and the CEO-firm fit, a hump-shaped relation appears more 
plausible unless the average CEO has a broad skill set that enables her to adapt to different, 
partly unforeseeable changes or can easily be replaced in each period.23 The more dynamic a 
firm’s environment, the more likely and pronounced is a hump-shaped tenure-firm value 
relation as incumbent CEOs are expected to lose their fit with the firm at a faster pace. Labor 
market and corporate governance frictions will further make the hump-shaped relation more 
likely as they increase adjustment costs – due to, e.g., local CEO-firm matching bias (Yonker, 
2017) or CEO entrenchment (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) 
– which make CEO replacements more costly.24 Nevertheless, how the tenure-firm value 
relation looks like remains an empirical question.  
We document that for the average S&P 1500 company the relation between CEO tenure and 
firm value is hump shaped. We use both parametric and semi-parametric estimations, which 
                                                 
23 In Appendix 3.A, we provide anecdotal evidence on a decreasing CEO-firm fit and value over time which 
supports the existence of a hump-shaped tenure-firm value relation.  
24 Governance frictions likely reinforce a negative relation between high CEO tenure and firm value as CEOs gain 
power over their tenure and influence board composition to distort monitoring and avoid turnover (e.g., Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen 2014; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Taylor, 2010), which explains why some CEOs stay even if 




include CEO, firm, and governance characteristics, and account for concerns of extrapolation 
and sample selection. The life cycle is economically meaningful: holding controls at their 
means, we estimate a 4.5% increase in firm value over the early years of tenure and a 4.2% 
decrease over the same number of years in the later period of tenure. The evidence suggests 
that a considerable fraction of high-tenure CEOs are no longer the optimal match for their firms 
and that these firms have difficulties replacing CEOs with candidates of better fit.  
Because hiring and firing CEOs are non-random decisions, we perform several tests to address 
concerns related to initial and contemporary endogenous CEO-firm match which might bias or 
even explain the results. As the main test, we analyze the stock market reaction to 
announcements of sudden, unexpected CEO deaths. Because sudden deaths occur randomly 
and are likely to be exogenous to current firm and market conditions, this approach mitigates 
endogeneity concerns. As the stock market reaction reflects CEOs’ future net contribution to 
shareholder value, this analysis also constitutes a test of whether the tenure-firm value relation 
is hump shaped. If so, CEOs’ net contribution to shareholder value will decline over their tenure 
and we can expect to find a positive relation between CEO tenure and abnormal stock returns 
upon announcement of CEOs’ death. The results are in line with this expectation. The relation 
between CEO tenure and abnormal returns is significantly positive and low (high) tenure values 
are associated with significantly negative (positive) stock returns, underpinning that a 
considerable fraction of high-tenure CEOs is no longer the optimal match for their firms. 
Importantly, the positive stock market reaction found for high-tenure CEOs suggests that 
corporate governance rather than labor market frictions – i.e., entrenchment rather than a lack 
of CEO candidates – seem to distort the optimal CEO-firm match, as only the former is 




We provide several additional tests to further account for endogenous CEO-firm matching and 
turnover as well as unobserved CEO heterogeneity. To address endogenous matching and CEO 
heterogeneity, we exclude the first years of tenure for each CEO and reestimate the regressions 
with additional controls for CEOs’ abilities, education, and work experience. Alternatively, we 
use CEO-firm fixed effects. We further measure tenure as a fraction of the CEO’s maximum 
realized tenure to allow life cycles to differ across CEOs. To address endogenous CEO 
turnover, we estimate hazard rates for different types of turnover and include them as additional 
controls to account for the endogeneity of most turnover and to capture effects of expected 
turnover on firm value. Second, we exclude a five-year event window around CEO turnover as 
performance patterns around these events might explain the results. Third, we address concerns 
of CEO or firm survivorship bias. For example, CEOs with good performance may get 
recruited to run bigger companies (Fee and Hadlock, 2003), while poorly performing CEOs 
may stay with their firms (due to entrenchment). The hump-shaped relation between CEO 
tenure and firm value is robust to all aforementioned tests. 
We run further tests to eliminate several alternative explanations, including non-linear 
relationships between firm value and CEOs’ age, compensation, ownership, power, wealth 
sensitivity, or (dis)investment decisions which might all be captured by CEO tenure. We also 
use residuals of CEO tenure which account for hard-to-disentangle variables, such as CEO and 
firm age, CEO founder status and power, or past performance. Finally, we use return on assets 
as an alternative measure of firm performance. All these tests confirm the results. 
To better understand the relation between CEO tenure and firm value, we provide an additional 
analysis of corporate (dis)investment behavior over the CEO’s time in office. Specifically, we 
examine the stock market reaction to takeover announcements, which constitute major 




pattern between CEO tenure and abnormal stock returns. To understand how CEOs’ ability and 
willingness to change is related to their tenure, we further examine corporate disinvestments. 
Consistent with decreasing ability and increasing reluctance to change and to reverse earlier 
investment decisions (Miller, 1991; Boot, 1992; Prendergast and Stole, 1996), we find that the 
likelihood of disinvestments decreases with CEO tenure. 
The last set of tests is concerned with heterogeneity across industries, CEOs, and the business 
cycle. In a first step, we examine the role that firms’ industry dynamics play for the relation 
between CEO tenure and firm value. According to the general theoretical framework, firms’ 
managerial skill needs are more (less) likely to change if firms operate in more (less) dynamic 
industries. Firms in dynamic industries may also find it harder to identify and attract new CEO 
candidates with better suited skills sets. As a consequence, the more (less) dynamic a firm’s 
industry, the more (less) likely and the faster (slower) will a CEO’s skill set become less 
optimal for the firm. This setting leads to testable empirical predictions. In particular, relative 
to the average firm we expect to find that CEO tenure is associated with declining firm value 
at relatively lower (higher) tenure levels if the firm’s industry is more (less) dynamic. Put 
differently, the relation between CEO tenure and firm value is less (more) likely to be hump 
shaped and more (less) likely to be positive if firms are subject to low (high) dynamism. Using 
the industry dynamism index proposed by Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2015), we find empirical 
support for the predictions. While on average firm value peaks (i.e., starts to decline) after 
about 10-12 years of CEO tenure, we find that firm value peaks much earlier (after 8.6 years) 
for firms with above median industry dynamism and much later (after 13.8 years) for firms 
with below median dynamism. The overall difference in the peak point of firm value amounts 
to economically meaningful 5.2 years, indicating that heterogeneity across firms’ industries 




In a second step, we consider differences across the business cycle. Because economic activity, 
technological progress, and industry dynamism typically slow down during recessions, and 
because competition for CEOs can be expected to be lower when the economy does not do well 
(which makes it easier to replace incumbent CEOs with new candidates), we expect that 
relative to the average S&P 1500 company firm value will peak at higher levels of CEO tenure 
during recessions and at lower levels during non-recession years. We again find empirical 
support for the prediction.    
Lastly, we consider CEOs’ adaptability to changes. For those firms that employ CEOs who 
find it easier to adapt to changes in firms’ economic environment, the relation between CEO 
tenure and firm value is more likely to be positive (instead of hump shaped), i.e., firm value 
will peak at much higher levels of CEO tenure. We measure CEO adaptability using Custódio, 
Ferreira, and Matos’s (2013) general ability index, which encompasses managerial work 
experience in different firms, industries, and positions, and find empirical support for the 
expectation. Specifically, while the tenure-firm value relation is hump shaped and firm value 
peaks after 10 years of CEO tenure for less adaptable CEOs, we find that the tenure-firm value 
relation is significantly positive for more adaptable generalist CEOs. 
The evidence presented in this chapter has important policy implications. While it suggests that 
regular CEO turnover can be valuable for shareholders as even successful CEOs may be 
associated with declining firm value over the later course of their tenure, it does not support a 
one-size-fits-all policy of CEO term limits given that the tenure-firm value relation differs 
considerably across firms and CEOs. However, it might make sense to increase the board’s 
flexibility to react to changes in firms’ skill needs and to make CEO contract extensions more 
dependent on actual CEO-firm fit and less on past performance. In this regard, firms should be 




board of directors should be able and incentivized to frequently monitor the CEO’s fit with the 
firm taking into account industry dynamics and the CEO’s skill set. This can require boards to 
have sufficient independence and industry experience. 
The two studies closest to the work of this chapter are Guay, Taylor, and Xiao (2015), who 
examine CEO turnover in reaction to industry shocks, and Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016) 
who analyze CEO power and investment behavior over the CEO’s tenure. Guay, Taylor, and 
Xiao (2015) find that when firms are subject to industry shocks CEO turnover becomes more 
likely, particularly for those CEOs who possess relatively more firm-specific knowledge. They 
interpret their results as evidence that CEOs have problems adapting to shocks. In line with the 
increasing power of CEOs over their time in office, the authors find that high-tenure CEOs are 
less likely to leave their firm, even after industry shocks. Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016) 
provide evidence that a firm’s net investment quantity increases over the CEO’s tenure, while 
investment quality decreases. The authors show that the latter result can be explained by the 
CEO’s control over the board which grows over her time in office. This analysis is broader in 
scope. In contrast to the aforementioned studies, we make clear predictions for the relation 
between CEO tenure and firm value and test this relation empirically, while the results in both 
Guay, Taylor, and Xiao (2015) and Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016) are consistent with a 
positive or hump-shaped relation between CEO tenure and firm value and even with a negative 
relation in the latter. Moreover, we show that the hump-shaped relation between CEO tenure 
and firm value as well as acquisition returns holds even when we control for CEO entrenchment 
and power over the board and firms’ investment decisions suggesting that corporate investment 




that actions other than large observable investments taken by the CEO also seem to have value 
consequences that are conditional on the CEO’s tenure.25 
At a more general level, this chapter extends the literature concerned with CEOs’ impact on 
firm value and performance (e.g., Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005; Bennedsen, Pérez-
González, and Wolfenzon, 2010, 2011; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Jenter, Matveyev, and 
Roth, 2016). Supporting extant work, the results suggest that CEOs matter for firm value as 
their skills seem to constitute an important input factor in the firm’s production process. 
However, while the existing literature has focused on heterogeneity across different CEOs, this 
chapter provides evidence for the importance of within-CEO and industry heterogeneity. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and 
variables. Section 3.3 presents a detailed analysis of the relation between CEO tenure and firm 
value and various robustness tests. Section 3.4 provides an analysis of the heterogeneity of the 




                                                 
25 We note that the management literature has also been concerned with the life cycle of leaders and their impact 
on organizational performance. In their seminal work, Eitzen and Yetman (1972) find evidence of a hump-shaped 
relation between the tenure of 58 college basketball coaches and team performance. Providing an explanation for 
this relation, Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) conceptual study on the five seasons of a CEO’s tenure suggests 
that the benefits of tenure (e.g., on-the-job learning) outweigh the costs (e.g., commitment to a fixed paradigm) in 
the early years of tenure, while this relation likely reverses in later years. Henderson, Miller, and Hambrick (2006) 
empirically test the aforementioned CEO life cycle. The authors examine two industries, the stable food industry 
and the more dynamic computer industry, and find that in the former the relation between CEO tenure and firm 
profitability is hump shaped, while it is negative in the latter. The general theoretical framework we present in 
this chapter provides an alternative explanation for the findings in Eitzen and Yetman (1972) as well as Henderson, 
Miller, and Hambrick (2006) which are limited in their scope and do not provide tests to establish causality. In 
contrast, the chapter provides comprehensive evidence for meaningful heterogeneity across various industries, the 




3.2.  Data and Variables 
3.2.1. Data 
 The initial sample consists of all S&P 1500 companies over the period 1998 to 2011 as 
covered by ISS (formerly RiskMetrics).26 For these firms, we collect governance data from 
ISS’ Governance segment and director-level data from the Director segment. We complement 
this dataset with data from several databases. First, we match the sample with ExecuComp to 
obtain information on several CEO characteristics, including tenure, age, gender, and an annual 
description of titles (i.e., chairman and president). We obtain data on whether the CEO is the 
company’s founder from Board Analyst’s The Corporate Library database for the years 2001 
to 2011. Data for earlier years is hand-collected from proxy statements. Accounting data and 
business segment information is retrieved from Compustat. Finally, stock price information 
stems from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). After excluding utilities and 
financial firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999), because of differences in accounting 
and regulation, the final sample (with all available data) consists of 12,427 firm-year 
observations covering 1,782 firms and 3,054 unique CEO-firm pairs. 
3.2.2. Variables 
The main variable of interest is CEO tenure calculated as the fiscal year minus the year 
the CEO became the company’s CEO (ExecuComp data item "BECAMECEO"). CEOs are 
identified using the ExecuComp variable ‘CEOANN’. Following Masulis and Mobbs (2014), 
                                                 
26 ISS provides data from 1996 on. However, due to problems of data availability and consistency for the years 




we replace missing observations by the number of years the CEO has been serving on the 
company’s board of directors (provided by ISS).27  
The main output variable is Tobin’s Q, defined as the sum of the market value of equity and 
the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity, divided by the book value of total 
assets. Other output variables include stock returns to acquisition announcements and to 
announcements of unexpected CEO deaths, and a firm’s return on assets (ROA). ROA is 
calculated as earnings before interest expenses, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
divided by the book value of total assets at the end of the previous year and is winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. Announcement returns to acquisition announcements and 
unexpected CEO deaths are defined in Section 3.3.  
In the analyses, we control for several additional CEO characteristics, including the age of the 
CEO in years (CEO age), a dummy variable set to one if the CEO is female (CEO gender), and 
a dummy variable set to one if the CEO is the firm’s founder (Founder CEO). Further, CEOs 
typically become more powerful as their tenure increases (see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). To account for effects of CEO power on firm value, and to 
separate CEO power from CEO tenure, we use the variable CEO power index. It is based on 
the following variables: (i) CEO ownership, i.e., the fraction of common shares held by the 
CEO, (ii) Co-Option which is the fraction of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office 
(Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014), (iii) Duality which is a dummy that equals one if the CEO 
is also the chairman of the board, (iv) Involved CEO which is a dummy that equals one if the 
                                                 
27 We identify the company’s CEO in ISS by applying the methodology described in Mobbs (2013). A member 
of the board of directors is considered to be the CEO of the company if, first, the ISS variable 
„CLASSIFICATION“ states that the director’s board affiliation is classified as employee/insider ("E") and, 
second, if the variable “EMPLOYMENT_CEO” equals one, indicating that her primary employment title is CEO. 
Using this methodology, we are able to identify a firm’s CEO within ISS in 99.8% of the cases in which we could 
not identify a CEO in ExecuComp. CEO tenure is then calculated as the fiscal year minus the year the CEO has 




board has a separate nominating committee and the CEO is a member or if such a committee 
does not exist (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999), (v) Only insider which is a dummy that equals 
one if the CEO serves as the only inside (i.e., executive) director on the board of directors, and 
(vi) President which is a dummy that equals one if the CEO has the title of president of the 
firm. Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) use the latter four variables to measure CEO power. 
The CEO power index is the sum of the following dummy variables: CEO ownership above 
median, Co-Option above median, Duality, Involved CEO, President, and Only insider. We 
separately control for Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s (2009) E-index to further account for 
CEO entrenchment. 
We control for a series of additional corporate governance and firm characteristics. Appendix 
3.B provides an overview and detailed definitions of all variables used in this chapter. Except 
for the variables Business segments, Firm age, and Sales growth, all other firm characteristics 
(i.e., Book leverage, CapEx, Firm risk, Operating CF, R&D, and Total assets) enter the 
regressions with one lag. Firm value regressions additionally include Tobin’s Q with one lag 
as an explanatory variable to capture the relation between past performance and tenure as well 
as unobserved value-relevant CEO and firm heterogeneity.28  
3.2.3. Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the previously defined variables. In terms of 
CEO tenure and Maximum CEO tenure, which take on values between 0 and 60 years, the 
cross-sectional average is about 7.7 and 10.5 years, respectively. Maximum CEO tenure is 
defined as the largest value of CEO tenure in the sample per CEO-firm pair. Based on the 3,054 
CEO-firm pairs in the sample (instead of firm-year level data) average Maximum CEO tenure 
                                                 




is 8.2 years. It increases to 10.3 years when we exclude the 22% of all CEOs who leave the 
firm during their first three years in office, the period often referred to as “honeymoon”. 
Excluding turnover in the honeymoon period, Maximum CEO tenure at CEO turnover has a 
mean of 11.1 years. 31% of all CEOs reach a maximum tenure of at least 10 years, i.e., about 
a third of all S&P 1500 CEOs stay with their firm for at least a decade. This fraction increases 






Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of S&P 1500 companies (excluding SIC codes 
4000-4999 and 6000-6999) comprising 12,427 firm-year observations based on 1,782 unique firms and 
3,054 unique CEO-firm pairs over the period 1998-2011. CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO 
has been serving as the firm’s CEO. Max CEO tenure is the largest value of CEO tenure in the sample 
for each CEO-firm pair. Both CEO tenure and Max CEO tenure take on integer values between 0 and 
60. CEOs leave in their honeymoon period if Max CEO tenure is smaller than three years. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix 3.B. 
 
 Obs. Mean Median 1. Quartile 3. Quartile SD 
CEO tenure       
CEO tenure (cross-sectional) 12,427 7.67 5.00 2.00 10.00 8.02 
Max CEO tenure (cross-sectional) 12,427 10.51 8.00 5.00 13.00 8.42 
Max CEO tenure 3,054 8.22 6.00 3.00 11.00 8.01 
Max CEO tenure  
w/o CEOs who leave in honeymoon 
2,367 10.28 8.00 5.00 13.00 7.98 
CEOs who leave in honeymoon 
(dummy) 
3,054 0.22    0.42 
Max CEO tenure ≥ 10 yrs (dummy) 3,054 0.31    0.44 
Max CEO tenure at turnover 
w/o CEOs who leave in honeymoon 
948 11.12 8.00 5.00 14.00 8.46 
CEO characteristics       
CEO age 12,427 55.66 56.00 51.00 60.00 7.38 
CEO gender (dummy) 12,427 0.02    0.15 
Founder CEO (dummy) 12,427 0.12    0.32 
CEO power index  12,427 2.90 3.00 2.00 4.00 1.21 
CEO ownership 12,427 0.03 0.010 0.003 0.026 0.06 
Co-Option 12,427 0.38 0.33 0.11 0.63 0.30 
Duality (dummy) 12,427 0.58    0.49 
Involved CEO (dummy) 12,427 0.18    0.38 
Only insider (dummy) 12,427 0.57    0.49 
President (dummy) 12,427 0.58    0.49 
Governance characteristics       
Board age 12,427 60.11 60.22 57.67 62.60 3.94 
Board size 12,427 9.01 9.00 7.00 10.00 2.23 
Busy board (dummy) 12,427 0.20    0.40 
Director ownership 12,427 0.002 0.0005 0.0002 0.001 0.005 
E-index 12,427 2.47 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.35 
Independence ratio 12,427 0.71 0.75 0.63 0.83 0.16 
Outside director tenure 12,427 8.23 7.63 5.60 10.11 3.78 
Firm characteristics       
Book leverage 12,427 0.40 0.41 0.27 0.51 0.17 
Business segments 12,427 2.81 3.00 1.00 4.00 2.29 
CapEx 12,427 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.05 
Firm age 12,427 25.11 19.00 11.00 35.00 19.34 
Firm risk 12,427 0.46 0.41 0.31 0.55 0.21 
Operating CF 12,427 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.10 
R&D 12,427 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.06 
ROA 12,402 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.21 0.12 
Sales growth 12,427 0.10 0.08 -0.007 0.17 0.27 
Tobin's Q 12,427 1.99 1.59 1.22 2.26 1.35 
Total assets 12,427 6,211.67  1,355.68 556.39 3,944.00 26,765.89 




With respect to the other CEO characteristics, we find that mean CEO age is 56 years, 2% of 
all CEOs are female, and 12% are founders of the firm they lead. The CEO power index has a 
mean of 3 (relative to a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 6). As can be seen from Figure 3.1, 
CEO power increases significantly with CEO tenure, at least over the first 15 years. Turning to 
the components of the CEO power index, on average CEO ownership amounts to 3% (with a 
median of 1%), 38% of directors on the board were appointed after the CEO assumed office 
(Co-Option), 58% of the CEOs also hold the position of the chairman of the board, 18% are 
involved in director selection, 57% of the CEOs are the only insiders on the board of directors, 
and 58% hold the title of the firm’s president. 25% of CEOs hold both the chairman and the 
president title.  
Figure 3.1: CEO power and forced turnover as functions of CEO tenure 
This figure shows results from locally weighted regressions (lowess) of the CEO power index and 
Forced turnover on CEO tenure. Lowess regressions provide a semiparametric way of estimating the 
relation between CEO power and CEO tenure as well as CEO forced turnover and CEO tenure. The 
bandwidth is 0.4. CEO power index is the sum of the following indicator variables: CEO ownership 
above median, Co-Option above median, Duality, Involved CEO, President, Only insider. Forced 
turnover is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the turnover is classified as forced 
according to Peters and Wagner (2014) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) who provided the data. CEO 














Overall, the summary statistics – also those for the governance or firm characteristics (not 
discussed here) – compare well to those in recent corporate governance studies (e.g., Adams, 
Ferreira, and Almeida, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Huang, 
2013; Li, Lu, and Phillips, 2017; Masulis and Mobbs, 2014).  
3.3. The Relation between CEO tenure and Firm value 
In this section, we present a detailed examination of the relation between CEO tenure 
and firm value. In Section 3.3.1, we show the results from parametric and semi-parametric 
estimations of the baseline regression model. While Section 3.3.2 provides various robustness 
tests to address concerns of extrapolation and sample selection, CEO heterogeneity, 
endogenous CEO-firm matching and turnover as well as several alternative explanations, 
Section 3.3.3 presents additional evidence from firms’ (dis)investment decisions. 
3.3.1. Firm value analysis 
The general theoretical framework outlined at the beginning of the chapter suggests that 
the relation between CEO tenure and firm value should be either positive or hump shaped. To 
analyze how the relation between CEO tenure and firm value looks like, we estimate 
regressions of Tobin’s Q on different functional forms of CEO tenure and a large number of 
controls for CEO, corporate governance, and firm characteristics (presented in Section 3.2.2). 
All regressions also include year and firm fixed effects to account for unobserved variables 
which are either constant across firms or constant over time. Firm fixed effects constitute the 
baseline estimation approach as it is consistent with the theoretical framework where firms 
invest in and employ the production factor labor, i.e., CEOs, and where their investments in 
CEOs depend on their firm-specific needs for managerial skills, and likely on firm-specific 
hiring/firing policies. Hence, it is crucial to account for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. 




firm actually just changes its CEO, they do not accurately account for firm-specific 
heterogeneity as it is important in the context of this chapter. Furthermore, firm fixed effects 
allow for sufficient variation in CEO tenure (as changes in tenure are not limited to exactly one 
unit for each observation), while they allow to control for CEO age as well as for many other 
CEO characteristics. Still, we employ CEO-firm fixed effects in robustness tests presented in 
Section 3.3.2. 
Table 3.2 shows regression results for different functional forms of CEO tenure. In regression 
specifications (1) and (2), we test whether the relation between CEO tenure and firm value is 
positive. Therefore, in specification (1) we estimate the baseline regression model and assume 
a logarithmic functional form by using the natural logarithm of CEO tenure, i.e., ln(CEO 
tenure). This functional form makes the reasonable assumption that the increase in firm value 
decreases marginally over the CEO’s tenure. In specification (2), we assume a basic linear 
relation and accordingly use the variable CEO tenure. To test whether the tenure-firm value 
relation is hump shaped, we use CEO tenure and its squared term, i.e., CEO tenure squared, in 






Table 3.2: The relation between CEO tenure and firm value 
This table reports results from firm fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on different functional 
specifications of CEO tenure along with CEO, firm and corporate governance characteristics. The 
sample includes S&P 1500 firms over the period 1998-2011 excluding regulated utility and financial 
firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999). Regression specification (1) uses the natural logarithm of 
CEO tenure (denoted ln(CEO tenure)), while specification (2) uses CEO tenure. Specifications (3) and 
(4) show regression results for a second-order and a third-order polynomial of CEO tenure, respectively. 
Specification (5) shows results of reestimating regression specification (3) with interacted year and 
industry (based on Fama French 48 industries) fixed effects as additional controls. Specification (6) 
uses the variable Residual CEO tenure and its squared term instead of CEO tenure and its squared term.  
Residual CEO tenure is the residual from a regression of CEO tenure on the variables CEO age, CEO 
power index, Firm age, Founder CEO, Tobin’s Qt-1 and year-fixed effects. All other variables are 
defined in Appendix 3.B. An intercept and year dummies are included in all regressions, but not 
reported. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
           Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ln(CEO tenure) 0.0162 
(0.706) 
    
















CEO tenure cubic    0.0000 
(0.926) 
  
Residual CEO tenure      0.0133** 
(2.252) 
Residual CEO tenure 
squared 
     -0.0006*** 
(-3.682) 
CEO characteristics       
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Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*year fixed effects No No No No Yes No 
Observations 12,427 12,427 12,427 12,427 12,427 12,427 
R-squared (within) 0.295 0.295 0.297 0.299 0.354 0.297 




The results suggest that the relation between CEO tenure and firm value is hump shaped. In 
particular, in specifications (3) and (4) the coefficients of CEO tenure and CEO tenure squared 
are significant and their opposite signs indicate a hump shape, while all other functional forms 
are not statistically supported. The hump shape is also found when we additionally include 
(Fama French 48) industry*year fixed effects in order to control for time-varying factors 
particular to an industry as shown in specification (5). In specification (6), we provide estimates 
that address the concern that CEO tenure is correlated with a set of control variables used in 
the regression model and might therefore capture the effects that these variables may have on 
firm value. In particular, a CEO’s time in office (technically) increases with CEO and firm age 
and is expected to increase in CEO power and past firm performance, and to be higher if the 
CEO is the company’s founder. Therefore, instead of CEO tenure, we use Residual CEO 
tenure, which is the residual from a regression of CEO tenure on CEO age, CEO power index, 
Firm age, Founder CEO, Tobin’s Q lagged, and time fixed effects. The residual no longer 
captures the effects of the above variables on firm value. The results on Residual CEO tenure 
are qualitatively similar to those on CEO Tenure and again support a hump-shaped relation 
between CEO tenure and firm value. Further, the results of the quadratic specifications suggest 
that for the average S&P 1500 company firm value peaks (i.e., starts to decline) after about 10-
12 years of CEO tenure.  
In terms of the control variables, we find founders to be associated with a higher firm value, 
consistent with, e.g., Fahlenbrach (2009). Supporting previous studies, we also find both board 
size (e.g., Yermack, 1996) and busy boards (e.g., Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) to be negatively 
related to firm value. The other CEO and governance characteristics are estimated to be 
insignificant. Results for firm characteristics are consistent with prior studies.29  
                                                 
29 The coefficients on the firm characteristics and all fixed effects are not reported for space reasons. The 




In addition to the aforementioned parametric estimation results, we provide results from semi-
parametric estimations which do not impose any functional form for the tenure-firm value 
relation. Particularly, we perform locally weighted regressions (lowess) of residuals of Tobin’s 
Q on CEO tenure. The residuals of Tobin’s Q are from a regression of the baseline model, 
shown in specification (3) of Table 3.2, where we omit the variables CEO Tenure and CEO 
tenure squared. As can be seen from Figure 3.2, the results suggest that the relation between 
CEO tenure and firm value, apparent in the data, is indeed hump shaped.30 
 
Figure 3.2: Semiparametric estimation of the relation between firm value and CEO tenure 
This figure shows the results from a locally weighted regression (lowess) of residuals of Tobin’s Q on 
CEO tenure. Lowess regressions provide a semiparametric way of estimating the relation between firm 
value and CEO tenure. The bandwidth is 0.4. The residuals of Tobin’s Q are from a regression of the 
baseline model shown in column (3) of Table 3.2 where we omit the variables CEO tenure and CEO 









                                                 
of Operating CF, R&D, Sales growth and the lag of Tobin’s Q (coefficient of 0.222) are significantly positive. 
When we exclude the lag of Tobin’s Q from the regressions, the results shown in Table 3.2 remain statistically 
significant with comparable turning points. When we use two lags of Tobin’s Q or substitute the lag of Tobin’s Q 
for the firm’s stock market performance of the previous year, results remain qualitatively similar.  
30 We also obtain a hump-shaped relation between CEO tenure and firm value when we analyze the residuals from 
the same regression model using CEO-firm fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects. In addition, we follow 
Mudambi (1997) and run regressions of Tobin’s Q on polynomials of order 1 to 4 of the variable CEO tenure (and 
control variables). The corresponding test statistics (i.e., adjusted R-squared, AIC and BIC information criteria) 




3.3.2. Tests on the robustness of the firm value analysis 
We perform a battery of robustness tests on the results shown in Section 3.3.1. As a 
first test, we replicate the regressions in Table 3.2 with firm fixed effects replaced by random 
effects with Fama French 48 industry controls. The results (not reported for brevity) confirm 
the hump-shaped relation between CEO tenure and Tobin’s Q. In the following, we present 
various other tests in more detail. 
3.3.2.1. Extrapolation and sample selection  
A statistical concern with the hump shape we document is that the relation between 
Tobin’s Q and high values of CEO tenure is only based on available observations, i.e., it is 
based on CEOs who survive until a specific year of tenure. By imposing a specific functional 
form, such as a second-order polynomial, we might extrapolate (based on slope and curvature 
parameters) information for CEOs who actually do not survive. This might lead us to find a 
hump-shaped relation between CEO tenure and firm value although the actual relation is not 
hump shaped (but, e.g., rather similar to a logarithmic function of CEO tenure). 
We address this concern in two ways. First, we use semi-parametric (lowess) estimations, 
similar to those shown in Section 3.3.1, and restrict the sample to firm-year observations for 
which CEO tenure either takes on values of 11 years or less (the average turning point found 
in Table 3.2) or values larger than 11 years. The results are shown in Figures 3.3a and 3.3b, 
respectively. The figures show that residual firm value increases over the early years of tenure 








Semiparametric estimation of the relation between firm value and 
CEO tenure (CEO tenure ≤ 11 yrs) 
This figure shows the results from a locally weighted regression (lowess) of 
residuals of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure for all observations with tenure values 
≤ 11 years. The bandwidth is 0.4. The residuals of Tobin’s Q are from a 
regression of the baseline model shown in column (3) of Table 3.2 where 







Semiparametric estimation of the relation between firm value and 
CEO tenure (CEO tenure > 11 yrs) 
This figure shows the results from a locally weighted regression (lowess) of 
residuals of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure for all observations with tenure values 
> 11 years. The bandwidth is 0.4. The residuals of Tobin’s Q are from a 
regression of the baseline model shown in column (3) of Table 3.2 where 









Second, in Table 3.3 we reestimate the baseline regression model from specification (3) of 
Table 3.2 and impose different restrictions with respect to CEO tenure. In specification (1), we 
restrict the sample to those CEOs who have been at the top of their firm for at least 9 years and 
who stay no longer than 23 years (i.e., 8 ≤ Max CEO tenure ≤ 22)31. The thresholds equal the 
median and the 90th percentile of the variable Max CEO tenure, respectively. We further restrict 
the upper threshold by another 5 years (i.e., 8 ≤ Max CEO tenure ≤ 17) in specification (2). 
Finally, consistent with the semi-parametric test described above, in specifications (3) and (4) 
we restrict the sample to observations with CEO tenure smaller/ equal to or larger than 11 years, 
respectively. To mitigate concerns of extrapolation and outliers, we further restrict the sample 
in specification (4) to only those CEOs who stay no longer than 18 years. While we find a 
hump-shaped tenure-firm value relation in specifications (1) and (2), specifications (3) and (4) 
provide additional support for the semi-parametric results shown in Figures 3.3a and 3.3b. 
Overall, the findings from Section 3.3.1 appear robust to tests for extrapolation, sample 
selection, and outliers. 
                                                 
31 As the smallest value of the variable Max CEO tenure is 0, the restriction 8 ≤ Max CEO tenure ≤ 22 corresponds 




Table 3.3: Addressing concerns of extrapolation and sample selection 
This table reports results from firm fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure or CEO tenure and its squared term along with CEO, firm, and 
corporate governance characteristics. The sample includes S&P 1500 firms over the period 1998-2011 excluding regulated utility and financial firms (SIC codes 
4000-4999 and 6000-6999). Regression specification (1) restricts the sample to all observations for which Max CEO tenure is between 8 and 22 years (the 50th 
and 90th percentiles of Max CEO Tenure, which ranges from 0 to 60 years), i.e., the respective CEOs stayed with their firm for at least 9 years, but no longer 
than 23 years. Specification (2) further restricts the sample to all observations for which Max CEO tenure is between 8 and 17 years. Specification (3) shows 
regression results for a subsample of CEOs who stayed with their firm for a maximum of 11 years (Max CEO tenure ≤ 11 yrs). Specification (4) shows regression 
results for a subsample of CEOs who have already been in office for more than 11 years (i.e., CEO tenure > 11 yrs) and who stayed with the firm for a maximum 
of 13 to 18 years (i.e., 12 ≤ Max CEO tenure ≤ 17 yrs). Control variables are identical to those used in regression (3) of Table 3.2. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix 3.B. An intercept and year dummies are included in all regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
                        Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 8 ≤ Max CEO tenure ≤ 22 yrs 8 ≤ Max CEO tenure ≤ 17 yrs 
 
Max CEO tenure ≤ 11 yrs 
CEO tenure > 11 yrs &  
12 ≤ Max CEO tenure ≤ 17 
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Governance characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 5,717 4,943  8,546 817 





3.3.2.2. Sudden deaths and endogenous CEO-firm matching and turnover 
Because the decision to hire and fire CEOs is not random, the (initial and contemporary) 
endogenous CEO-firm match and possible unobserved CEO heterogeneity might bias the 
estimations (perhaps leading us to falsely conclude that the tenure-firm value relation is hump-
shaped) or might even provide alternative explanations for the results.  
As the main test to address endogenous CEO-firm matching, we analyze the stock market 
reaction to announcements of sudden and unexpected deaths of incumbent CEOs, similar to, 
e.g., Johnson et al. (1985), Bennedsen, Pérez-Gonzàlez, and Wolfenzon (2010), Nguyen and 
Nielsen (2014), and Jenter, Matveyev, and Roth (2016). Because sudden deaths occur 
randomly and are likely to be exogenous to current firm and market conditions, this approach 
mitigates endogeneity concerns considerably. As the stock market reaction to sudden deaths 
reflects CEOs’ future contributions to shareholder value (net of the expected successor), this 
analysis also constitutes a test of whether the relation between CEO tenure and firm value is 
hump shaped. If so, CEOs’ contributions to shareholder value will decline over their tenure 
and we should find a positive relation between CEO tenure and abnormal stock returns.32 The 
sudden death setting further allows distinguishing between labor market and corporate 
governance frictions as the reason for CEO survival. In fact, a positive stock market reaction 
to deaths of incumbent high-tenure CEOs, who are still the best match for the firm although 
they are associated with declining firm value (as due to labor market frictions no value-
enhancing replacement is available), seems unlikely and unreasonable. To the contrary, if 
governance frictions (i.e., entrenchment and power) prevent the replacement of incumbent 
                                                 
32 A positive stock price reaction suggests a negative contribution to firm value. This reaction is consistent with 
the hump-shaped tenure-firm value relation which corresponds to a negative relation between a CEO’s tenure and 




CEOs who are no longer the optimal match for their firms, we would expect a positive 
announcement return upon unexpected deaths of such CEOs.   
We hand-collected a sample of CEO deaths between 1992 and 2012 from various sources, 
mainly LexisNexis, EDGAR online, Google and the Wall Street Journal, by searching for 
articles disclosing unexpected deaths of CEOs. We use keyword search terms such as “chief 
executive officer”, “CEO” and “accident”, “deceased”, “death”, “heart attack”, “passed away”, 
“stroke”, “sudden(ly)” and “unexpected” to identify sudden deaths. To ensure that the CEO’s 
death conveys new information, we restrict the sample to unexpected deaths using the 
definition of Nguyen and Nielsen (2014), i.e., we classify deaths as sudden when the cause of 
death is a heart attack, stroke, or an accident or when the specific cause is unreported, but the 
death is described as unexpected. We exclude murders and suicides (which might be related to 
firm performance) and cases of deaths if they cannot be identified as sudden or unexpected. 
We only consider CEOs of firms with available data in CRSP. This procedure leaves us with a 
sample of 80 sudden CEO deaths.33 For these 80 events, we compute cumulative abnormal 
stock returns (CARs) over the three-day period from the day before until the day after the 
announcement date (CAR [-1,1]). We use the market model with the CRSP value-weighted 
index as a proxy for the market return. We winsorize CAR [-1,1] and accounting data (from 
Compustat) at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
The results are reported in Table 3.4. Panel A reports results from univariate difference-in-
means tests for whether CAR [-1,1] differs depending on the deceased CEO’s tenure. 
Specifically, we compare mean CARs across three sub-samples based on whether i) CEO 
                                                 
33 Comparable to Nguyen and Nielsen (2014), who report a mean market capitalization of US$ 1,260 million, a 
mean market-to-book ratio of 2.7, a (median) CEO age of 60 years, and a CEO tenure of 9.4 years, we find that 
the mean market capitalization in the sample is US$ 1,455 million, the market-to-book ratio is 2.8, the median 
CEO age is 60 years and the median tenure is 8.5 years (with a minimum value of zero). The cause of death is a 




tenure is above or below (or equal to) the sample median, or ii) above or below (or equal to) 
11 years, the average turning point determined in the analyses in Section 3.3.1, or iii) whether 
tenure is in the first or in the third tercile. The results for all three sub-samples show that 
abnormal stock returns to announcements of sudden deaths of incumbent CEOs with shorter 
tenure are significantly lower than announcement returns of CEOs with longer tenure. 
Table 3.4: Using CEO sudden deaths to address endogenous CEO-firm match and turnover 
This table reports three-day abnormal stock returns to announcements of sudden CEO deaths between 
1992 and 2012. The methodology and the definition of sudden deaths follow Nguyen and Nielsen 
(2014). CAR [-1,1] is the three-day cumulative abnormal announcement return calculated using the 
market model with a CRSP value-weighted market index as the market proxy, where the event day t=0 
is either the trading day on which the sudden and unexpected death of a CEO is first reported in the 
news or the next trading day in case a death was announced on a non-trading day. Panel A shows results 
of left- and two-tailed univariate difference-in-means tests allowing for unequal variances across 
subsamples (based on CEO tenure). Panel B reports multivariate results for regressions of CAR [-1,1] 
on CEO tenure and additional controls. Dummy variables for each decade (1990s, 2000s, and 2010s) 
are included in specifications (4) to (7). Specifications (5) to (7) additionally include industry fixed 
effects based on the Fama and French 12 industries. Succession plan is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one if the firm has a succession plan in place or announces an interim successor within one 
week after the announcement of the sudden death. CAR [-1,1] and accounting data are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. The sample size varies across regression specifications (1) to (7) due to data 
availability. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.B. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-means tests for abnormal stock returns around CEO sudden 
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Table 3.4: Using CEO sudden deaths to address endogenous CEO-firm match and turnover 
(cont’d) 
Panel B: Multivariate evidence from sudden deaths  
                 CAR [-1,1]  
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
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Decade controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 80 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Adj. R-squared 0.073 0.237 0.219 0.247 0.306 0.334 0.334 
Consistent with the economic reasoning and the hump-shaped relation between CEO tenure 
and firm value documented above, we find that the sub-sample means of CAR [-1,1] are 
negative for low tenure values, while they are positive for high tenure values. The positive 
stock market reaction to sudden deaths of high-tenure CEOs indicates that a considerable 
fraction of these CEOs is no longer the optimal match for their firms and that governance rather 
than labor market frictions are likely to distort the CEO-firm match. 
Panel B reports additional results from multivariate regressions of CAR [-1,1] on CEO tenure 




time and industry fixed effects. We add controls successively. Specification (1) only includes 
CEO tenure and a constant, specification (2) adds CEO age and firm characteristics, 
specification (3) adds Duality, Founder CEO, and President, some of the most important CEO 
power measures (see Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005), specification (4) adds time fixed 
effects, and specification (5) adds industry fixed effects and a dummy for whether the firm had 
a succession plan (using Nguyen and Nielsen’s (2014) definition). Finally, in specifications (6) 
and (7) we replace CEO tenure by two dummy variables, one for tenure values in the second 
or first tercile, respectively, and one for tenure values in the third tercile of the sample’s 
distribution of CEO tenure. The results of all regressions are consistent with the univariate 
findings and suggest a positive relation between abnormal stock returns to announcements of 
incumbent CEOs’ unexpected deaths and CEO tenure. Hence, long tenure periods are (more) 
negatively perceived by the stock market.  
3.3.2.3. Further tests to address endogenous CEO-firm matching, turnover, and      
            unobserved CEO heterogeneity 
We provide a number of additional robustness tests – beyond CEO sudden deaths – to 
further address concerns of endogenous CEO-firm matching and turnover as well as 
unobserved CEO heterogeneity. Table 3.5 shows results from regressions which take 
heterogeneity across CEOs and the endogenous (initial) CEO-firm match into account. In 
specification (1), we reestimate the baseline regression model from specification (3) of Table 
3.2 excluding the first two years of tenure for each CEO. Over the CEO’s first years in office, 
most uncertainty about CEO quality resolves (Jovanovic, 1979; Pan, Wang, and Weisbach, 
2015). Hence, the skill set of CEOs who survive their first years in office is likely considered 





Table 3.5: CEO heterogeneity and endogenous CEO-firm match: Additional robustness tests 
This table reports results from multivariate regressions of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure and its squared term or CEO tenure/Max CEO tenure and its squared term 
along with CEO, firm and corporate governance characteristics. The sample includes S&P 1500 firms over the period 1998-2011 excluding regulated utility 
and financial firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999). Specifications (1) and (2) show firm fixed effects regression results with additional control variables 
capturing differences between CEOs. These controls are: (i) Education score which is measured on a four-point scale reflecting the highest level of education 
a CEO attained (0 = no college degree or missing, 1 = bachelor’s degree, 2 = master’s degree or MBA, 3 = Ph.D. degree), (ii) Inside CEO which is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if a CEO is classified as an inside CEO according to the definition of Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011), zero otherwise. 
A CEO is considered an insider if the CEO joined the company more than a year before becoming CEO, or if the CEO is classified as the founder of the 
company (Founder CEO), or if the data item “JOINED_CO” is missing, (iii) Ivy League graduate which is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if 
the CEO graduated from an Ivy League college, zero otherwise, (iv) Managerial ability score which is a measure of managerial ability developed by Demerjian, 
Lev, and McVay (2012) (https://community.bus.emory.edu/personal/PDEMERJ/Pages/Download-Data.aspx), (v) Recession graduate which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the CEO entered the labor market during a recession year, zero otherwise. The definition follows Schoar and Zuo (2017). 
Market entry of managers is approximated by the manager’s year of birth plus 24 years. Recession years are based on the business cycle dating database of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Results shown in regression specification (1) are obtained from excluding all observations with CEO tenure 
below two years (i.e., CEO tenure > 1). Specification (2) uses CEO tenure standardized by Max CEO tenure (denoted CEO tenure/Max CEO tenure) and its 
squared term as an alternative, CEO-specific measure of CEO tenure for the sample of firm-year observations for which CEO tenure is > 1. Specifications (3) 
and (4) use CEO-firm fixed effects. Regression results in specification (3) are based on all observations for which CEO tenure is > 1. Specification (4) shows 
regression results for the sample of CEOs who stayed with their firm for at least 9 but no longer than 23 years (i.e., 8 ≤ Max CEO tenure ≤ 22 yrs). All other 
control variables are identical to specification (3) of Table 3.2. Other variables are defined in Appendix 3.B. An intercept is included in all regressions, but not 
reported. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses in specifications (1) and (2) are adjusted for clustering by firm. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses 









               Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
CEO tenure > 1 
(i.e., w/o first two years of tenure) 





   0.0531*** 
(2.846) 
CEO tenure squared -0.0008*** 
(-3.580) 
   -0.0019** 
(-2.476) 












Max CEO tenure  -0.0107 
(-1.194) 
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CEO characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Governance characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  No No 
CEO-firm fixed effects No No  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 10,114 10,114  10,144 5,652 








Consequently, by focusing on these good matches, we mitigate concerns of endogenous CEO-
firm matching, while being able to control for time-varying CEO quality (which may be 
important in the context of this chapter). In this regard, specification (1) includes additional 
controls that capture important differences across CEOs. To account for CEO quality, we use 
the time-varying Managerial ability score proposed by Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012). 
Educational differences are captured by a dummy variable Ivy league graduate, which is set to 
one if a CEO graduated (at any level) from an Ivy league college, and by the variable Education 
score, which is a count variable that takes on the values 0 (no college degree), 1 (Bachelor), 2 
(Master or MBA) and 3 (Ph.D.). We further control for the two dummy variables Recession 
graduate (Schoar and Zuo, 2017) and Inside CEO to account for early-job and firm-specific 
experience. The definition of the latter variable follows Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). 
In specification (2), we use the same approach as before but replace CEO tenure and its squared 
term by the variable CEO tenure/Max CEO tenure and its squared term, i.e., we measure tenure 
as a fraction of the CEO’s maximum realized tenure. This way, we allow life cycles to differ 
across CEOs, which is likely to be a relevant source of CEO heterogeneity in the context. For 
example, CEOs might differ in their ability to learn and adapt and in the amount of time after 
which they run out of new ideas and become more and more obsolete. In specification (3), we 
reestimate specification (2) and use CEO-firm fixed effects as an alternative way of addressing 
unobserved (time-invariant) CEO heterogeneity and endogenous CEO-firm matching.  
Finally, in specification (4), we reestimate specification (1) of Table 3.3 replacing firm fixed 
effects by CEO-firm fixed effects to simultaneously address extrapolation, endogenous 
matching, and CEO heterogeneity. All aforementioned tests confirm the hump-shaped relation 




In the next set of analyses shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, we provide additional tests to address 
concerns of endogenous CEO turnover which might bias or even explain the results. We use 
CEO turnover data as provided by Peters and Wagner (2014) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) 
and apply the authors’ definition of forced turnover. All non-forced turnover of CEOs aged 63 
or older are defined as planned retirements and all remaining turnover are defined as 
unclassified turnover. Panel A of Table 3.6 shows summary statistics for the three types of 
CEO turnover. In line with expectations we find that tenure values at the time of the turnover 
differ significantly across the type of turnover. Particularly, CEOs who were forced out of their 
position only stayed on average for about 4.8 year in office which is significantly less than 
those CEOs who retired as planned according to, for example, a defined corporate age 




Table 3.6: Endogenous CEO turnover: Additional robustness tests (I) 
Panel A presents summary statistics of CEO tenure at the event of CEO turnover for different types of 
CEO turnover. Panel B presents results of a survival model analysis. Regression specification (1) to (4) 
report coefficients of a Cox proportional hazard model for different failure events as described at the 
top of each column. In regression specification (1) the failure event equals CEO turnover. CEO turnover 
is an indicator variable equal to one if there is a change in the CEO position in year t+1 for any reason. 
In regression specification (2), the failure event equals Forced turnover which is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the turnover is classified as forced according to Peters and Wagner (2014) and Jenter 
and Kanaan (2015) who provided the data. In specification (3), the failure event is Planned retirement. 
Planned retirement is an indicator variable that is set to one if the turnover is not classified as forced 
and the CEO is 63 years or older. Specification (4) shows results for the failure event of an Unclassified 
turnover. Unclassified turnover is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the CEO turnover 
is not classified as a forced turnover or as a planned retirement. CEO of retirement age is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the age of the CEO is between 63 and 66 years, zero otherwise. 
Stock return is the one-year buy-and-hold return calculated from monthly returns. If not stated 
otherwise, control variables are for year t. Year and industry-fixed effects (based on Fama-French 48 
industry classification) are included in specifications (1) to (4) of Panel B. Panel C reports results of 
firm fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure, its squared term, and controls for the 
probability of different CEO turnover types, i.e., the respective hazard rates obtained from the 
regressions shown in Panel B. Specifications (1), (3), (5) and (7) control for the predicted hazard rate. 
Specifications (2), (4), (6) and (8) additionally control for the squared term of the hazard rate from Panel 
B. All other control variables in Panel C are identical to those used in specification (3) of Table 3.2. All 
other variables are defined in Appendix 3.B. An intercept and year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in 

















Panel A: Max CEO tenure at CEO turnover       
 Obs. Mean Median 1. Quartile 3. Quartile SD 
Forced turnover  263 4.77 4.00 1.00 6.00 4.97 
Forced turnover w/o honeymoon leaver CEOs 164 6.99 5.00 4.00 8.00 5.13 
       Planned retirement 368 12.25 10.00 6.00 18.00 10.80 
Planned retirement w/o honeymoon leaver CEOs 327 14.76 11.00 7.00 20.00 10.52 
       Unclassified turnover 471 8.53 7.00 4.00 12.00 6.47 




Table 3.6: Endogenous CEO turnover: Additional robustness tests (I) (cont’d)
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Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,514 10,514 10,514 10,514 





Table 3.6: Endogenous CEO turnover: Additional robustness tests (I) (cont’d) 
Panel C: Controlling for CEO turnover probability   




Forced CEO turnovert+1 
 
Planned CEO turnovert+1 
 Unclassified CEO 
turnovert+1 
(1)  (2)   (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
















































Hazard rate squared  0.0001*** 
(3.883) 
  0.0000*** 
(6.579) 
  0.0002** 
(2.499) 
  0.0000** 
(2.279) 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Governance characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 10,514 10,514  10,514 10,514  10,514 10,514  10,514 10,514 







We first address the possible bias due to endogeneity of turnover and the concern that the hump-
shaped relation between CEO tenure and firm value might simply reflect varying managerial 
incentive structures as job security of many CEOs might increase over the early years of tenure, 
but decrease afterwards. In this regard, Cziraki and Groen-Xu (2017) find that job security 
affects corporate risk-taking and investments (which could affect firm value). Therefore, in a 
first step we perform a survival analysis using a Cox hazard model with CEO turnover and all 
three types of CEO turnover as failure events. The results are shown in Panel B of Table 3.6.  
Turnover refers to the next year (t+1). As can be seen from Panel B, all types of turnover are 
less likely if the CEO has more power or if she is the founder of the company, while turnover 
probability is higher when the board is more independent. Furthermore, higher firm value and 
accounting performance reduce the likelihood of forced turnover. These results are in line with 
the literature. In a second step, we run the baseline regression model from specification (3) of 
Table 3.2 and additionally include the resulting hazard rate (for each type of turnover), or the 
hazard rate and its squared term, to account for the endogeneity of turnover and for CEO job 
security. The results, shown in Panel C of Table 3.6, remain qualitatively similar.  
Table 3.7 provides further analyses to address concerns of endogenous CEO turnover. All tests 
use the baseline regression model shown in specification (3) of Table 3.2. First, the hump-
shaped relation between CEO tenure and firm value might be the outcome of performance 
patterns around CEO turnover, especially forced turnover (e.g., Denis and Denis, 1995; Jenter 
and Kanaan, 2015) in conjunction with the use of firm fixed effects. In this regard, Huson, 
Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) and Taylor (2010) show that firm profitability tends to decline 
in the two years prior to forced CEO turnover and increases in the two years after a new CEO 




Table 3.7: Endogenous CEO turnover: Additional robustness tests (II) 
This table reports results from firm fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure and its squared term along with CEO, firm and corporate governance 
characteristics. The sample includes S&P 1500 firms over the period 1998-2011 excluding regulated utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-
6999). Regression specification (1) controls for the different types of CEO turnover and excludes the last observation for each firm. Specification (2) excludes 
firm-year observations in the [-2, 2]-year window around a forced CEO turnover, while specification (3) excludes firm-year observations in the [-2, 2]-year 
window around an unclassified CEO turnover. Specification (4) excludes all firm-year observations for which the CEO’s age exceeds the general retirement age 
of 65 years. Specification (5) restricts the sample to S&P 500 companies. Specification (6) restricts the sample to relatively wealthy, better compensated CEOs 
for which Cumulative total CEO compensation is above the sample median. Cumulative total CEO compensation is the sum of the value of total annual 
compensation (ExecuComp item “TDC1”) the CEO has received over her tenure until the end of the fiscal year (standardized by CEO tenure). Values of total 
annual compensation before 2006 are adjusted following the methodology in Walker (2011). Specification (7) excludes firms that have been identified as takeover 
targets. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.B. An intercept is included in all regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Turnover controls        
Forced turnover -0.2171*** 
(-3.794) 
      
Planned retirement 0.0373 
(0.780) 
      
Unclassified turnover 0.0332 
(0.455) 
      
CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governance characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,644 11,369 10,477 3,994 11,462 6,238 11,690 





As Figure 3.4 illustrates, we find a similar pattern for Tobin’s Q around forced turnover while 
we find no pattern for planned retirements, and a decline in firm value for the group of 
unclassified turnover (likely due to voluntary or health-related turnover of CEOs with good 
performance).  
Figure 3.4: Firm value around CEO turnover 
This figure illustrates how firm value (Tobin’s Q) changes in the years around CEO turnover. The event 
window ranges from two years prior (t-2) to two years after (t+2) CEO turnover for three different types 
of CEO turnover. Forced turnover is defined according to Peters and Wagner (2014) and Jenter and 
Kanaan (2015) who provided the data. Planned retirement is defined as any non-forced turnover of a 
CEO who is 63 years or older. Unclassified turnover is defined as any turnover not classified as a forced 











To address this concern, in specification (1) we use three dummy variables to control for CEO 
turnover. In specifications (2) and (3), we exclude from the sample all firm-year observations 
in the five-year event window starting two years prior to and ending two years after forced or 




firm value might simply be attributed to CEO or firm survival. Specifically, it might reflect 
that CEOs with very good performance get recruited to run bigger companies (Fee and 
Hadlock, 2003), while CEOs with relatively poor performance remain with their firms. The 
latter may still survive for longer time periods through entrenchment in poorly governed firms 
and, probably, due to a lack of succession planning. A similar argument is that successful CEOs 
receive larger compensation and accumulate more wealth resulting in higher opportunity costs 
of work and earlier retirement. The acquisition of a company, which is usually associated with 
high returns (see, e.g., Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001) while terminating the CEO’s 
tenure with this company through the subsequent delisting of the target firm, may also cause 
part of the effect. We consider different sub-samples to address these concerns. In specification 
(4), we restrict the sample to S&P 500 companies as CEOs of these very large companies are 
less likely to get recruited to run even bigger firms.34 The focus on the 500 leading U.S. 
companies also reduces heterogeneity with respect to CEO talent and pay and mitigates 
concerns of succession problems. In specification (5), we exclude CEOs who have exceeded 
the typical retirement age of 65 years. These CEOs are more likely to lead companies that lack 
CEO succession plans, while at the same time they have fewer, if any, career concerns. In 
specification (6), we focus on wealthier CEOs, i.e., those with a cumulative total CEO 
compensation (relative to their tenure) above the median. Finally, in specification (7) we 
exclude firms that have become takeover targets over the sample period. The results of all 
aforementioned tests confirm the main finding from Section 3.3.1.  
 
                                                 
34 Consistent with the general theoretical framework, we find that for the large and well-known S&P 500 
companies, which are more likely to find and successfully recruit CEO candidates, firm value starts to decline 
after about 15 years of tenure, later than for the average S&P 1500 company. However, consistent with the results 
for sudden deaths, the finding that the relation between CEO tenure and firm value remains hump-shaped even 
for the large S&P 500 firms suggests that corporate governance rather than labor market frictions distort the 
optimal match between CEOs and firms, i.e., incumbent CEOs seem to overstay likely due to power and 




3.3.2.3. Alternative explanations 
As another set of robustness tests, shown in Appendix 3.C, we attempt to rule out a 
number of alternative explanations. First, CEO tenure and CEO tenure squared may simply 
pick up the effect of a non-linear relation between CEO age or firm age and firm value. Hence, 
in specifications (1) and (2), we add CEO age squared and Firm age squared as an additional 
control variable to the baseline regression model (as reported in specification (3) of Table 3.2), 
respectively. When we use a firm’s foundation age (obtained from The Corporate Library) 
instead of its age since IPO in unreported regressions, the result remains qualitatively similar. 
Second, CEO tenure and its squared term may simply capture a hump-shaped relation between 
CEO power and firm value as power grows with longer tenure and as it may have both costs 
and benefits (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005; Li, Lu, and Phillips, 2017; Sah and Stiglitz, 
1986). Hence, in specification (3), we add the squared term of CEO power index to the standard 
regression. Third, in specification (4), we additionally control for Board age and its squared 
term which might correlate with a CEO’s tenure and affect firm value. Fourth, Huang (2013) 
reports a hump-shaped relation between outside director tenure and firm value. As director 
tenure may correlate with CEO tenure, in specification (5), we extend the baseline model to 
include Outside director tenure and its squared term. Finally, in specification (6) we include 
all these additional explanatory variables simultaneously. We find the hump-shaped relation 
between CEO tenure and firm value to hold across all six regressions. 
We investigate further alternative explanations in Appendix 3.D. As shown in Pan, Wang, and 
Weisbach (2016), while firms’ disinvestments decrease over CEO tenure, investments increase 
but with decreasing quality. Under the assumption that disinvestments efficiently reshape the 
firm, the hump-shaped relation between CEO tenure and firm value might just reflect this 




for in all of the regressions, in specification (1), we include additional controls for firms’ 
acquisition and divestiture activities. Specifically, we use the dummy variables Acquisition and 
Divestiture set to one if a firm undertakes an M&A transaction or a divestiture in a given year. 
In specification (2), we control for CEO ownership and its square to address a potential hump 
shape of equity ownership and firm value (e.g., McConnell and Servaes, 1990). We 
alternatively include the CEO’s fraction of variable to total compensation and its squared term 
in specification (3). Finally, in specification (4) we control for CEOs’ wealth-performance 
sensitivity using the data from Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009). Specification (5) shows 
the regression results where we include all additional controls simultaneously. Again, we find 
the results to hold across all regression specifications with all coefficients on CEO tenure and 
CEO tenure squared being statistically significant. 
3.3.2.4. Further robustness tests  
As an additional test on whether the relation between CEO tenure and firm value is 
hump shaped, we reestimate the baseline regression model from specification (3) of Table 3.2 
and replace CEO tenure and its squared term by the indicator variable CEO tenure plateau [11-
13], which is set to one for firm-year observations for which CEO tenure takes on values 
between 11 and 13. The regression results are shown in Appendix 3.E. Consistent with the 
results in Section 3.3.1 and the hump-shaped tenure-firm value relation, we find that the 
coefficient for CEO tenure plateau [11-13] is statistically significant and positive in regression 
specification (1), where we use firm fixed effects, and in specification (2), where we use CEO-
firm fixed effects instead. 
As a final robustness test on the main results, we replace Tobin’s Q by return on assets (ROA) 
as an accounting (i.e., non-forward looking) measure of firm performance. The results are 




Table 3.2 (i.e., with industry*year fixed effects) and use firm fixed effects in specification (1) 
and CEO-firm fixed effects in specification (2). The results are consistent with the previously 
documented hump-shaped relation between CEO tenure and firm value.  
3.3.3. Complementary evidence from corporate investment decisions  
In this section, we present additional complementary evidence from corporate 
investment and disinvestment decisions to provide the reader with a better understanding of 
the relation between CEO tenure and firm value. In a first step, we investigate a major channel 
through which CEOs can create and destroy firm value, acquisitions. The hump-shaped relation 
between CEO tenure and firm value is likely to be driven and reflected by CEOs’ investment 
decisions. Specifically, over the early years of tenure those CEOs with a non-optimal skill set 
and fit who are likely associated with less successful investment decisions are more likely to 
be fired by the board of directors. As eventually CEOs’ fit with their firms deteriorates in longer 
tenure, and CEOs become increasingly entrenched and reluctant to change, we expect 
investment decisions to become worse. Thus, consistent with the general theoretical 
framework, we expect to find a hump-shaped relation between CEO tenure and abnormal stock 
returns in reaction to acquisition announcements. An analysis of announcement returns allows 
for a straightforward market-based assessment of the quality of CEOs’ investment decisions. 
In this regard, acquisitions are an ideal setting to study the quality of CEOs’ decisions as they 
are among the largest and most easily observable investments which tend to be directly 
influenced by CEOs (see, e.g., Custódio and Metzger, 2013).  
We compile a dataset of acquisitions announced by the sample firms during the period 1998-
2011. Data on mergers and acquisitions stem from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database. We 
only include takeovers with a total transaction value of at least 5 million US dollars in which a 




transaction’s total value to represent at least 5% of the acquirer’s market capitalization 20 days 
prior to deal announcement. These filters result in 2,171 acquisitions made by 1,148 distinct 
firms for which the basic control variables (those typically used in the M&A literature) are 
available. The sample is reduced to 1,526 acquisitions made by 806 distinct firms when we use 
the same control variables as in Section 3.3.1.  
We measure acquirer announcement returns over the three-day event window from one day 
before to one day after the event date (CAR [-1,1]), defined as the day of the acquisition 
announcement in Capital IQ (or the first trading day thereafter if the announcement was made 
on a non-trading day). Cumulative abnormal announcement returns are calculated using the 
market model with the S&P 500 market index. In addition to the firm characteristics used in 
Section 3.3.1, we also control for deal characteristics following previous research (e.g., 
Custódio and Metzger, 2013; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). They include the 
payment method, target ownership status, relative deal size, industry relatedness, geographic 
relatedness, and whether the acquisition is hostile. We further control for the number of an 
acquirer’s previous deals in the last five years to account for acquisition experience and the 








                                                 
35 Mean values of the control variables for deal characteristics are not reported for brevity. They are in line with 
previous research. For example, relative deal size is 25% and the fraction of public targets is 36%. Custódio and 




Table 3.8:  Channels (I): Evidence from acquisitions 
This table presents results from regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR [-1,1]) and 
eleven-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR [-5,5]) around acquisition announcements on CEO 
tenure and its squared term along with CEO, acquirer (including corporate governance) and deal 
characteristics. To estimate abnormal returns, we use the market model with the S&P 500 index as a 
proxy for the market portfolio. Cross-border is a dummy variable whether a deal is cross-border, and 
zero for domestic deals. Hostile is a dummy variable that is set to one for deals defined by Capital IQ 
as hostile deals, zero otherwise. Market-to-book is the acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio defined as 
the acquirer’s market capitalization 20 trading days prior to deal announcement divided by the 
acquirer´s common equity as of the end of the fiscal year prior the announcement of the M&A deal. 
Number previous deals is the number of acquisitions made by the acquirer in the 5 years prior to deal 
announcement. Payment includes stock is a dummy variable that equals one if the consideration 
includes stock, and zero otherwise. Public target is dummy variable that equals one if the target firm is 
a listed company, and zero otherwise. Relative size is the deal’s total transaction value divided by the 
acquirer’s market capitalization 20 days prior to the announcement of the deal. Same industry is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target belong to the same two-digit SIC industry, 
and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the Appendix 3.B. Regression specification (1) 
includes year and industry fixed effects (based on Fama-French 48 industries), while specifications (2) 
to (5) include year and firm fixed effects. Robust t-statistics of the regression coefficients (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by acquirer. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
                      CAR[-1,1]  CAR[-5,5] 
Relative size: ≥ 5%  ≥ 5% ≥ 5% ≥10%  ≥ 5% 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
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Table 3.8:  Channels (I): Evidence from acquisitions (cont’d) 
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Industry fixed effects Yes  No No No  No 
Firm fixed effects No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 2,171  2,171 1,526 922  1,526 
 
Specifications (1) and (2) of Table 3.8 report the results from regressions of CAR [-1,1] on 
CEO tenure, CEO tenure squared, deal characteristics, a limited set of acquirer characteristics, 
and year fixed effects. Specification (1) uses industry fixed effects (in order to make the results 
more comparable to the M&A literature), while specification (2) uses firm fixed effects. In 
specifications (3) and (4) the extended set of control variables and firm fixed effects are used. 
The first three specifications report the results for the sample of acquisitions whose total 
transaction value represents at least 5% of the acquirer’s market capitalization, while 
specification (4) reports the results for acquisitions with a relative size of at least 10%. 
Additionally, specification (5) uses CAR [-5,5] instead of CAR [-1,1] as the dependent variable 




shaped relation between CEO tenure and acquisition announcement returns. Consistent with 
the results on the relation between CEO tenure and firm value, we find the turning point of 
CEO tenure to be located in the area of 8.5-14 years when firm fixed effects are used. This 
evidence is consistent with the notion that high-tenure CEOs have lost too much of their fit 
with the company and are entrenched, and thus select non-optimal takeover targets (e.g., those 
with relatively low synergies or low growth prospects). Empire building (Jensen, 1986) or 
attempts to diversify the personal portfolio (Amihud and Lev, 1981) may aggravate this 
problem. Overall, the relatively lower returns to acquisition announcements associated with 
very short or very long CEO tenure support the CEO life cycle we posit.  
In a second step, we provide an analysis of corporate disinvestments and CEO tenure. 
Economic theory suggests that over their tenure CEOs become reluctant to change and to 
reverse earlier (investment) decisions (e.g., Miller, 1991; Boot, 1992; Prendergast and Stole, 
1996), which will make them less responsive and probably also less adaptable to changes. 
Coupled with increasing power and entrenchment, unresponsive CEO behavior may make the 
increasing likelihood of a mismatch between CEOs’ skill sets and their firms’ skill needs due 
to the evolution of the economy and its industries an even more severe problem. For example, 
high-tenure CEOs may be likely to divest less than necessary when their industry evolves 
which likely demands changes to affected firms’ technologies. We therefore test whether the 
probability of corporate divestitures decreases with CEO tenure. The regression results are 
shown in Table 3.9. Supporting Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016), we find that corporate 
divestitures become less likely over CEOs’ time in office. In addition, consistent with high-
tenure CEOs being reluctant to make necessary changes to their companies, we further find 





Table 3.9: Channels (II): Evidence from corporate disinvestments 
This table reports results from firm fixed effects regressions (regression specification 1) and conditional 
logistic firm fixed effects regressions (specifications 2 to 4) of the indicator variable Divestiture on CEO 
tenure along with CEO, firm and corporate governance characteristics. The sample includes S&P 1500 
firms over the period 1998-2011 excluding regulated utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 
and 6000-6999). CEO tenure [0, 2] is a dummy variable that equals one for the first three years of a 
CEO’s tenure, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 3.B. An intercept and year 
fixed effects are included in all regressions, but not reported. For regression specification (1), robust t-
statistics adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
           Prob (Divestiture) 
 
 CEO tenure  
≤ median 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 







CEO tenure [0, 2]    0.2171* 
(1.8128) 
CEO characteristics     




























Firm characteristics     








































































Governance characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,427 4,740 4,740 2,204 
R-squared (within)/  
Log likelihood 





3.4. Heterogeneity of the Relation between CEO tenure and Firm value 
In this section, we examine the heterogeneity of the relation between CEO tenure and 
firm value. On the one hand, the analyses and results we present in the following aim at 
providing a better understanding of the tenure-firm value relation. On the other hand, they 
constitute tests of the general theoretical framework. With regard to this framework, we study 
the role of industry dynamics and general economic dynamism, which alter firms’ managerial 
skill needs, as well as CEOs’ abilities to adapt to changes to their firms’ business environments.  
In a first step, we examine firms’ industry dynamics, i.e., how fast industries evolve. We make 
the reasonable assumption that firms’ managerial skill needs are more (less) likely to change if 
firms operate in more (less) dynamic industries. Further, firms in dynamic industries may also 
find it harder to identify new CEO candidates with better suited skills sets because predicting 
the optimal skill set demands can be more difficult and because CEO candidates may have 
preferences to work in more stable economic environments. As a consequence, the more (less) 
dynamic a firm’s industry, the more (less) likely and the faster (slower) will a CEO’s skill set 
become less optimal for the firm. Thus, relative to the average S&P 1500 firm we expect to 
find that CEO tenure is associated with declining firm value at relatively lower (higher) tenure 
levels if the firm’s industry is more (less) dynamic. Put differently, the relation between CEO 
tenure and firm value is less (more) likely to be hump shaped and more (less) likely to be 
positive if firms are subject to low (high) dynamism. 
To measure firms’ industry dynamics, we use the industry dynamism index proposed by Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2015). The index is defined as the sum of the following four indicator 
variables: (i) a dummy whether the average annual sales growth of all firms in the industry is 
above the 50th percentile, (ii) a dummy whether the average R&D expenses to total assets at 




scores of Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) is above the 50th percentile, and (iv) a dummy 
whether the number of mergers in the industry divided by the number of firms in the industry 
(e.g., Harford, 2005) is above the 50th percentile. Industries are defined based on the three-digit 
SIC codes. The index takes on discrete values between 0 and 4 (with a median value of 2) with 
higher values indicating higher industry dynamism. The results from reestimating the baseline 
regression model from specification (3) of Table 3.2 for sub-samples based on whether industry 
dynamism is high or low are reported in Panel A of Table 3.10. Specification (1) reports the 
results for firm-years with a dynamism index above the median (i.e., more dynamic settings), 
while specification (2) reports the results for firm-years with a dynamism index below or equal 
to the median (i.e., less dynamic industries). We provide additional evidence in Panel B of 
Table 3.10 where we use each component of the dynamism index to compare more to less 
dynamic industry settings. 
The results support the expectations. While on average firm value is estimated to peak (i.e., 
starts to decline) after about 12.2 years of CEO tenure in the baseline regression model (Table 
3.2), we find that firm value peaks much earlier, namely after 8.6 years (or 30% earlier), for 
firms with above median industry dynamism and is estimated to peak much later, after 13.8 
years (or 13% later), for firms with below median dynamism. The overall difference in the 
turning point of firm value amounts to 5.2 years, an economically meaningful variation. When 
we use the components of the dynamism index, in Panel B, the results are confirmed and we 
find firm value to peak at even higher tenure levels for some low-dynamism firms suggesting 
that the relation between CEO tenure and firm value becomes less likely to resemble a hump 
shape (as expected). Yet, for all four low-dynamism sub-samples we test whether the relation 
can also be described by a positive logarithmic function of CEO tenure and find that this is 




indicate that heterogeneity with respect to firms’ industry dynamics plays an important role for 
the tenure-firm value relation. 
Table 3.10: Industry dynamics and the relation between firm value and CEO tenure 
This table presents results from firm fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure and its 
squared term along with CEO, firm and corporate governance characteristics for different industries. 
The sample includes S&P 1500 firms over the period 1998-2011 excluding regulated financial and 
utility firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999). Panel A reports regression results for samples of 
more versus less dynamic industries. Industry dynamism is measured via the industry dynamism index 
proposed by Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2015). Industries are defined based on three-digit SIC clusters. 
Dynamism index is defined as the sum of the following four indicator variables: (i) R&D industry that 
equals one if the average R&D expenses to total assets at the industry level is above the 75th percentile, 
zero otherwise, (ii) Merger industry that is set to one if the number of mergers in the industry divided 
by the number of firms in the industry (e.g., Harford, 2005) is above the 50th percentile, zero otherwise, 
(iii) Growth industry that equals one if the average annual sales growth of all firms in the industry is 
above the 50th percentile, zero otherwise, and (iv) Fluidity industry which is set to one if the average of 
the fluidity scores of Hoberg, Philips, and Prabhala (2014) is above the 50th percentile, zero otherwise. 
The index takes on discrete values between 0 and 4, where higher values indicate higher industry 
dynamism. Panel B shows regression results for samples based on each of the four index components. 
The number of observations used for the analyses in Panel B can vary due to data availability. Absolute 
and relative changes at the bottom of each panel are calculated with respect the turning point of 12.2 
years obtained from regression (3) of Table 3.2. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.B. Control 
variables are identical to those used in specification (3) of Table 3.2. An intercept and year fixed effects 
are included in all regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by Fama-
French 48 industry clusters are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Dynamism index (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2015) 
                   Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) 











CEO characteristics Yes Yes 
Governance characteristics Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 3,476 8,846 
R-squared (within) 0.374 0.394 
Turning point 8.6 13.8 
Absolute change (yrs) - 3.6 + 1.6 






Table 3.10: Industry dynamics and the relation between firm value and CEO tenure (cont’d) 
Panel B: Dynamism index components  
 Tobin's Q 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 





































CEO characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Governance charac. Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 3,911 8,516  6,820 5,607  6,161 6,266  5,207 7,220 
R-squared (within) 0.365 0.392  0.304 0.393  0.351 0.290  0.331 0.390 
Turning point 10.3 15.0  10.2 18.0  8.3 18.9  10.3 - 
Absolute change (yrs) - 1.9 + 2.8  - 2.0 + 5.8  - 3.9 + 6.7  - 1.9 - 








In a second step, we examine differences across the business cycle. During recessions, 
economic activity, technological progress, and industry dynamism typically slow down. 
Further, competition for CEOs is likely to be lower when the economy does not do well, which 
facilitates replacing CEOs by candidates with better fit. Accordingly, similar to the previous 
results shown in Table 3.10, we expect that relative to the average S&P 1500 company firm 
value will peak at higher levels of CEO tenure during recessions, when CEOs skill sets are less 
likely to lose their fit with firms’ skill needs, and at lower levels during non-recession years. 
To test this prediction, we define an indicator Recession that equals 1 if the observation year is 
classified as a recession year according to the NBER Business Cycle Expansions and 
Contractions data (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The results, shown in Table 3.11, provide 
empirical support for the expectation. We find a hump-shaped relation between CEO tenure 
and firm value for both non-recession and recession years. However, in specification (1), where 
we only consider non-recession years, we estimate the turning point of firm value to be at 10.2 
years of tenure, 20% lower than for the average firm, while in specification (2), which is limited 
to recession years only, firm value is estimated to peak around 14.8 years of tenure, i.e., 21% 
later. Again, this variation is economically meaningful. Thus, heterogeneity with regard to the 













Table 3.11: The business cycle and the relation between firm value and CEO tenure 
This table reports results – for recession vs. non-recession years – from firm fixed effects regressions 
of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure and its squared term along with CEO, firm and corporate governance 
characteristics. The sample includes S&P 1500 firms over the period 1998-2011 excluding regulated 
utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999). Regression specification (1) shows 
results for non-recession years (i.e., the indicator variable Recession equals 0), while specification (2) 
shows results for recession years (i.e., the variable Recession equals 1). Recession is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the observation year is classified as a recession year according to the NBER 
Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions data (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). All other years 
are defined as non-recession years. All other variables are defined in Appendix 3.B. In Panel A, robust 
t-statistics adjusted for clustering by industry (Fama French 48 industry classification) are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
         Tobin’s Q 
 Recession = 0 Recession = 1 











CEO characteristics Yes Yes 
Governance characteristics Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 9,603 2,824 
R-squared (within) 0.299 0.446 
Turning point (yrs) 10.2 14.8 
Absolute change (yrs) -2.0 + 2.6 





In a last step, we consider CEOs’ abilities to adapt to changes in firms’ economic environment. 
For those firms that employ adaptable CEOs, who are less likely to lose their fit with the 
company, the relation between CEO tenure and firm value is more likely to be positive (instead 
of hump shaped), i.e., firm value will likely peak at much higher levels of CEO tenure as it 
needs more or more drastic changes to render an adaptable CEO’s skill set non-optimal. To 
measure CEO adaptability, we use Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos’s (2013) general ability 
index, which encompasses managerial work experience in different firms, industries and 
positions. Because of their broad managerial experience, we expect generalists to be better able 
to adapt to changes and to be more capable of learning new concepts and solving new problems. 
This expectation is consistent with Guay, Taylor, and Xiao (2015) who find that CEOs with 
more general managerial ability are less likely to be fired when their firms are hit by industry 
shocks. The results, shown in Table 3.12, support the expectation. We use the indicator variable 
Generalist CEO, which equals one if the general ability index is above the annual median value 
for the respective year, and interact it with CEO tenure and its squared term in specification 
(1). We find that non-generalist CEOs are associated with a hump-shaped relation between 
CEO tenure and firm value which is estimated to peak after 10.3 years. For generalist CEOs, 
however, we find a positive interaction term with CEO tenure squared which suggests that firm 
value starts to decline much later. Consistently, in specifications (2) and (3) we find no hump 
shape, but rather a positive tenure-firm value relation for generalists.36 These findings support 
the general framework and the existing literature on generalist CEOs and indicate that 
adaptability is an important CEO attribute. 
 
 
                                                 





Table 3.12: Adaptable CEOs and the relation between firm value and CEO tenure 
This table reports results from firm fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure and its squared 
term or the natural logarithm of CEO tenure (denoted ln(CEO tenure)) along with CEO, firm and 
corporate governance characteristics. The sample includes S&P 1500 firms over the period 1998-2011 
excluding regulated utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999). Specification (1) 
shows regression results with interaction effects for generalist CEOs. Generalist CEO is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the General Ability Index (Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos, 2013) 
is above the annual median value for the respective year, zero otherwise. The data is retrieved directly 
from the website of the Journal of Financial Economics. The index is available until 2007. Missing index 
values for the years 2008 to 2011 are filled with the latest available index value of the respective CEO-
firm pair. Specifications (2) and (3) show regression results for the sample of Generalist CEOs. 
Specification (2) uses CEO tenure and its squared term as the functional form for the relation between 
CEO tenure and Tobin’s Q, while specification (3) uses ln(CEO tenure). All other variables are defined 
in Appendix 3.B. Control variables are identical to those used in specification (3) of Table 3.2. An 
intercept and year fixed effects are included in all regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics 
adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.    
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 All CEOs Generalist CEOs 
    














CEO tenure * Generalist CEO -0.0088 
(-0.764) 
  





Generalist CEO -0.0209 
(-0.410) 
  
CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Governance characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,234 5,147 5,147 
R-squared (within) 0.289 0.313 0.313 
Test of linear hypothesis  
(CEO tenure squared + CEO tenure 
squared * Generalist = 0) 
F-statistic 









3.5. Conclusion  
In this chapter, we examine whether CEOs’ impact on the firms they run varies over 
their tenure and which factors render CEOs more or less valuable over time. Consistent with a 
general theoretical framework that considers environmental dynamics, we document a hump-
shaped relation between CEO tenure and firm value for the average S&P 1500 company using 
both parametric and semi-parametric estimations. This relation is robust to a battery of 
robustness tests, including CEO sudden deaths, and is subject to economically meaningful 
variation depending on industry dynamics, the business cycle, and CEOs’ adaptability to 
changes. We provide further results for corporate investment decisions consistent with the 
hump-shaped tenure-firm value relation. In all, the evidence we provide suggests that a 
considerable fraction of high-tenure CEOs is no longer the optimal match for their firms and 
that these firms seem to have difficulties, apparently due to corporate governance frictions, 
replacing the incumbent CEOs with candidates who have better fitting skill sets. 
The results presented in this chapter help explain why even very successful CEOs can be 
associated with declining firm value after some point in time. They suggest that firms should 
be careful with granting CEOs additional power as rewards for good performance as this makes 
it harder to replace the CEO if the fit deteriorates in the future. Results also suggest that regular 
CEO turnover can be valuable for shareholders, but they do not support a one-size-fits-all 
policy of CEO term limits. The board of directors should rather frequently monitor the CEO’s 
fit with the firm and have the flexibility to react to changes in firm’s skill needs and to make 
CEO contract extensions more dependent on actual CEO-firm fit and less on past performance. 
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Chapter 4 – On the Choice of Board Leadership Structure: 
Evidence from a Mandatory Disclosure Regulation 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Probably the most contentious issue in corporate governance, in both academia and 
practice, is whether the chief executive officer (CEO) of a corporation should simultaneously 
serve as the chairman of the board of directors (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, and Dalton, 2007; 
Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). Increasing pressure from governance experts and 
shareholders has led to a significant trend in board leadership structure towards the separation 
of the two positions over recent years. However, today still more than half of the S&P500 
companies (52%) combine the CEO and chairman position (see e.g., Spencer Stuart, 2016), 
while only about 27% of corporate boards are led by an independent chairman. This raises the 
questions to why firms actually choose a combined or a separate leadership structure and what 
are the reasons of corporate boards behind their choice of board leadership structure? 
Using a 2009 regulatory change in corporate disclosure requirements on board leadership 
structure by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a set of hand-collected new 
information on the rationales of board leadership structure decisions of large public companies, 
the chapter presents a novel approach for understanding leadership structure decisions of public 
companies by examining the endogenous motives of board leadership structure choices. The 
chapter systematically identifies the yet unobserved rationales of large U.S. S&P 500 
companies for the decision to combine or separate the CEO and chairman position, as disclosed 
by the companies themselves, and further analyzes investors’ stock market reactions following 




While agency theory argues that combining the CEO and chairman position is detrimental for 
shareholders as CEO duality fosters managerial entrenchment which leads to impaired 
monitoring and governance effectiveness (see e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993), 
proponents of organization theory emphasize that vesting the two roles in a single person leads 
to superior performance as the increase in managerial discretion and the promotion of clear and 
consistent managerial leadership facilitates effective decision-making by the CEO and reduces 
additional information sharing and coordination costs between the CEO and the chairman (see 
e.g., Boyd, 1995; Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997). Despite extensive research on the effects 
of board leadership structure decisions, the empirical evidence on the consequences of board 
leadership structure with respect to managerial entrenchment, risk taking and corporate 
performance is mixed and rather inconclusive (see e.g., Dalton et al. 1998 for a meta-analysis 
or Krause, Semandeni, and Cannella, 2014 for a recent review of the literature). 
Endogeneity issues related to the choice of governance and leadership structures generally 
exacerbate reliable inference about the effects and quality of firms’ governance and leadership 
structure decisions (see e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 
2010; Roberts and Whited, 2013). Understanding the endogenous choice of board leadership 
structure necessitates the knowledge about the unobserved rationales behind the decision of 
corporate boards to either combine or separate the CEO and chairman position. While firms 
might choose on average their value-maximizing leadership structure, heterogeneity in the 
endogenous reasoning for the decision can be important for investors in assessing the firms’ 
board leadership structure decisions as some firms may have good motives for their leadership 
structure choice while others may have no or rather inappropriate motives. The academic 
research on the determinants of board leadership structure decisions is very limited and so far 
there is no systematic evidence on the firms’ reasons behind their decision to combine or 




In December 2009, the SEC issued a new disclosure rule to Item 407 (h) of Regulation S-K to 
increase transparency on board leadership structure decisions of corporate boards. The new 
disclosure regulation which was effective from February 28th, 2010 requires public U.S. 
companies to provide information about the company’s board leadership structure in a separate 
section in the firm’s proxy statement.37 In particular, the disclosure regulation requires firms to 
disclose the rationales behind their decision to combine or separate the positions of the CEO 
and the chairman, and the reasons why the board of directors believes that the leadership 
structure is the most appropriate leadership structure for the company at the time. 
For a sample of 447 companies of the S&P500 index which consists of 282 firms with a 
combined leadership structure and 165 firms with a separate board leadership structure, we 
manually collect the individual disclosed rationales from the firms’ proxy statement which was 
filed with the SEC within a one year time period after the new disclosure regulation became 
effective. Overall, we identify 24 distinct reasons for firms that combine the CEO and chairman 
position, and a total of 22 individual reasons for firms with a separate leadership structure.  
Firms that combine the CEO and chairman position most frequently disclose rationales 
consistent with organization theory that emphasizes the benefits of a combined leadership 
structure. For example, firms typically state that the combined leadership structure is chosen 
because it promotes clear, strong and consistent leadership (“Unified leadership”), it allows the 
firm to leverage the CEO’s in-depth knowledge about the company’s operations which best 
positions her to act as the chairman (“Knowledge as CEO”), it enables the CEO act as a bridge 
between management and the board to facilitate the information flow (“Bridge between 
management and board”), the leadership structure contributes to an efficient and effective 
                                                 
37 SEC Release No. 33-9089; 34-61175 (“Proxy Disclosure Enhancements”), December 16, 2009, is available at 
www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-9089.pdf. The rules apply to proxy and information statements, annual reports 
and registration statements under the Exchange Act, and registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933 




functioning of the board (“Efficiency and effectiveness of board”), or because the combined 
structure has served the company and its shareholders well in the past (“Leadership structure 
has served well”). Firms with a separate leadership structure, on the contrary, make frequently 
use of reasons that are largely consistent with agency theory. Firms usually state that their 
leadership structure has been chosen to account for the inherent differences between the tasks 
and roles of the CEO and chairman (“Differences between tasks/roles”), because it facilitates 
the monitoring of the CEO and management (“Facilitates monitoring”), it allows the CEO to 
focus on managing the day-to-day operations of the company (“CEO can focus on 
management”) or because the structure promotes the use of the chair’s knowledge and 
experience with the company (“Chair’s experience with the company”). 
Using two-day abnormal returns following the disclosure of the firms’ leadership structure 
reasons, the chapter analyzes investor reactions to individual leadership reasons - separately 
for firms with a combined or separate leadership structure. Cross-sectional regressions from 
two-day announcement returns on the five most frequently stated reasons for both leadership 
subsamples yield overall insignificant estimates for the majority of leadership reasons. The 
cross-sectional results, however, indicate that the disclosure of the rationale “Leadership 
structure has served well” is negatively related to two-day abnormal stock returns to equity 
holders for firms with a combined leadership structure. For firms with a separate leadership 
structure, we find that the rationale “Differences between tasks/roles” for splitting the roles 
tends to be positively related to two-day abnormal returns. 
An analysis of heterogeneity in announcement returns for the individual leadership reasons 
reveals that investors evaluate the disclosed rationales conditional on the specific 
circumstances of the company and consistent with potential benefits and costs associated with 




“Unified leadership” yields heterogeneous stock market reactions depending on the economic 
environment and the size of the firm. Specifically, we find that high-tech firms that are likely 
operating in more dynamic business environments, where managerial discretion is expected to 
be most valuable, experience positive abnormal stock returns to the disclosure of this rationale. 
Bigger and more mature firms are associated with negative abnormal returns following the 
disclosure of the reason “Unified leadership”, while stock market reactions for smaller firms 
are positive. Finally, we find that the negative effect for the reason “Leadership structure has 
served well” is robust to differences in the firms’ past stock market or accounting performance. 
However, the rationale is welcomed by shareholders if it is stated by founder-CEO firms which 
have been documented to be associated with superior stock market performance (see e.g., 
Fahlenbrach, 2009).   
For firms with a separate leadership structure, we find that shareholder reactions to the 
disclosure of the rationale “CEO can focus on management” also varies based on the size of 
the firm and the characteristics of the chairman. In particular, separating the roles to allow the 
CEO to focus on managing the company is welcomed by investors for larger and more mature 
firms, while it is associated with negative abnormal returns for smaller companies. Further, 
both leadership rationales “CEO can focus on management” and “Chair’s experience with 
company” are positively related to two-day abnormal returns and hence welcomed by corporate 
shareholders if the chairman possesses in-depth knowledge about the company. Consistently, 
the results further indicate that investors seem to dislike both leadership reasons if stated by 
firms that have already higher governance standards in place, i.e., an independent chairman or 
higher board independence. 
Finally, studying textual similarity of the sample firms’ 2010 and 2011 disclosed sections on 




phrasing and the disclosed reasons over time. We find only little evidence that certain 
leadership rationales encourage firms to revise their sections on board leadership structure to 
avoid or replace specific reasons strategically. Overall, the results suggest that the disclosed 
rationales constitute valuable new information for investors to be better able to assess the board 
leadership structure and corporate governance decisions of public companies. 
By providing a systematic analysis of the rationales for board leadership structure decisions of 
corporate boards, the chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the chapter 
extends the literature on the determinants of board structures of public firms (see e.g., Boone, 
Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007; Coles, Daniel, Naveen, 2008; and Harris and Raviv, 2008; 
Wintoki, Linck, and Netter, 2012) and particularly the scarce literature on the determinants of 
board leadership structure (Faleye, 2007; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008; Wintoki, Linck, and 
Netter, 2012). Faleye (2007), for example, documents that organizational complexity, CEO 
reputation, and managerial ownership are positively related with the probability of a combined 
leadership structure. Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) and Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) 
specify empirical models based on CEO, firm, governance and industry characteristics to study 
determinants of board leadership, board size and board independence. Similarly, Grinstein and 
Valles (2008) study time trends in the determinants of a separate leadership structure. Dey, 
Engel, and Liu (2011) use a comparable empirical model of leadership structure determinants 
to obtain specific predictions for the firms’ board leadership structure to test performance and 
compensation implications of board leadership structure changes. In contrast to this analysis, 
all of the aforementioned studies are limited to the identification of quantitative factors that are 
simply correlated with the decision to combine or separate the CEO and chairman position, but 





Second, the chapter extends the strand of the literature that studies the reasons and the effects 
of changes in board leadership structure of public companies. Dey, Engel, and Liu (2011), show 
that forced separations due to public pressure are negatively related to abnormal announcement 
returns as well as future operating performance. Analyzing firm announcements to the decision 
to separate or combine the CEO and chairman positions, Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) 
surprisingly find that splitting the roles is associated with negative abnormal returns while 
announcements to combine the two titles on average experience neither positive nor negative 
stock market reactions. Palmon and Wald (2002) document that changing from a combined to 
a separate leadership structure is typically accompanied by positive abnormal returns for larger 
firms but negative announcement returns for smaller companies.  
Third, the chapter adds at a more general level to the literature that studies the discosure of new 
information of public companies or uses changes in the disclosure regulation to study the 
effects on shareholder value and firm behavior (see e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012; Healy 
and Palepu, 2001, and Leuz and Wysocki, 2016, for a general review of the disclosure 
literature). The studies closely related to this chapter of the dissertation are Yermack (2006) 
and Grinstein, Weinbaum, and Yehuda (2015) which both analyze investor reactions and future 
firm behavior following the disclosure of perquisites of managers of public U.S. companies, as 
well as Yermack and Wei (2011) who analyze equity and bondholder reactions to the initial 
disclosure of CEOs’ inside debt positions, following a December 2007 SEC regulation reform 
to the disclosure of CEO pensions and deferred compensation. 
Finally, the chapter contributes to the recent discussion about CEO duality and adds to the yet 
unanswered questions to whether and to what extent board leadership structure matters for 




The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly reviews the 
theoretically and empirically related aspects of board leadership structure decisions, presents a 
description of the sample selection process, and describes the data and the main variables. 
Section 4.3 first provides a systematic identification and documentation of the disclosed 
leadership rationales. The section then continues with an analysis of two-day abnormal returns. 
Finally, section 4.3 investigates the determinants of textual similarity of the 2010 and 2011 
sections on board leadership and whether certain leadership rationales encourage firms to 
revise their section on board leadership structure to avoid or replace specific reasons 
strategically. Section 4.4 concludes. 
4.2. Board Leadership Structure, Sample Selection, and Data Description 
4.2.1. Aspects on the choice of board leadership structure 
Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) referred in their early work to the issue of board 
leadership structure as a “double-edged sword” metaphor that consists of the inherent trade-off 
based on agency theory and organization theory arguments.  
Agency theory which is likely the most commonly applied framework in corporate finance 
emphasizes the inherent differences in the tasks and roles of the CEO and the chairman arguing 
that oversight from management is essential for the effective monitoring to prevent managerial 
entrenchment. Combining the two leadership positions increases agency costs as it fosters the 
CEOs’ power accumulation and control over the board which leads to higher managerial 
entrenchment and impaired monitoring (see e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Jensen, 1993). Several studies provide empirical evidence consistent with agency theory 
that increasing CEO power has adverse effects for corporate shareholders regarding managerial 
entrenchment, risk taking, CEO compensation, and firm performance. Goyal and Park (2002) 




performance. Daily and Dalton (1994) find that firms with a combined leadership structure are 
more frequently associated with filing for corporate bankruptcy than firms with a separate 
leadership structure. More powerful CEOs have also been found to increase managerial 
entrenchment and the ability to influence the director nomination process (see e.g., Westphal 
and Zajac, 1995a; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999) that leads to lower turnover-performance 
sensitivity by corporate boards (see e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014) and usually more 
generous and CEO-friendly compensation structures (see e.g., Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; 
Hwang and Kim, 2009; Morse, Nanda, and Seru, 2011).  
Organization theory which is based on stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) and 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) emphasizes the potential benefits of 
a combined leadership structure. Proponents of organization theory argue that vesting the two 
roles in a single individual increases managerial discretion and provides clear managerial 
leadership which facilitates effective decision-making and improves the responsiveness of 
boards to external events. As CEOs acquire unparalleled specific knowledge from managing 
the day-to-day operations which is costly to transfer (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling; 1995, Brickely, Coles, Linck, 1999), proponents of organization theory also argue 
that being the company CEO best positions the individual to act as the chairman, to coordinate 
board actions and to implement strategies more effectively. 
Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) extend the theoretical framework on CEO duality, 
suggesting that the additional chain of command via a separate chairman might incur additional 
costs of coordination, information acquisition, information processing, additional 
compensating or other frictions related to the deviation from the traditional CEO succession 
process. Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) and Boyd (1995) hypothesize that the benefits of 




for firms operating in highly dynamic, more competitive, and more complex environments. In 
support of the information cost and decision-making efficiency hypothesis, Yang and Zhao 
(2004) document that firms with a combined board leadership structure outperform non-duality 
firms by about 3-4% using the 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement as an 
exogenous shock to industry competition. Li, Lu, and Phillips (2017) provide evidence that 
powerful CEOs are particularly beneficial in more dynamic and more competitive product 
markets. More powerful CEOs are found to be associated with more new products 
introductions, higher investment and advertisement activities, and ultimately higher firm 
valuation. Analyzing announcements of granting the incumbent CEO also the position as the 
chairman of the board, the authors show that shareholder reactions are more positive to the 
unification of the two leadership roles the more dynamic the economic environment of the 
company is.  
Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) further document that large U.S. companies typically 
separate the CEO and chairman position during the transition to a new CEO because more 
successful CEOs are also more likely to remain on the board as the chairman following their 
retirement as the company’s CEO (see e.g., Brickley, Coles, and Linck, 1999; Andres, Fernau, 
and Theissen, 2014). Finally, firms tend to frequently grant their CEOs the chairman title as an 
additional reward within the promotion and succession process. Hambrick and Quigley (2012) 
find empirical evidence that a chairman who is a former company CEO rather creates additional 
agency problems than alleviating them since she might not be an objective monitor and likely 
constitutes an obstacle to corporate turnarounds in some circumstances. Overall, corporate 
boards should ideally weigh the potential benefits and costs contingent on the specific 
circumstances and characteristics of the firm when determining the company’s appropriate 




4.2.2. Sample selection and data description 
The main research strategy uses standard event study methodology to assess stock 
market reactions to the disclosure of firms’ board leadership structure rationales. According to 
the 2009 SEC disclosure regulation, firms are required to provide detailed information about 
their choice of board leadership structure in a separate section within their proxy statement. 
Specifically, firms are required to disclose whether and why the principal executive officer and 
board chairman positions are combined or separated together with the statement why the board 
believes that the chosen board leadership is the most appropriate structure for the company at 
the time. 
We focus upon public U.S. companies in the S&P 500 index at the calendar year-end 2009, the 
time when the SEC’s final disclosure requirement passed.38 We begin by identifying all firms 
that filed their proxy statement with the SEC effectively between March 01, 2010 and February 
28, 2011 which constitutes a one-year time period after the disclosure regulation became 
effective on February 28, 2010. From the initial sample of the 500 firms, we exclude all firms 
that filed their proxy statements either before the effective date (5 firms) or after the one-year 
sample period (15 firms).39 For the remaining 480 firms, we download each proxy statement 
from the SEC’s EDGAR database and try to identify the respective section on board leadership 
structure with the statement. Overall, the proxy statements of 16 firms do not contain a specific 
section on board leadership structure. For one firm there is no 2010 proxy filing available.40 To 
ensure that the disclosed information actually represents new information for investors and 
corporate shareholders, we further check the firms’ previous year proxy statement as well as 
                                                 
38 Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) show that larger firms tend to adopt stricter disclosure rules than smaller firms. 
To reduce potential heterogeneity in disclosure quality between large and smaller firms, the analysis is based upon 
the 500 largest U.S. companies.  
39 The large majority of firms that filed their most recent proxy statement after the sample period had changed the 
end of their fiscal year. This postponed the disclosure of the proxy statements which first contains the information 
on board leadership structure beyond the sample period.  




past disclosed 8-K filings for potential voluntary disclosure related to the choice of board 
leadership structure.41 We identify and exclude three firms that already voluntarily disclosed 
information in their 2009 proxy statements.  
In the following step, we determine the firms’ current board leadership structure and exclude 
all firms with unconventional board leadership structures. In particular, we drop five 
observations where the firms are led by two Co-CEOs, three firms that explicitly state to be led 
by an interim CEO, and four observations where the firm explicitly states to have not formally 
established a chairman position. After excluding one additional firm for which only insufficient 
historic stock price information is available to calculate abnormal returns, the final sample 
constitutes of 447 of the 500 largest publicly listed U.S. companies. 
Because firms are required to disclose the information on their board leadership structure in 
their proxy statement, the event date for the analysis is typically the firm’s filing date with the 
SEC. We identify a total of 109 sample firms that already filed a preliminary proxy statement 
a couple of days prior to their final proxy statement. We find that 106 of the 109 preliminary 
proxy statements contain the identical section on board leadership structure as the final proxy 
statement and hence, the event date for the 106 sample firms is set to the filing date of the 
preliminary proxy statement. Figure 4.1 presents a month-by-month overview of the event 
dates for the 447 sample firms. Similar to Wei and Yermack (2011), a vast majority (about 
79%) of the sample firms file their proxy statements with the SEC within the first two months 




                                                 
41 We check the sample firms’ 8-K filings that contain information on Item 5.02 “Departure of Directors or 
Principal Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Principal Officers“ under which changes in major 




Figure 4.1: Sample company filings by month 
This graph depicts the 12 subsequent months of the sample period in which the first proxy statements 
were filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) after the new disclosure regulation on 
board leadership structure became effective on February 28, 2010. The sample for the analysis consists 
of 447 firms that were members of the S&P 500 index at the end of the year 2009. The sample period 
represents the first year after the effectiveness of the disclosure regulation, i.e., March 01, 2010 to 















































In order to analyze the sample firms’ rationales for their choice of board leadership structure, 
we manually extract the section on board leadership structure from the 2010 proxy statement 
for each sample firm and read each text paragraph very carefully to identify individual board 
leadership structure reasons. We obtain the final categorization of board leadership reasons 
following a two-step methodology: First, we read all 447 sections on board leadership structure 
and develop a detailed list of rationales that contains textual examples for each individual 
leadership reason. In a second step, we combine similar reasons to obtain the final set of reasons 
for a combined and separate leadership structure.42 To ensure the highest accuracy in the 
assignment of reason categories and to rule out subjective judgement as far as possible, we ask 
two individuals to assign reason categories to each section independently. In more than 93% 
of all cases, the individual assignments of reasons perfectly matched. Each case with deviations 
in the assignment of reason categories was revisited and reclassified.  
The hand-collected data for the 447 sample firms is augmented with fundamental data from 
Capital IQ. Information on the companies’ CEO and chairman, board composition, as well as 
management and shareholder proposals are also manually collected from the companies’ proxy 
statements. Stock prices for the calculation of abnormal returns are taken from Bloomberg.  
   
                                                 
42 We acknowledge that the identification and categorization of reasons may be (at least to some degree) subjective 




Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics and univariate comparisons of firms with combined or separate board leadership structure 
This table gives descriptive statistics for the sample of 282 combined leadership structure firms and 165 firms with a separate leadership structure which 
were members of the S&P 500 index at the end of the calendar year 2009. The sample period is March 01, 2010 to February 28, 2011. The four sections 
of the table show information for the company’s CEO, chairman, firm characteristics and textual characteristics of disclosed sections on the board 
leadership structure section. CEO and chairman characteristics are manually collected from the proxy filings. Company financial data for fiscal year 
2009 are based upon Capital IQ information. CEO age is the age of the company’s CEO in years. CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been 
serving as the company’s CEO. Founder CEO is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is the founder of the company, zero 
otherwise. Independent chair is an indicator variable set to one if the chairman of the board is classified as an independent director, zero otherwise. 
Founder chair is an indicator variable set to one if the chairman of the board is the founder of the company, zero otherwise. Chair former company CEO 
is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the chairman has previously served as the CEO of the company, zero otherwise. CAR [0,1] is the 
two-day cumulative abnormal return calculated from the Fama-French three-factor model using a 220 days estimation window from -21 days to -241 
days before the filing date. Market capitalization is calculated as the number of common shares outstanding times the stock price at the end of the 
previous fiscal year. Tobin’s Q is defined as total assets minus book value of equity plus market capitalization all divided by total assets. Firm age is the 
number of years since the first inclusion date in CRSP. Prior year BHR is calculated as the buy-and-hold return over the previous 250 trading days 
before the filing date of the firm’s proxy statement. Tech firm is an indicator variable set to one if the firm operates in a high-tech industry according to 
the Loughran and Ritter (2004) high-tech definition (SIC codes: 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 
3679, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, or 7379). Board size is the number of 
directors serving on the firm’s board of directors. Independence ratio is the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors. 
Staggered board is an indicator variable set to one if the firm has a classified board, zero otherwise. Number BLS reasons is the absolute number of 
distinct leadership rationales disclosed in the firm’s section on board leadership structure. Positive (negative) tone is calculated as the number of positive 
(negative) words divided by the number of total words used. Word lists for positive (negative) words are obtained from Bill McDonald’s word lists page 
(http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html). A positive word is only considered as positive if there is no simple negation (no, not, none, neither, 
never, nobody) within the three words preceding a positive word. Text similarity is the similarity of a firm’s 2010 section on board leadership structure 
with the subsequent section disclosed in 2011. The sample consists of 276 of the 282 sample firms with a combined leadership structure, and 162 firms 
with a separate leadership structure for which the 2011 proxy statement is available. Text similarity is calculated using the Ratcliff and Obershelp (1988) 
algorithm for pattern matching. The algorithm returns similarity scores of two strings between zero and one where larger values indicate higher textual 
similarity. Words is the total number of words of the proxy statement section on board leadership structure. All dollar values are in millions. The last 
column presents two-sided difference-in-means test allowing for unequal variances between the two subsamples. ***, **, * denote significance at the 








Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics and univariate comparisons of firms with combined or separate board leadership structure (cont’d) 
  Combined leadership structure (N=282)  Separate leadership structure (N=165)  Difference-in-means 
  N Mean SD Median  N Mean SD Median  Difference (t-stat) 
CEO characteristics                       
CEO age 282 56.88 6.21 56.50   165 53.27 6.44 53.00   3.61*** (5.79) 
CEO tenure 282 7.12 6.30 6.00   165 3.32 4.08 2.00   3.80*** (7.74) 
Founder CEO 282 0.08 0.27     165 0.02 0.15     0.06*** (2.83) 
Chair characteristics                       
Independent chair            165 0.50 0.50       
Founder chair           165 0.19 0.39       
Chair former company CEO           165 0.47 0.50       
Firm characteristics                       
CAR [0,1] [%] 282 0.07 2.27 0.09   165 -0.12 2.24 -0.13   0.19 (0.86) 
Firm age 282 37.29 24.86 37.00   165 28.78 19.19 24.00   8.51*** (4.04) 
Market capitalization 282 23,967.71 38,985.55 9,858.25   165 15,530.62 26,604.69 7,775.91   8,437.08*** (2.71) 
Prior year BHR 282 0.25 0.80 0.07   165 0.31 0.79 0.07   -0.06 (-0.74) 
Tech firm 282 0.11 0.32   165 0.22 0.41   -0.10*** (-2.80) 
Tobin’s Q 282 1.71 0.82 1.47   165 1.81 0.95 1.48   -0.10 (-1.12) 
Total assets 282 52,160.66 165,957.90 1,3611.62   165 41,858.70 170,866.40 9,155.52   10,301.96 (0.62) 
Governance characteristics            
Board size 282 10.83 2.15 11.00   165 10.77 2.75 11.00   0.06 (0.26) 
Independence ratio 282 0.86 0.07 0.89   165 0.81 0.10 0.82   0.05*** (5.88) 
Staggered board 282 0.66 0.48   165 0.59 0.49   0.06 (1.30) 
Text characteristics                       
Negative tone [%] 282 0.68 0.66 0.54   165 0.55 0.63 0.37   0.13** (2.12) 
Number BLS reasons 282 2.09 1.19 2.00  165 1.70 1.17 2.00  0.39*** (3.43) 
Positive tone [%] 282 2.62 1.30 2.34   165 1.91 1.20 1.86   0.71*** (5.82) 
Text similarity [%] 276 75.49 29.77 8.72  162 74.43 29.71 88.19  1.64 (0.36) 







Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics about the sample firms’ CEOs, the chairpersons, 
fundamental and governance characteristics as well as textual characteristics of the disclosed 
section on board leadership structure, separately for each type of leadership structure. We 
identify 282 firms with a combined leadership structure, i.e., where the CEO simultaneously 
holds the position of the chairman and a total of 165 sample firms that use a separate leadership 
structure. Overall, this represents about 63% CEO duality for the entire sample. Focusing on 
the distribution of board leadership structure across individual industries, we find that board 
leadership structure decisions vary significantly with the firms’ business environment. Figure 
4.2 depicts the distribution of board leadership structures across industries using the Fama-
French 12 industry classification. Relative to the cross-sectional average of 63%, a combination 
of the CEO and chairman position seems to be more frequently used by firms operating in the 
manufacturing (FF3), energy (FF4), chemical (FF5), utility (FF8), and health industry (FF10). 
Separating the roles, however, seems to be more commonly used in industries related to 
consumer durables (FF2), business equipment (FF6) or money (FF11).43  
                                                 
43 The high fraction of separate board leadership structures, particularly for the “FF11 – Money” and “FF2 - 
Consumer Durables” industry categories is at least partly related to the high number of contemporary CEO 
transitions. Specifically, 13.9% (FF11) and 16.7% (FF2) of the CEOs assumed office within less than one year in 
these industries. The average across all industry clusters amounts to 10.2%. Additionally, about 19% of all firms 
in the “FF11- Money” industry cluster state in their section on board leadership structure that the current separate 
leadership structure is has been chosen due to leadership transition and leadership continuity reasons. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Board leadership structure choices by industries 
This graph presents differences in the choices of board leadership structure for the 447 sample firms across industries. Industries are defined based on the Fama-
French 12 industry classification. Firms with a combined leadership structure unify both positions of the CEO and the chairman of the board. Firms with a 
separate leadership structure have two different persons serving as the chairman of the board and as the CEO of the company.    
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Turning to the descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.1 and the characteristics of the CEO and 
chairman, we find consistent with previous studies that CEOs who serve also as the chairman 
of the board differ significantly from CEOs with a separate chairman. On average, a dual 
leadership CEO is about 56.9 years old, has been serving as the company’s CEO for about 7.1 
years and is in 8.0% of the cases the founder of the company. Comparing CEOs of both 
leadership types, CEOs of firms with a combined leadership structure are on average 3.6 years 
older, have been serving about 3.8 years longer as the company’s CEO and are significantly 
more frequent also the company’s founder. Regarding the characteristics of the chairman, half 
of the separate leadership structure firms in our sample have an independent chairman and for 
about 19% of the firms the chairman is also the founder of the company. Consistent with 
Brickely, Coles, and Linck (1999), a significant fraction of chairmen are a former CEO of their 
company (47%). 
With respect to the fundamentals, firms of both types of leadership structure do not seem to 
differ in firm characteristics such as book value of total assets (Total assets), firm valuation 
(Tobin’s Q), or prior year stock performance (Prior year BHR). We find that firms with a 
combined leadership structure, however, tend to be larger in terms of market capitalization 
($23,968mn vs. $15,530mn), older (37.3 years vs. 28.8 years), and less likely high-tech 
companies (11% vs. 22%).  
Regarding the governance characteristics, both leadership types are similar in terms of board 
size (10.8 directors) and the use of classified boards. On average, about two thirds of the 
combined leadership structure firms have established staggered boards while about 60% of the 
separate leadership structure firms have established a classified board. Consistent with the need 
for independent monitoring on the board when vesting the CEO and chairman titles in a single 




independence than firms with a separate chairman (86% vs. 81%). 
We follow recent research methodologies on textual analysis (see e.g., Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011; García, 2013) to further investigate whether sections on board leadership 
structure differ in terms of text structure and sentiment across board leadership types. The 
sections on board leadership structure of dual leadership firms and those of firms with a non-
independent chairman usually contain a description of the tasks and duties of the lead or 
presiding director. Since these descriptions most likely do not reveal any relevant information 
on the firm’s actual leadership structure choice, we delete these paragraphs manually from the 
text sections before proceeding with the calculation of textual characteristics.44 We calculate 
measures of positive and negative tone as the number of positive (negative) words relative to 
the total number of words.  We apply Bill McDonald’s word lists to derive the number of 
positive (negative) words, thereby controlling for simple negations (“no”, “not”, “none”, 
“neither”, “never”, “nobody”) within the three words preceding a positive word as done in 
Loughran and McDonald (2011).45  
Overall, we find that the disclosed sections on board leadership structure of both leadership 
structures differ significantly with respect to several textual characteristics. Consistent with the 
increasing pressure towards the separation of the leadership roles and a likely greater need to 
justify a combined leadership structure, we find that the sections of dual leadership firms 
contain on average more board leadership reasons and also more words than sections of firms 
with a separate chairman. Specifically, sections on board leadership structure of dual leadership 
firms are typically about 263 words long and contain about two different reasons to explain 
                                                 
44 Since firms with a combined leadership structure and those with a non-independent chairman are more likely 
to have established the position of a lead or presiding director, these firms are also more likely to include a 
description of the tasks and duties that accompany these positions. Hence, this would introduce a bias with respect 
to the number of words used in the section to describe and explain their choice of board leadership structure for 
such firms.  





why the firm combines the CEO and chairman positions. Firms with a separate leadership 
structure, however, use significantly fewer words (223 words) and state significantly fewer 
leadership reasons (1.70).  
Calculating and comparing the measures of textual sentiment indicates that text paragraphs on 
board leadership also differ with respect to the tone of the disclosed texts. Although firms of 
both leadership types seem to phrase their sections more positively than negatively, text 
sections of dual leadership firms contain on average a higher fraction of positive as well as 
negative words. Specifically, firms with a combined leadership structure use about 2.62% 
positive and only 0.68% negative words. Sections of firms with a separate leadership structure 
usually contain only 1.91% positive and only 0.55% negative words.  
Finally, we extract the firms’ subsequent year section on board leadership structure from their 
2011 proxy statement to analyze potential changes in the firms’ wording or disclosed 
reasoning. We are able to extract the sections for 276 out of the initially 282 combined 
leadership firms and for 162 out of the 165 firms with a separate board leadership structure.46 
We calculate the similarity of the 2010 and 2011 disclosed sections on board leadership for 
every sample firm using the Ratcliff and Obershelp (1988) algorithm for pattern recognition 
and textual similarity.47 The algorithm generates similarity scores (Text similarity)48 between 
zero and one, where larger values indicate higher textual similarity. The results presented in 
                                                 
46 The six missing firms are the following: Allergheny Energy Inc. (merger with FirstEnergy Corp.); King 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (acquired by Pfizer Inc.); Massey Energy Co. (acquired by Alpha Natural Resources); 
National Semiconductor Corp. (acquired by Texas Instruments Inc.); Pactiv Corp. (acquired by Rank Group Ltd); 
Qwest Communications International Inc. (merged with CenturyLink Inc.). The three missing firms are Expedia 
Inc. (2011 proxy statement not available via the SEC’s EDGAR database); Marshall & Ilsley Corp. (merged with 
Bank of Montreal); McAfee Inc. (acquired by Intel Corp.) 
47 In order to be able to compare texts for the years 2010 and 2011, we apply the same text modifications to the 
2011 section on board leadership structure as for 2010. In particular, we check each text manually and delete the 
paragraph on the description of the lead or presiding director’s tasks and duties. 
48 Similarity of the two strings is calculated as the number of matching characters divided by the total number of 
characters in the two strings. Matching characters are those in the longest common subsequence plus, recursively, 
matching characters in the unmatched region on either side of the longest common subsequence. The algorithm 




Table 4.1 suggest that both types of firms show comparable values of textual similarity. Firms 
with a combined leadership structure show average similarity scores of about 75.5% (median: 
88.7%) while textual similarity for separate leadership structure firms is on average 74.4% 
(median: 88.1%). In untabulated analyses where we restrict the sample to firms having the 
same individual serving as the company’s CEO for the year 2010 and 2011, we find significant 
higher values of textual similarity for both leadership types. In particular, the increase in mean 
and median values of Text similarity is much stronger for firms that combine the CEO and 
chairman position than for firms with a separate leadership structure. Average and median 
values of Text similarity increase to 79.7% and 94.2% for dual leadership firms, and to 75.1% 
and 89.3% for separate leadership firms, respectively. Generally, the above findings suggest 
that sections on board leadership structure are quite persistent over time. High similarity scores 
for both leadership structures indicate that sections of both types of leadership structure are 
subject to only minor changes with respect to wording, text structure and the disclosed board 
leadership structure rationales.49  
4.3. Empirical Analysis of Board Leadership Structure Reasons 
4.3.1. Board leadership structure and disclosed board leadership structure reasons 
We begin the analysis with a systematic documentation of the disclosed rationales for 
the sample firms’ boar leadership structure decision, separately for the 282 firms with a 
combined leadership structure and for the 165 firms that separate the CEO and chairman 
position. We manually identify the reasons within the sample firms’ text sections on board 
leadership structure in their 2010 proxy statement following the procedure described at the end 
of Section 4.2.2. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 present overviews of the 15 most frequently 
                                                 
49 Comparing the disclosed leadership reasons for the years 2010 and 2011, we find that only very few firms 




disclosed reasons for each type of board leadership structure. The complete lists with all 
individually identified reasons are provided in Appendix 4.A and 4.B. Overall, we identify 24 
distinct reasons for the sample of combined leadership firms and a total of 22 rationales for 
firms that separate the CEO and chair position. Appendix 4.C and Appendix 4.D provide 
detailed descriptions as well as textual examples for the five most frequently stated reasons of 
both leadership types. 
Figure 4.3 provides relative and absolute frequencies for the fifteen most frequently used 
rationales of the 282 combined leadership firms. The figure suggests that the use of reasons for 
combining the CEO and chairman position is highly concentrated among few but frequently 
used rationales which are often related to arguments consistent with organization theory and 
the potential benefits of a unitary leadership structure. Specifically, more than half of the 282 
firms state that the roles of CEO and chairman are currently combined due to the importance 
and need for a single leader with unity of command who is able to provide clear operational 
and strategic guidance (“Unified leadership”). About 46% of the firms justify the unification 
of the two positions with the superior knowledge and informational advantage of the CEO from 
managing the day-to-day operations of the company which best qualifies her to act effectively 
as the chairman of the board (“Knowledge as CEO”). About 23.4% of the dual leadership firms 
point out that having the CEO acting in the dual role is essential to enable the CEO to act as an 
effective bridge between the management and the board to foster the information flow between 
the two entities (“Bridge between management and board”). Another 8.5% of the firms argue 
that the unified leadership structure generally contributes to the effective and efficient 
functioning of their board (“Efficiency and effectiveness of board”).  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Combined board leadership structure and disclosed reasons 
This graph depicts the 15 most frequently used leadership reasons for a combined leadership structure. The reasons were stated by the 282 sample firms that 
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Interestingly and most remarkable is the fact that a significant number of firms justify the 
preservation of the status quo and their current choice of a combined board leadership structure 
with the past experience over recent years. In particular, 53 of the sample firms specifically 
state that the current dual leadership structure has been chosen because the leadership structure 
has proven to be effective and has served the company and its shareholders well over the past 
(“Leadership structure has served well”). In addition, 3.2% of the firms point out that the 
current leadership structure is chosen because it is a company tradition, while another 3.5% of 
the firms have decided to combine the two leadership roles because it is the commonly applied 
leadership practice among U.S. companies or industry peers. Current or future business and 
company circumstances (7.8%), the avoidance of additional costs (4.6%), the characteristics 
and attributes of the individual serving as the company CEO, such as the CEO’s experience 
with the company (8.5%), the CEO’s founder status (5.0%) or her industry expertise and other 
qualifications (5.0%) are less frequently used as a rationale and seem to be of minor importance 
for the decisions to combine the CEO and chairman position. Also remarkably, about 6% of 
the firms with a combined leadership structure do not provide any reason at all. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Separate board leadership structure and disclosed reasons 
This graph depicts the 15 most frequently used leadership reasons for the choice of a separate leadership structure. The reasons are stated by the 165 sample 
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Figure 4.4 depicts relative and absolute frequencies for the fifteen most frequently disclosed 
rationales of firms with a separate board leadership structure. The figure suggests that the use 
of reasons for a separate leadership structure appears to be less concentrated compared to the 
use of rationales by firms with a combined leadership structure. Firms splitting the CEO and 
chairman position usually refer to reasons consistent with agency theory or the importance and 
experience of the chairman. In particular, almost one third of the 165 firms with a separate 
leadership structure point out that the leadership structure is chosen in recognition of the 
different tasks and duties associated with both positions (“Differences between tasks/roles”). 
About 30.3% of the firms argue that separating the roles facilitates and improves the monitoring 
of the CEO and the management by the board (“Facilitates monitoring”). According to 22.4% 
of the firms, having a separate individual serving as the chairman is the appropriate because 
the leadership structure allows the CEO to focus on managing the day-to-day operations of the 
company (“CEO can focus on management”).  
Overall, the skills and attributes of the chairperson seem to be more important for the decision 
to split the leadership roles than the characteristics, skills or attributes of the CEO are for 
combining the two positions. Specifically, 18.8% of the firms state that the decision to separate 
the roles has been made to leverage the in-depth experience and knowledge of the chair with 
the company (“Chair’s experience with company”), the chair’s valuable advice and mentoring 
ability (12.1%) or in recognition of the chair’s industry experience and other qualifications 
(3.6%). Remarkably, although 19% of the chairmen are the founder of the company, only few 
firms actually relate the board leadership structure decision to the chair’s founder status (6.1%) 
or to the significant stock ownership (3.6%). Finally, 21 firms (12.7%) currently separate the 
leadership positions due to contemporary CEO transitions and the need for continuity in 
leadership (12.7%), while a significant part of the firms (13.3%) do not provide any reason for 




4.3.2. Determinants of the number of stated board leadership structure reasons 
The new SEC disclosure regulation requires firms to disclose the reasons why 
combining or separating the roles of CEO and chairman is the most appropriate leadership 
structure for the company at the time. Because firms are free to disclose as many relevant board 
leadership rationales as they want to, the total number of disclosed reasons might further reveal 
valuable information on the endogenous choice of the firms’ board leadership structure. 
Firms may choose to disclose more reasons in order to signal investors and corporate 
shareholders the board’s superior quality and appropriate determination of the board leadership 
structure for the company. However, the disclosure of more reasons could also be interpreted 
negatively if firms might feel compelled to convince shareholders about their leadership 
structure decision. For example, firms deviating from generally accepted good governance 
practices might be urged to disclose more leadership rationales to explain the firm’s choice of 
board leadership structure to shareholders with particular emphasis than firms in compliance 
with good governance practices would be.50 Faleye (2007) argues that differences in firm and 
CEO characteristics help explain whether a certain leadership structure is beneficial or 
detrimental for the firm. He finds that organizational complexity, CEO reputation and 
managerial ownership are positively related with the probability of a combined leadership 
structure. 
We run Poisson regressions of the number of disclosed board leadership reasons (Number BLS 
reasons) on a set of CEO, chair, governance and firm characteristics to analyze whether the 
number of disclosed leadership rationales is determined by the specific characteristics or 
circumstances of the firm. We perform regressions for the entire sample as well as for each 
leadership structure subsample separately. To capture differences in the number of reasons 
                                                 




between firms with a combined and a separate leadership structure, the regression specification 
for the entire sample contains the variable Combined leadership structure, an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if the firm combines the CEO and chairman position, and zero 
otherwise. The regression results are shown in Table 4.2.  
In line with the univariate results of Table 4.1, the multivariate regression results in column (1) 
of Table 4.2 indicate that a combined leadership structure is positively related with the number 
of disclosed leadership rationales. Further, the full sample results in column (1) as well as the 
results for each subsample presented in columns (2) and (3) provide consistent evidence that 
firms led by founder CEOs are also positively related with the number of disclosed leadership 
rationales. Regarding the subsample of firms with a separate chairman, we find that the number 
of disclosed reasons is also related to the characteristics of the chairperson. In particular, 
consistent with the hypothesis of Hambrick and Quigley (2012) that retaining the former CEO 
as the chairman often represents an obstacle to strategic change and therefore might have 
negative performance effects, firms having a former company CEO or the founder of the 
company serving as the chairman of the board are associated with the disclosure of more 
leadership rationales. Finally, there is no evidence that other governance or firm characteristics 
seem to systematically affect the number of disclosed board leadership structure rationales. 
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Table 4.2: Determinants of the number of disclosed board leadership reasons 
The table presents Poisson regression results of absolute number of individual disclosed board 
leadership structure reasons (Number BLS reasons) on CEO, chair, governance and firm characteristics. 
Column (1) presents estimates for the entire sample of 447 firms. Combined leadership structure is an 
indicator variable that is set to one if the firm combines the CEO and chairman position in a single 
individual, zero otherwise. Column (2) and (3) present regression results for each type of board 
leadership separately. All other variables are as defined in Table 4.1. An intercept is included in all 
regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression 
coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Number BLS reasons 
  
 Combined board 
leadership structure 
 Separate board 
leadership structure 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Combined leadership structure 0.7143** 
(2.12) 
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Chair characteristics      
Chair former company CEO 0.5722 
(1.61) 
   0.6232* 
(1.82) 
Founder chair 0.2228 
(1.59) 
   0.2379* 
(1.67) 
Independent chair 0.4771 
(1.39) 
   0.4960 
(1.49) 
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4.3.3. Regression analysis of abnormal returns 
We continue the analysis by examining cumulative abnormal returns to equity holders 
following the disclosure of board leadership structure reasons by the 282 combined leadership 
structure firms and the 165 sample firms with a separate leadership structure. We use two-day 
abnormal returns around the filing date of the firms’ proxy statements which includes the filing 
day and the following trading day because some proxy filings are published after financial 
markets are closed. Two-day abnormal stock returns are calculated using the three-factor model 
developed by Fama and French (1993) and the [-241, -21] parameter estimation period prior to 
the event date. We obtain data on daily Fama/French three factors from Kenneth French 
website.51 The event study results remain qualitatively similar when we use a simple market 
model using the S&P500 index as the market return or the four-factor model as alternative 
models to calculate abnormal returns.52  
The main variables of interest in the following analysis are the five most frequently stated 
reasons for each leadership type. We focus on the five most frequently stated board leadership 
reasons to circumvent estimation issues related to low sample frequency or potential outlier 
effects. For each leadership reason we create an indicator variable that equals one if the firm 
states this reason in their section on board leadership structure as to why it has chosen to 
combine or separate the positions of CEO and chairman, zero otherwise. To account for the 
disclosure of other reasons beyond the five most frequent rationales, we also include an 
indicator variable “Other reason stated” to the regression specification that take the value of 
one if the firm disclosed any other reason beyond one of the five most frequently disclosed 
                                                 
51 The data is available for download on Kenneth R. French’s professional website:  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f-f_factors.html. According to the data 
description, the market index includes all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms. 
52 The analysis is robust to the use of two-day cumulative abnormal returns that are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
or at the 5th and 95th percentile, respectively. On average, the regression results tend to improve in statistical 




rationales. Since the section on board leadership structure is only one part of the firms’ 
comprehensive proxy statements and firms sometimes disclose other matters that are likely of 
importance to corporate shareholders simultaneously, we also include a broad set of proxy 
statement control variables in the regression specification. We examine each of the 447 proxy 
statements of our sample firms manually and identify matters for which investor reactions have 
previously been analyzed and been document to be important for corporate shareholders, such 
as CEO compensation, changes in the board composition, and other diverse topics of 
shareholder proposals.  
We generally follow the approach proposed by Wei and Yermack (2011) and create a set of 
nine control indicator variables for the regression specification. First, we include an indicator 
that equal to one for thirty-nine of the sample firms that nominate new independent directors 
to be elected to the corporate board (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). Second, an indicator variable 
that equals one for three firms that nominate new non-independent outside directors who are 
likely to have a material interest in the company (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Third, we 
include three indicator variables for firms whose management proposes shareholder-friendly 
management proposals. Specifically, we add an indicator for nineteen firms where the 
management proposes to repeal the super-majority voting requirements, to introduce majority 
voting in director elections (sixteen firms) or to declassify a staggered board which is the case 
for fourteen firms (Faleye, 2007). Fourth, we control for several shareholder resolutions. We 
include indicators for shareholder proposals related to executive compensation (twenty-four 
firms), other corporate governance issues (thirty-seven), social or environmental issues (sixty-
eight firms) (Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling, 1996), and any shareholder proposal other than 
one of the aforementioned (twenty-three firms). Finally, we include an indicator variable 
Regulated Industry that is set to one if the firm operates primarily in the regulated utility or 




company is considered a high-tech company according to the four-digit SIC industry 
classification suggested by Loughran and Ritter (2004).53 We test statistical significance of the 
regression estimates using robust standard errors. 
 4.3.3.1. Combined leadership structure reasons and abnormal returns to equity holders 
We first turn the analysis of the two-day abnormal returns to the disclosure of board 
leadership reasons to the 282 firms with a combined leadership structure. Table 4.3 presents 
the regression results. The first three columns of Table 4.3 present cross-sectional ordinary 
least squares regression estimates of two-day cumulative abnormal returns to equity holders 
(CAR [0,1]) on the five most frequently stated reasons and control variables. The last two 
columns show results from cross-sectional logit regressions where the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable CAR [0,1] negative that takes the value of one if the two-day cumulative 
abnormal return is below zero, zero otherwise. Results presented in column (1) and (4) of Table 
4.3 are based on the entire sample of 282 combined leadership firms while the results in 
columns (2), (3) and (5) are obtained from restricting the sample to early disclosure events, i.e., 
firms that filed their proxy statement either during the first month (March 2010) or within the 
first two months (March and April 2010) after the new disclosure regulation became 
effective.54 
                                                 
53 The Loughran and Ritter (2004) high-industry definition contains the following four-digit SIC code industries: 
3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3812, 3823, 3825, 
3826, 3827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, or 7379. 
54 The distribution of disclosure events presented in Figure 4.1 shows that the majority of observations are located 
in the first and first two months, respectively.  
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Table 4.3: Combined leadership structure - Announcement returns and disclosed reasons 
This table contains regression results of two-day cumulative abnormal stock returns on the five most 
frequently used leadership reasons disclosed by the 282 sample firms with a combined leadership 
structure. Columns (1), (2), and (3) provide ordinary least squares regression results. The dependent 
variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return to equity holder (CAR [0,1]). Columns (4) and 
(5) show logit regression results where the dependent variable is the indicator variable CAR [0,1] 
negative, which takes the value of one if the two-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR [0,1]) is 
below zero, zero otherwise. Regression results in columns (1) and (4) are obtained from the entire 
sample of 282 firms with a combined leadership structure. Regression results in column (2) are based 
on a restricted sample of firms that filed their proxy statement within the first month after the new 
SEC disclosure regulation became on February 28th, 2010. In column (3) and column (5), the sample 
is restricted to all observations within the first two months following the change in the disclosure 
regulation. “Other reason stated” is an indicator variable that is set to one if the company stated at 
least one reasoning for the board leadership structure decision beyond one of the five most frequent 
leadership rationales. Regulated industry is an indicator variable set to one if the company operates 
in the utility or financial industry (SIC codes: 4000 – 4999, 6000 – 6999), zero otherwise. The nine 
proxy statement control variables are dummy variables that take the value of one if certain corporate 
governance events, described more fully in Section 4.2.3, are reported in the proxy statement. All 
other variables are as defined in Table 4.1. An intercept is included in all regressions, but not 
reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficient. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  CAR [0,1]   CAR [0,1] negative 
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Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 282 164 230  281 229 
R-squared/ Pseudo R-squared 0.047 0.132 0.115  0.059 0.071 
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Overall, the regression results for the entire sample of 282 firms with a combined leadership 
structure of Table 4.3 show insignificant estimates for the majority of the five most frequently 
disclosed reasons upon two-day abnormal returns (CAR [0,1]) and the probability of a negative 
two-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR [0,1] negative). However, the results show that the 
disclosure of the leadership reason “Leadership structure has served well” is negatively related 
to two-day abnormal stock returns (column (1)) and consistently also positively related to the 
probability of a negative two-day cumulative abnormal return (column (4)). Specifically, the 
disclosure of the rationale “Leadership structure has served well” reduces abnormal returns by 
about 0.5 percentage points while it increases the probability of a negative stock price reaction 
by about 17.1 percentage points. Hence, we conclude that investors consider the rationale 
“Leadership structure has served well” as an inappropriate reasoning for combining the CEO 
and chairman positions which might further constitute a negative signal regarding the overall 
governance of the company. With respect to the control variables of the specifications, none of 
the controls is significant and the vast majority of the proxy statement controls are insignificant 
as well. Hence, there is little evidence that simultaneous disclosure of other confounding 
information may affect the findings of the analysis. 
Insignificant estimates for the majority of the board leadership reasons might suggest that 
market participants may already possess precise pre-disclosure expectations about the firms’ 
leadership structure rationales. In this case, the new disclosure requirement would not provide 
valuable new information for investors. As a consequence, abnormal stock market reactions 
can be expected to converge to zero and the estimates of the leadership reasons will most likely 
be insignificant. Although investors’ expectations might be relatively precise for some 
leadership rationales or some firms, the expectations are likely less precise for other rationales 
and firms. In addition, since we focus entirely on firms that have not disclosed previously any 




and we do find significant stock market reaction for at least some rationales, we consider the 
explanation of systematic ex-ante shareholder expectation to be less likely to be the case. 
A second explanation consistent with insignificant estimates is related to potential learning 
effects of both firms and market participants. Firms disclosing their proxy statements relatively 
late during the sample period have the opportunity to learn from previous disclosures of other 
companies and might therefore be able to strategically select the set of disclosed leadership 
reasons. Hence, those firms might be able to avoid certain reasons that are assessed negatively 
by the market or have the possibility to substitute such rationales with reasons likely viewed 
more favorably by corporate shareholders. We attempt to address this issue by analyzing 
relative frequencies of the five most frequently stated reasons for early and late disclosing 
firms. The subsample means for early and late disclosures together with the difference-in-
means tests are shown in Appendix 4.E. The results indicate that there is no evidence that 
reason disclosures of firms with a combined leadership structure differ significantly over time. 
Specifically, early and late disclosing firms use individual rationales equally frequent which 
suggests that firms do not seem to select reasons strategically.  
Alternatively, investors might use the information provided by early disclosing firms to update 
their expectations about subsequent disclosures of reasons of similar companies. This might 
result in pre-disclosure price adjustments and hence diminishing and insignificant stock market 
reactions over the sample period. Estimates for early disclosure events can therefore be 
expected to be economically and statistically pronounced compared to late disclosure events 
and to the entire sample estimates. Hence, we repeat the full sample regression analyses of 
column (1) and column (4) of Table 4.3 using a restricted subsample of firms that filed their 
proxy statements during the first month (March 2010) or within the first two months (March 




are presented in columns (2), (3), and (5) of Table 4.3.  
Although the majority of estimates of the board leadership structure reasons are still statistically 
insignificant which is in line with the investor learning hypothesis, we find that estimates 
generally improve in economic magnitude as well as statistical significance. The regression 
results for the subsamples of early disclosing firms further supports the full sample finding of 
a negative stock market reaction to the disclosure of the rationale “Leadership structure has 
served well”. On average, the disclosure of the reason during the early sample period is 
associated with lower abnormal returns of about 0.83 percentage points and an increase in the 
likelihood of a negative abnormal announcement return of about 22.7 percentage points. The 
results are generally consistent with the notion that market participants learn from early 
disclosures and update their beliefs about reason disclosures of other comparable companies. 
Lastly, insignificant estimates for the majority of the board leadership structure reasons might 
also indicate heterogeneity in the assessment of disclosed rationales by market participants. 
Depending on the characteristics of the company, some firms may have good reasons to select 
a given board leadership structure while others may have poor or even no reasoning. As 
indicated by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), boards should ideally select the appropriate board 
leadership structure by trading off potential benefits and costs that are likely specific to the 
characteristics and business environment of the firm. Recent empirical literature provides 
various empirical evidence for heterogeneous effects across a variety of governance structures, 
such as CEO power (see e.g., Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005; Li, Lu, and Phillips, 2017), 
board size (see e.g., Coles, Daniel, Naveen, 2008), board independence (see e.g., Faleye, 
Hoitash, and Hoitash, 2011) or staggered boards (see e.g., Cremers, Litov, and Sepe, forth).  
Previous empirical research also suggests heterogeneity with respect to the choice of board 




CEO duality is particularly valuable for firms operating in high uncertain and more dynamic 
business environments that are characterized by high communication and information sharing 
costs where managerial discretion and fast decision making are expected to be most beneficial 
(see e.g., Boyd, 1995). Since more growth-oriented firms typically rely on very specific 
information which is more difficult to share and less transparent to company outsiders (e.g., 
Subrahmanyam and Titman, 2001; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Linck, Netter, Yang, 2008), the 
benefits of a combined leadership structure likely outweigh the potential costs for firms with 
higher growth opportunities. Hence, we hypothesize that leadership rationales emphasizing the 
benefits of a unified leadership structure should be positively related with two-day abnormal 
returns for firms operating in more dynamic or more growth-oriented business environments. 
The literature further argues that larger and more mature firms likely operating in more stable 
and less dynamic business environments and are hence better predictable. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) hypothesize that agency costs are an increasing function of firm size and monitoring 
activities become more difficult and more expensive the larger the firm gets over time, making 
more powerful CEOs more dysfunctional. Analyzing announcements of changes in board 
leadership structure of public U.S. companies, Palmon and Wald (2002) as well as Dey, Engel, 
and Liu (2011) provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that benefits and costs of board 
leadership structure vary with the size of the firm. The authors document that changing board 
leadership structure from a combined structure to a separate structure is on average associated 
with negative announcement returns for small firms while large firms usually experience 
positive abnormal returns. We therefore expect that leadership rationales for a combined 
leadership structure disclosed by larger and more mature firms are viewed less favorably by 
investors and hence leadership rationales that particularly emphasize the benefits of a unified 




We test the hypotheses regarding the heterogeneity in abnormal stock returns to the disclosure 
of combined leadership reasons by adding interaction terms of the respective leadership 
rationale and measures for environmental dynamics, firm size, or firm maturity to the 
regression specification of two-day abnormal returns (CAR [0,1]) for the sample of 282 
combined leadership structure firms shown in column (1) of Table 4.3. In particular, we focus 
on the three most frequently stated rationales based on organization theory, i.e., “Unified 
leadership”, “Knowledge as CEO”, and “Bridge between management and board”.  
We apply the following measures for environmental dynamics and growth-orientation, firm 
size and firm maturity: First, we use the indicator variable Tech firm according to the high-tech 
industry definition proposed by Loughran and Ritter (2004) since high-tech industries are 
typically characterized by rapidly changing and highly dynamic environments. Second, as an 
alternative and more restrictive definition, we apply the high-tech industry definition according 
to Murphy (2003) (New economy). Third, we use the firm’s market-to-book ratio (MTB) 
because higher MTB ratios likely indicate higher uncertainty regarding future growth potential 
and future profitability. Firm size is captured by the natural logarithm of the firm’s book value 
of total assets (ln(Total assets)) or the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization 
(ln(Market cap)). Finally, the maturity of the firm is measured as the number of years since the 
firm first appeared in CRSP (Firm age).  
The results for the three major combined leadership reasons “Unified leadership”, “Knowledge 
as CEO”, and “Bridge between management and board” are presented in Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 
4.6. Each table consists of two panels. Panel A shows the regression results for the interactions 
with Tech firm, New economy, and MTB while Panel B presents the estimates of the interactions 





Table 4.4: Combined leadership structure - Heterogeneous stock market reactions to 
“Unified leadership” 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results on heterogeneity of two-day abnormal 
returns (CAR [0,1]) following the disclosure of the board leadership reason “Unified leadership” for the 
sample of 282 firms with a combined board leadership structure. Panel A contains results from 
interactions with proxies for dynamic business environments, while Panel B shows interaction results 
with measures of firm size and firm maturity. New economy is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if the firm operates in a high-tech industry following the definition in Murphy (2003), zero 
otherwise. A firm is considered a high-tech firm if it operates in one of the following 4-digit SIC codes: 
3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372, and 7373. MTB 
is the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of equity. Control variables are identical to those 
shown in Table 4.3, except for column (1) of Panel B where ln(Market cap) is replaced by ln(Total 
assets) in the set of other controls. All other variables are as defined in Table 4.1. The nine proxy 
statement control variables are dummy variables that equal one if certain corporate governance events, 
described more fully in Section 4.2.3, are reported in the proxy statement. An intercept is included in all 
regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression 
coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A   CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  Tech firm New economy MTB 
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       Other reasons Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 282 282 282 
R-squared 0.094 0.106 0.051 
 
Panel B CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  ln(Total assets) ln(Market cap) Firm age 
  (1) (2) (3) 
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        Other reason categories Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 282 282 282 




We turn first to the heterogeneity analysis for the leadership rationale “Unified leadership” 
shown in Table 4.4. In support of the hypothesis that potential benefits of a combined 
leadership structure likely exceed the potential costs for firms operating in highly dynamic and 
likely more uncertain business environments, the estimates of each interaction term in column 
(1) to column (3) of Panel A show positive and statistically significant relations with the two-
day abnormal returns. The results indicate that investors welcome the disclosure of “Unified 
leadership” as a rationale for combining the CEO and chairman position if the firm operates in 
dynamic high-tech industries or is characterized by high growth opportunities. 
The results in Panel B of Table 4.4 are generally in support of the hypothesis of heterogeneity 
in stock market reactions across firm size which suggests that investors likely assess the 
leadership rationale “Unified leadership” contingent on the size of the company. Consistent 
with increasing agency costs associated with combining the CEO and chairman position in 
larger and more mature companies, the results show negative estimates for the interaction terms 
with the two proxies for firm size and for firm maturity. Taking heterogeneity across firm size 
into account, the main estimate of the rationale “Unified leadership” becomes significant and 
is overall positively related with the two-day cumulative abnormal returns throughout all three 
specifications of Panel B. The results generally show that smaller firms are associated with 
positive abnormal returns while larger firms typically experience negative abnormal returns 








Table 4.5: Combined leadership structure - Heterogeneous stock market reactions to 
“Knowledge as CEO” 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results on heterogeneity of two-day abnormal 
returns (CAR [0,1]) following the disclosure of the board leadership reason “Knowledge as CEO” for 
the sample of 282 firms with a combined board leadership structure. Panel A contains results from 
interactions with proxies for dynamic business environments, while Panel B shows interaction results 
with measures of firm size and firm maturity. New economy is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if the firm operates in a high-tech industry following the definition in Murphy (2003), zero 
otherwise. A firm is considered a high-tech firm if it operates in one of the following 4-digit SIC codes: 
3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372, and 7373. MTB 
is the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of equity. Control variables are identical to those 
shown in Table 4.3, except for column (1) of Panel B where ln(Market cap) is replaced by ln(Total 
assets) in the set of other controls. All other variables are as defined in Table 4.1. The nine proxy 
statement control variables are dummy variables that equal one if certain corporate governance events, 
described more fully in Section 4.2.3, are reported in the proxy statement. An intercept is included in all 
regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression 
coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A   CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  Tech firm New economy MTB 
  (1) (2) (3) 
       






















     Other reasons Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 282 282 282 
R-squared 0.051 0.055 0.049 
 
Panel B CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  ln(Total assets) ln(Market cap) Firm age 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        




















        Other reason categories Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 282 282 282 




The results from a similar analysis for the leadership reason “Knowledge as CEO” are 
presented in Table 4.5. Consistent with the previous hypotheses, we again expect investors to 
react more favorably to the rationale if the firm operates in a more dynamic and growth-
oriented business environment while market participants are expected to react more negatively 
if the rationale is stated by larger and more mature firms. Overall, we do not find consistent 
evidence for heterogeneous stock market reactions regarding the rationale “Knowledge as 
CEO”. Neither the interactions with proxies for environmental dynamics shown in Panel A nor 
the interactions with firm size or firm maturity in Panel B are statistically significant. The 
insignificant estimates might suggest that the leadership rationale provides only very limited 
insights into the decision about the firm’s board leadership structure. 
Turning to the analysis for the third most frequently stated reason for a combined leadership 
structure “Bridge between management and board”. The rationale particularly emphasizes the 
potential benefits of enhanced information flow between the management and the board if the 
CEO also acts as the chairman of the board. We again expected the rationale to be most valuable 
for firms in more dynamic and growth-oriented business environment while the relation is 
expected to less beneficial for larger and more mature firms. The results presented in Table 4.6 
provide some empirical support for the hypotheses. Although the majority of the interaction 
terms show insignificant regression estimates, both coefficients of the interactions with the 
high-tech industry indicators are positive (see Panel A) while the coefficients of the interactions 
with both measures for firm size show negative signs (see Panel B). Consistent with the firm 
size hypothesis, the interaction of the leadership reason “Bridge between management and 
board” with firm age is significant and negatively related with two-day abnormal returns 
indicating that investors consider the rationale for combining the roles to allow the CEO to act 




Table 4.6: Combined leadership structure - Heterogeneous effects to “Bridge between 
management and board” 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results on heterogeneity of two-day abnormal 
returns (CAR [0,1]) following the disclosure of the board leadership reason “Bridge between 
management and board” for the sample of 282 firms with a combined board leadership structure. Panel 
A contains results from interactions with proxies for dynamic business environments, while Panel B 
shows interaction results with measures of firm size and firm maturity. New economy is an indicator 
variable set to one if the firm operates in a high-tech industry following the definition in Murphy (2003), 
zero otherwise. A firm is considered a high-tech firm if it operates in one of the following 4-digit SIC 
codes: 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372, and 7373. 
MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of equity. Control variables are identical to 
those shown in Table 4.3, except for column (1) of Panel B where ln(Market cap) is replaced by ln(Total 
assets) in the set of other controls. All other variables are as defined in Table 4.1. The nine proxy 
statement control variables are dummy variables that equal one if certain corporate governance events, 
described more fully in Section 4.2.3, are reported in the proxy statement. An intercept is included in all 
regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression 
coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A   CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  Tech firm New economy MTB 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
       
























       Other reasons Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 282 282 282 
R-squared 0.051 0.050 0.047 
 
Panel B CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  ln(Total assets) ln(Market cap) Firm age 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        




















        Other reason categories Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 282 282 282 




Finally, we investigate whether the previously documented negative relation of the rationale 
“Leadership structure has served well” depends on the actual performance of the company. In 
Table 4.7, we interact the leadership reason with two measures of recent corporate performance 
that are likely relevant to shareholders, i.e., the company’s prior year buy-and-hold return 
(Prior year BHR) and the total return to shareholders over the past three years (TRS 3 years). 
Both estimates for the interaction terms are insignificant (see columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.7). 
We find that better stock market performance does not seem to mitigate the overall negative 
effect. Moreover, the main effect of the rationale “Leadership structure has served well” 
remains negative and statistically significant throughout both regressions.55  
The finance literature argues that founder CEOs differ considerably from professional CEOs 
in several aspects. Founder-CEOs have shaped their companies from their inception and likely 
possess more influence and decision-making power. Founder-CEOs are furthermore 
characterized by their intrinsic motivation to ensure the company’s survival and prosperity, 
large equity stakes that mitigate agency problems and likely pursue more long-term oriented 
strategies rather than short-term actions to maximize firm value. Several empirical studies 
document superior stock market performance of founder CEOs (see e.g., Fahlenbrach, 2009; 
Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi, 2014). Given the unique characteristics of founder CEOs, we 
expect non-negative or even positive stock market reactions to the disclosure of the leadership 
rationale “Leadership structure has served well” for founder CEOs. Column (3) of Table 4.7 
shows the regression results for the aforementioned hypothesis for founder CEOs.  
 
 
                                                 
55 In unreported regressions, we alternatively interact the leadership rationale “Leadership structure has served 
well” with measures of current or past accounting performance of the sample firms. Using the firm’s return on 
assets calculated as EBITDA over lagged total assets, the ratio of net income over total sales, or simple sales 




Table 4.7: Combined leadership structure - Heterogeneous effects to “Leadership structure 
has served well” 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results on heterogeneity of two-day abnormal 
returns (CAR [0,1]) following the disclosure of the board leadership reason “Leadership structure has 
served well” for the sample of 282 firms with a combined board leadership structure. Column (1) and 
column (2) show results from interactions with past stock market performance, while column (3) 
contains regression results for the interaction of the rationale “Leadership structure has served well” 
with the indicator variable Founder CEO. Prior year BHR is the realized buy-and-hold return calculated 
over a 250 days window before the event date. TRS 3 years is the total return to shareholders calculated 
over the previous three years with reinvested dividends. Founder CEO is an indicator variable if the 
CEO is the founder of the company, zero otherwise. Control variables are identical to those shown in 
Table 4.3. The nine proxy statement control variables are dummy variables that equal one if certain 
corporate governance events, described more fully in the text, are reported in the proxy statement. An 
intercept is included in all regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses 




 CAR [0,1] 
Board leadership structure reason: Leadership structure has served well 
Interaction measure: Prior year BHR TRS 3 years Founder CEO 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    




















    Other reasons Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 282 275 282 
R-squared 0.048 0.065 0.062 
Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a positive relation of abnormal returns with the 
disclosure of “Leadership structure has served well” for founder-CEO firms, as the positive 
effect outweighs the general negative stock market reaction. Overall, the results of Table 4.7 
do not indicate heterogeneity in stock market reactions for the rationale “Leadership structure 
has served well” due to differences in the firms’ past performance. However, the results rather 
suggest heterogeneity with respect to differences between founder-CEO firms and firms 




4.3.3.2. Separate leadership structure reasons and abnormal returns to equity holders 
We now turn the analysis to the leadership reasons stated by the 165 sample firms that 
have chosen to separate the CEO and chairman position. Table 4.8 presents the regression 
results. Again, the first three columns (columns (1), (2) and (3)) show cross-sectional ordinary 
least squares regression results of two-day cumulative abnormal returns to equity holders (CAR 
[0,1]) on the five most frequently stated reasons by firms with a separate leadership structure. 
The last two columns contain estimates from logit regressions where the dependent variable is 
an indicator variable, CAR [0,1] negative, that takes the value of one if the two-day cumulative 
abnormal return is below zero, and zero otherwise. The estimates in column (1) and column 
(4) of Table 4.8 are based on the entire sample of firms with a separate leadership structure 
while the results shown in columns (2), (3) and (5) are obtained from restricting the sample to 
early disclosure events, i.e., firms that filed their proxy statements during the first month 
(March 2010) or within the first two months (March and April 2010) after the new disclosure 











Table 4.8: Separate leadership structure - Announcement returns and disclosed reasons 
This table contains regression results of two-day cumulative abnormal stock returns on the five most 
frequently used leadership reasons disclosed by the 165 sample firms with a separate leadership 
structure. Columns (1), (2), and (3) provide ordinary least squares regression results. The dependent 
variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return to equity holder (CAR [0,1]). Columns (4) and 
(5) show logit regression results where the dependent variable is the indicator variable CAR [0,1] 
negative, which takes the value of one if the two-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR [0,1]) is 
below zero, zero otherwise. Regression results in columns (1) and (4) are obtained from the entire 
sample of 165 firms with a separate leadership structure. Regression results in column (2) are based 
on a restricted sample of firms that filed their proxy statement within the first month after the new 
SEC disclosure regulation became on February 28th, 2010. In column (3) and column (5), the sample 
is restricted to all observations within the first two months following the change in the disclosure 
regulation. “Other reason stated” is an indicator variable that is set to one if the company stated at 
least one reasoning for the board leadership structure decision beyond one of the five most frequent 
leadership rationales. Regulated industry is an indicator variable set to one if the company operates 
in the utility or financial industry (SIC codes: 4000 – 4999, 6000 – 6999), zero otherwise. The nine 
proxy statement control variables are dummy variables that take the value of one if certain corporate 
governance events, described more fully in Section 4.2.3, are reported in the proxy statement. All 
other variables are as defined in Table 4.1. An intercept is included in all regressions, but not 
reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficient. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 165 72 122  163 117 




The regression results in column (1) and column (5) of Table 4.8 for the full sample of 165 
separate leadership firms again yield insignificant cross-sectional estimates for the majority of 
leadership rationales upon two-day abnormal returns (CAR [0,1]) and the probability of a 
negative two-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR [0,1] negative). However, we find positive 
stock returns for the rationale “Chair’s experience with company” suggesting that investors on 
average seem to welcome the disclosure of the rationale. The rationale is positively related with 
two-day abnormal returns and consistently also negatively related with the probability of a 
negative abnormal return. Surprisingly, we also find positive stock market reactions for firms 
whose sections on board leadership structure do not contain any rationale (“No reason stated”). 
Lastly, the full sample results further indicate that separating the two roles due to the 
differences between the CEO and chairman position (“Differences between tasks/roles”) tends 
to be viewed rather favorably by investors. We find that the disclosure of the reason is 
associated with a reduction of the likelihood of a negative two-day abnormal return. Again, the 
estimates for the large majority of the control variables as well as for the proxy statement 
controls are insignificant indicating that simultaneous disclosure of other confounding 
information does not seem to affect the findings of the analysis. 
Similar to the analysis of the two-day abnormal returns for firms with a combined leadership 
structure, we investigate whether learning effects of firms or investors, or heterogeneity in 
investors’ stock market reactions help explain the insignificant estimates for the majority of 
leadership rationales. First, to test for learning effects of investors over time, we rerun the 
regression analysis of column (1) of Table 4.8 with a restricted sample of firms that filed their 
proxy statements during the first month (March 2010) or the first two months (March and April 
2010) of the sample period, respectively. The results shown in column (2), (3) and (5) of Table 
4.8 again indicate that restricting the sample to early disclosure events generally improves the 




theory, we find that emphasizing the differences in the roles between the CEO and chairman is 
welcomed by investors as the relation of the leadership rationale with the two-day abnormal 
returns is found to be positive. Overall, the findings again support the notion that investors 
seem to learn about reason disclosures of firms over time and use the information provided by 
early disclosures to update their expectations about the reason disclosure of other comparable 
firms.  
Second, in Appendix 4.F we compare relative frequencies of leadership reasons over the 
sample period to test for potential learning effects of firms over time. Analyzing difference-in-
means tests for the five most frequently stated rationales reveals that the use of the two 
leadership reasons “Differences between tasks/roles” and “CEO can focus on management” for 
the separation of the CEO and chairman position significantly increases over time. Particularly, 
late disclosing firms, i.e., firms that file their proxy statement after the first two months of the 
sample period use both leadership reasons almost twice as often as early disclosing firms. 
Contrary to firms with a combined leadership structure, the significant differences in the 
frequencies of the aforementioned two rationales provide some indication for potential learning 
and adjustment effects of firms with a separate leadership structure over time.  
Finally, we perform an analysis regarding heterogeneity in stock market reactions to the 
disclosure of leadership rationales for the sample of separate leadership firms similar to the 
analysis for the sample of firms with a combined leadership structure. Specifically, we 
investigate whether two-day abnormal returns following the disclosure of the three most 
frequently stated leadership rationales for separating the CEO and chairman position, i.e., 
“Differences between tasks/roles”, “Facilitates monitoring”, and “CEO can focus on 
management” that are based on agency theory are also contingent on the characteristics and 




for board leadership structure decisions, the rationales for separating the two roles are expected 
to be viewed less favorably by corporate shareholders if the firm operates in more dynamic and 
growth-oriented business environments. On the contrary, rationales for the separation of the 
CEO and chairman position are expected to be rather welcomed by investors if stated by larger 
and more mature firms as those firms are typically more difficult to manage and separation of 
the tasks is likely most valuable for managing the company and in mitigating agency costs. 
Again, we use the high-tech classifications Tech firm and New economy as well as the firm’s 
market-to-book ratio (MTB) to proxy for dynamic business environments and growth 
opportunities. The measures for firm size and firm maturity are the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s total assets (ln(Total Assets) or the firm’s market capitalization (ln(MarketCap)), and 
the firm’s age (Firm age). In addition to the analysis for firms with a combined leadership 
structure, we investigate for the sample of firms with a separate leadership structure to what 
extent stock market reactions to the rationales for separating the CEO and chairman positions 
depend on the characteristics of the chairman (Founder chair, Chair former CEO, Independent 
chair), the characteristics of the CEO (CEO tenure, New CEO), as well as governance 
characteristics like board independence.56 We add interaction terms of the three main 
leadership rationales and the above listed variables to the full sample regression specification 
shown in column (1) of Table 4.8. The analysis and the respective regression results for the 
three leadership reasons are presented in Table 4.9, Table 4.10, and Table 4.11, respectively. 
Panel A of each table contains the interactions with environmental dynamics, firm size and 
firm maturity while Panel B contains the interactions with CEO, chairman and governance 
characteristics.
                                                 
56 We alternatively apply other CEO and governance characteristics, such as CEO age, Founder CEO, or 
Staggered board. We do not find evidence for heterogeneity in investors’ stock market reactions with respect to 
the aforementioned characteristics. 
 
 
Table 4.9: Separate leadership structure - Heterogeneous stock market reactions to “Differences between tasks/roles” 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results on heterogeneity in two-day abnormal returns (CAR [0,1]) following the disclosure of the board 
leadership reason “Differences between tasks/roles” for the sample of 165 firms with a separate board leadership structure. Panel A contains results from 
interactions of the leadership rationale with proxies for more dynamic business environments (column (1) to column (3)) and with measures of firm size and 
firm maturity (column (4) to column (6)). Panel B presents results from interactions with characteristics of the CEO (column (1) and (2)), characteristics of the 
chairman (column (3), (4), and (5)) or board independence (column (6)). New CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if the current CEO has been appointed 
the company’s CEO within less than one year, zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the first inclusion date in CRSP. Founder chair is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one if the chairman is the founder of the company, zero otherwise. Chair former CEO is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the chairman of the board has previously been worked as the company’s CEO, zero otherwise. Independent chair is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the chairman of the board is an independent director, zero otherwise. Independence ratio is the number of independent directors divided by the 
total number of directors. Control variables are identical to those shown in Table 4.8. The nine proxy statement control variables are dummy variables that equal 
one if certain corporate governance events, described more fully in the text, are reported in the proxy statement. An intercept is included in all regressions, but 













Table 4.9: Separate leadership structure - Heterogeneous stock market reactions to “Differences between tasks/roles” (cont’d) 
Panel A CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  Tech firm New economy MTB  ln(Total assets) ln(Market cap) Firm age 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
         












       Differences between tasks/roles* 

























         
Other reasons Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 165 165 165  165 165 165 
R-squared 0.082 0.084 0.081  0.114 0.081 0.102 
 
 
Panel B CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  New CEO CEO tenure  Founder chair Chair former CEO  Independent chair  Independence ratio 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
              












        Differences between tasks/roles* 

























              
Other reasons Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 165 165  165 165 165  165 







Table 4.10: Separate leadership structure - Heterogeneous stock market reactions to “Facilitates monitoring” 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results on heterogeneity in two-day abnormal returns (CAR [0,1]) following the disclosure of the board 
leadership reason “Facilitates monitoring” for the sample of 165 firms with a separate board leadership structure. Panel A contains results from interactions of 
the leadership rationale with proxies for more dynamic business environments (column (1) to column (3)) and with measures of firm size and firm maturity 
(column (4) to column (6)). Panel B presents results from interactions with characteristics of the CEO (column (1) and (2)), characteristics of the chairman 
(column (3), (4), and (5)) or board independence (column (6)).  New CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if the current CEO has been appointed the 
company’s CEO within less than one year, zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the first inclusion date in CRSP. Founder chair is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the chairman is the founder of the company, zero otherwise. Chair former CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the chairman of the board has previously been worked as the company’s CEO, zero otherwise. Independent chair is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
chairman of the board is an independent director, zero otherwise. Independence ratio is the number of independent directors divided by the total number of 
directors. Control variables are identical to those shown in Table 4.8. The nine proxy statement control variables are dummy variables that equal one if certain 
corporate governance events, described more fully in the text, are reported in the proxy statement. An intercept is included in all regressions, but not reported. 













Table 4.10: Separate leadership structure - Heterogeneous stock market reactions to “Facilitates monitoring” (cont’d) 
Panel A CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  Tech firm New economy MTB  ln(Total assets) ln(Market cap) Firm age 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
         












       Facilitates monitoring* 

























         
Other reasons Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 165 165 165  165 165 165 
R-squared 0.087 0.085 0.081  0.115 0.082 0.100 
 
 
Panel B CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  New CEO CEO tenure  Founder chair Chair former CEO  Independent chair  Independence ratio 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
              












        Facilitates monitoring* 

























              
Other reasons Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 165 165  165 165 165  165 







Turning to the analyses for the leadership reasons “Differences between the tasks/roles” and 
“Facilitates monitoring”.  The results in Panel A and Panel B of Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 do 
not suggest that there is heterogeneity in abnormal returns to the disclosure of the two 
leadership rationales. Neither the interactions with the tech-industry indicator variables, the 
firm’s MTB ratio, firm size, nor the interactions with the characteristics of the chairman show 
statistically significant estimates. Results in column (1) of Panel B in Table 4.9 indicate, 
however, that investors seem to react positively to the rationale “Differences between the 
task/roles” if the current CEO has recently been appointed. 
Turning to Panel B of Table 4.10, we find that the interaction of the rationale “Facilitates 
monitoring” with the indicator variable for a newly hired CEOs (New CEO) is negatively 
related to two-day abnormal returns (see column (1)) while the interaction with CEO tenure is 
associated with positive stock market reactions by investors (see column (2)). The negative 
coefficient for recently appointed CEOs is consistent with the notion that shareholders consider 
the rationale of more effective monitoring less convincing and rather implausible for the CEO 
has been recently hired as is likely less entrenched. The benefits of intense monitoring are 
rather small for recently appointed CEOs and likely less powerful CEOs compared to their 
long-tenured counterparts (see e.g., Taylor, 2010). Consistently, shareholders seem to welcome 
the rationale “Facilitates monitoring” for splitting the roles as it indicates that the board 
recognizes the need for enhanced monitoring ability which is particularly valuable for long-




Table 4.11: Separate leadership structure - Heterogeneous stock market reactions to “CEO can focus on management” 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results on heterogeneity in two-day abnormal returns (CAR [0,1]) following the disclosure of the board 
leadership reason “CEO can focus on management” for the sample of 165 firms with a separate board leadership structure. Panel A contains results from 
interactions of the leadership rationale with proxies for more dynamic business environments (column (1) to column (3)) and with measures of firm size and 
firm maturity (column (4) to column (6)). Panel B presents results from interactions with characteristics of the CEO (column (1) and (2)), characteristics of the 
chairman (column (3), (4), and (5)) or board independence (column (6)). New CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if the current CEO has been appointed 
the company’s CEO within less than one year, zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the first inclusion date in CRSP. Founder chair is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one if the chairman is the founder of the company, zero otherwise. Chair former CEO is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the chairman of the board has previously been worked as the company’s CEO, zero otherwise. Independent chair is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the chairman of the board is an independent director, zero otherwise. Independence ratio is the number of independent directors divided by the 
total number of directors. Control variables are identical to those shown in Table 4.8. The nine proxy statement control variables are dummy variables that 
equal one if certain corporate governance events, described more fully in the text, are reported in the proxy statement. An intercept is included in all regressions, 














Table 4.11: Separate leadership structure - Heterogeneous stock market reactions to “CEO can focus on management” (cont’d) 
Panel A CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  Tech firm New economy MTB  ln(Total assets) ln(Market cap) Firm age 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
         












       CEO can focus on management* 

























         
Other reasons Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 165 165 165  165 165 165 
R-squared 0.081 0.083 0.094  0.134 0.095 0.145 
 
 
Panel B   CAR [0,1] 
Interaction measure:  New CEO CEO tenure  Founder chair Chair former CEO  Independent chair  Independence ratio 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
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CEO can focus on management* 
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Other reasons Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 165 165  165 165 165  165 







The third most important reason for a separate leadership structure is the possibility to allow 
the CEO to fully concentrate on managing the day-to-day operations of the company. Being 
able to focus on managing the company can be particularly beneficial if the CEO just entered 
the corner office or if the firm is larger and likely more difficult to manage. In contrast, the 
benefits might be less pronounced for firms operating in more dynamic and more rapidly 
changing business environments. Table 4.11 provides the results of the analysis of 
heterogeneity in investors’ stock market reactions to the leadership rationale “CEO can focus 
on management”. 
In general support of the previous hypothesis, the first three columns of Panel A of Table 4.11 
show negative but insignificant coefficients for the interaction terms with high-tech and 
growth-oriented companies. The results, however, suggest that investors’ reaction to the 
disclosure of the leadership reason “CEO can focus on management” seems to depend less on 
the economic environment of the firm. However, and consistent with the hypothesis for firm 
size and firm complexity, we find that smaller firms are on average associated with negative 
abnormal returns while larger and more mature firms typically experience significant, positive 
stock market reactions (see column (4) to column (6) of Panel A). Overall, the findings 
complement the negative interaction effects for the interactions with firm size and firm age 
with the leadership rationale “Unified leadership” for a combined leadership structure shown 
in Section 4.3.3.1 very well. 
Allowing the CEO to focus on management likely necessitates to have a chairman or other 
directors on the board who possess in-depth knowledge about and experience with the 
company. It might be particularly valuable to have individuals on the board who are able to 
provide advice and managerial support to the CEO rather than having more independent and 




managerial actions. Panel B of Table 4.11 shows that shareholders indeed react positively to 
the disclosure of “CEO can focus on management”, particularly for recently appointed CEOs 
(see column (1)), and if the chairman is the founder or a former CEO of the company (see 
columns (3) and (4)). Consistently, stock market reactions are found to be negative if the firms 
has already higher governance standards in place, i.e., if the chairman is an independent 
director or board independence is high (see column (5) and (6)). 
In a last step of the analysis of two-abnormal returns, we address the question whether investor 
reactions to the disclosure of the rationale “Chair’s experience with the company” vary 
depending on the actual experience and knowledge of the chairman with the company. We use 
the chairperson’s founder status, the classification as a former company CEO and the non-
independence status as proxies for potential in-depth knowledge and experience with the 
company.57 In column (1) to column (3) of Table 4.12, we rerun the baseline regression from 
column (1) of Table 4.8 separately for the subsamples of founder chairmen, former company 
CEOs and non-independent chairmen. Throughout all three subsample regressions for proxies 
of in-depth knowledge and experience with the company, we find that the leadership rationale 
“Chair’s experience with company” is positively related with two-day abnormal returns. 
Finally, using the interaction term of the leadership rationale with the indicator variable 
Independent chair reveals substantial differences in stock market reactions between 
independent and non-independent chairs. Firms with a non-independent chairman experience 
positive abnormal returns while firms with an independent chairman face negative stock market 
reactions indicating that investors seem to assess the disclosure of the rationale “Chair’s 
experience with company” based on the chair’s actual experience with the company.
                                                 
57 Non-independent directors are usually inside directors who are employed by the company, or outside non-
independent directors who have material relationship with company either directly or as a partner, shareholder or 




Table 4.12: Separate leadership structure - Heterogeneous stock market reactions to “Chair’s experience with the company” 
This table presents heterogeneous stock market effects of two-day cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR [0,1]) to equity holders following the disclosure of 
the leadership reason “Chair’s experience with the company” for the sample of 165 firms with a separate leadership structure. Column (1), (2) and (3) present 
regression results for subsamples where the chairman is either the company’s founder, a former CEO of the company, or classified as non-independent chairman. 
The regression results in column (4) are obtained by adding an interaction term of the indicator variable Independent chair and the leadership rationale “Chair’s 
experience with the company” to the regression specification shown in column (1) of Table 8. Independent chair is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
chairman of the board is an independent director, zero otherwise. Control variables are identical to those shown in Table 4.8. The nine proxy statement control 
variables are dummy variables that equal one if certain corporate governance events, described more fully in the text, are reported in the proxy statement. An 
intercept is included in all regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficient. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 CAR [0,1] 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Subsample: Founder chair 





Interaction measure:     Independent chair 
      








Chair’s experience with company* 
Interaction measure 
    -0.0250** 
(-2.43) 
Interaction measure     0.0012 
(0.24) 
Other reasons Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Proxy statement controls (9) Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 31 78 82  165 







4.3.4. Analysis of textual similarity of sections on board leadership structure 
Shareholder reactions to firms’ leadership rationales as well as disclosures of leadership 
structure reasons of other companies might encourage firms to adjust their sections on board 
leadership structure over time. Firms might either change the wording of the disclosed section 
on board leadership or even substitute certain leadership rationales that are likely perceived 
less favorably by shareholders and financial markets. To address this question, we study the 
determinants of textual similarity of the sample firms’ 2010 sections on board leadership and 
the following sections that are disclosed in the firms’ 2011 proxy statements. 
We extract the following year sections on board leadership structure from the sample firms’ 
2011 proxy statement and calculate scores of textual similarity for each pair of a firm’s sections 
on board leadership structure using the Ratcliff and Obershelp (1988) algorithm for pattern 
recognition and textual similarity.58 The algorithm generates similarity scores (Text similarity) 
between zero and one, where larger values indicate higher textual similarity between both 
sections of a firm.59 We run Tobit regressions of Text similarity on the five most frequently 
stated leadership reasons, textual sentiment measures for positive and negative tone, and a set 
of additional potential other determinants related to firm, governance, CEO, or chairman 
characteristics. Table 4.13 and Table 4.14 present the regression results separately for each 
type of board leadership structure.  
As CEO turnover likely affects the disclosed text of firms’ sections on board leadership 
structure, the second column of each table contains estimates for the respective subsets of firms 
where the same individual is serving as the company’s CEO in both years 2010 and 2011. 
                                                 
58 Due to merger and acquisition activities of our sample firms during the fiscal year 2010, we are only able to 
access the proxy statements for 276 firms with a combined leadership structure and for 162 firms with a separate 
leadership structure.  




First, results in Table 4.13 for the sample of combined leadership firms yield insignificant 
estimates for almost all of the five leadership structure rationales. We only find that firms 
stating that the combined leadership structure contributes to an efficient and effective board are 
associated with higher textual similarity and hence fewer textual adjustments in their sections 
on board leadership structure. The analysis further reveals that dual leadership firms with larger 
boards also tend to be more persistent in their wording of the sections on board leadership 
structure. Further, we find female CEOs as well as larger firms to be associated with lower 
textual similarity over time. Most interestingly, the results also indicate that sections with more 
negative sentiment as well as sections disclosed by firms which have been targeted by 
shareholder proposals calling for an independent chairman in 2010 show lower textual 
persistence and are more likely to be rephrased. In line with expectations, CEO replacements 
are found to affect textual similarity of sections on board leadership structure negatively. 
 
Table 4.13: Combined leadership structure - Text similarity of 2010 and 2011 sections 
on board leadership structure 
The table presents Tobit regression results of Text similarity on the five most frequently used 
leadership reasons and additional CEO, firm and governance controls for firms with a combined 
leadership structure. Text similarity is the similarity of each firm’s texts on board leadership structure 
disclosed in the 2010 and the following 2011 proxy statement. The sample consists of 276 sample 
firms with a combined leadership structure and available 2011 proxy statement section on board 
leadership structure. Text similarity is calculated using the Ratcliff and Obershelp (1988) algorithm 
for pattern matching. The algorithm returns similarity scores of two strings between zero and one. 
Higher values indicate higher textual similarity. New CEO2011 is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the company’s CEO changed compared to the previous year, zero otherwise. In column (2), the 
sample consists of all firms where the same individual serves as the company’s CEO for the year 2010 
and 2011, i.e., indicator variable New CEO2011 equals zero. “Other reason stated” is an indicator 
variable set to one if the company stated at least one reason beyond the five most frequent ones. An 
intercept is included in all regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses 









Table 4.13: Combined leadership structure - Text similarity of 2010 and 2011 sections 
on board leadership structure (cont’d) 
 Text similarity2010_2011 
  (1)  (2) 
















































New CEO2011 -0.4302*** 
(-8.59) 
  
































Observations 276  243 





Second, turning to the results of textual similarity for firms with a separate leadership structure 
presented in Table 4.14, we find that disclosing rationales for separating the roles consistent 
with agency theory, i.e., “Difference between task/roles” or “Facilitates monitoring” is 
typically associated with higher textual similarity and higher persistence in the disclosed 
sections. Further, stating any other reason beside one of the five most frequent rationales as 
well as texts with higher negative sentiment are associated lower textual similarity and more 
likely to be subject to change over time. 
Table 4.14: Separate leadership structure - Text similarity of 2010 and 2011 sections 
board leadership structure 
The table presents Tobit regression results of Text similarity on the five most frequently used 
leadership reasons and additional CEO, firm and governance controls for firms with a separate 
leadership structure. Text similarity is the similarity of each firm’s texts on board leadership structure 
disclosed in the 2010 and the following 2011 proxy statement. The sample consists of 162 sample 
firms with a separate leadership structure and available 2011 proxy statement section on board 
leadership structure. Text similarity is calculated using the Ratcliff and Obershelp (1988) algorithm 
for pattern matching. The algorithm returns similarity scores of two strings between zero and one. 
Higher values indicate higher textual similarity. New CEO2011 is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the company’s CEO changed compared to the previous year, zero otherwise. In column (2), the 
sample consists of all firms where the same individual serves as the company’s CEO for the year 2010 
and 2011, i.e., indicator variable New CEO2011 equals zero. “Other reason stated” is an indicator 
variable set to one if the company stated at least one reason beyond the five most frequent ones. An 
intercept is included in all regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses 












Table 4.14: Separate leadership structure - Text similarity of 2010 and 2011 sections 
board leadership structure (cont’d) 
 Text similarity2010_2011 
  (1)  (2) 
















































New CEO2011 -0.1293 
(-1.17) 
  
































Observations 162  151 
Log likelihood -46.26  -40.60 
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Overall, we find that none of the estimates of the major board leadership structure rationales 
for both leadership types is negatively related to textual similarity. We take this as evidence 
that certain leadership rationales do not seem to encourage firms to revise their disclosed 
section on board leadership structure to strategically avoid or replace certain leadership 
rationales. In unreported regressions, we find no empirical evidence that neither two-day 
abnormal returns at the time of the first reason disclosure nor that cross-sectional heterogeneity 
with respect to the leadership structure rationales seems to affect textual similarity of firms’ 
sections on board leadership structure. For the sample of firms with a separate leadership 
structure, we also find no indication that textual similarity is related to individual characteristics 
of the chairman. Finally, restricting the sample to early disclosing firms does not change the 
findings and results presented in Table 4.13 and Table 4.14.  
4.4. Conclusion  
This chapter of the dissertation proposes a novel approach to study optimal board 
leadership structure decisions of public corporations. Using the 2009 change in the SEC 
regulation which requires firms to disclose the rationales why firms have decided to combine 
or separate the positions of the chief executive officer and the chairman, the chapter provides 
valuable insights from endogenous, yet unobserved rationales for board leadership structure 
decisions of corporate boards of S&P500 companies.  
We document that firms that combine the CEO and chairman position state more leadership 
rationales than firms with a separate leadership structure. The empirical results from the 
analysis of the two-day abnormal returns to equity holders suggest that the majority of 
disclosed reasons are informative for investors (as proposed by the SEC) and that market 
participants care about the so-far unobserved motives of board leadership structure choices. 




disclosure of individual leadership structure rationales indicates that investors seem to evaluate 
the rationales for the unification or separation of the CEO and chairman positions conditional 
on the specific circumstances and characteristics of the firm. Furthermore, the analysis reveals 
that stock market reactions of investors are largely consistent with the concept of potential 
benefits and costs associated with each type of board leadership structure, as suggested by 
agency and organization theories. 
The analysis of textual similarity of firms’ the current and following year sections on board 
leadership structure suggests that board leadership sections are largely persistent over time and 
do not seem to be actively change to avoid specific leadership rationales that are likely 
perceived less favorably by market participants. Hence, we do not find evidence for 
opportunistic or strategic disclosure of leadership rationales by firms.  
Overall, the chapter provides a significant contribution regarding the endogenous choice of 
board leadership structure of public firms, particularly against the backdrop of a highly 
controversial discussion and the question as to why firms grant their CEOs structural power 
via a dual leadership role.  Finally, the chapter provides evidence regarding the research 
question whether the rationales of corporate boards for their choice of leadership structure 
actually matter for corporate shareholders and whether the disclosed rationales constitute 
valuable information regarding the firm’s governance structure. 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion and Outlook 
 
A significant part of the literature in corporate governance and corporate leadership 
builds on the non-dynamic and rather dichotomous conception that certain governance 
mechanisms are either always beneficial or detrimental for corporate performance. So far, 
dynamic situations and interdependences as caused, for example, by sudden major shocks to 
the economic environment, dynamics in and interactions with the business environment or 
effects due to the evolution of managers over time have largely been neglected in the literature. 
In this context, this dissertation contributes to the recent strand of the literature on corporate 
governance and corporate leadership and helps to improve the understanding of how different 
forms of dynamics in a nonstationary world can interact with and alter the effects of governance 
and corporate leadership structures. 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation provides new insights on the interaction and relation between the 
CEO and chairman. Substantial age dissimilarity between the two leads to more intense board 
monitoring and higher firm value, particular for firms with greater monitoring needs. However, 
the positive effect of substantial age dissimilarity significantly changes after the economic 
shock of the 2007 financial crisis. During the crisis, firms with substantial age dissimilarity 
between the CEO and the chairman experience a stronger decline and destruction in firm value 
which cancels out the positive effect during the non-crisis years. The findings of the chapter 
contribute to the limited literature about the effects of the chair’s characteristics and to the 
emerging literature on the effects of (dis)similarities between the CEO and the board of 
directors. Further, the chapter provides evidence that this relationship matters for the board’s 
monitoring intensity and firm value. It shows specifically that the relationship is significantly 




documents that firms should mind the age gap as substantial age dissimilarity can have severe 
adverse effects during economic recessions. 
Chapter 3 studies how the impact of CEOs on the valuation of the firm they run changes over 
their time in office. The chapter investigates the external (environmental) determinants that 
dynamically render CEOs more or less valuable to the firm. The chapter documents that on 
average firm performance exhibits a hump-shaped relation over the CEO’s tenure. Most 
importantly, the tenure-performance relation is found to vary substantially depending on the 
dynamics of the industry environment of the firm, the economic business cycle and the 
exogenous conditions of the market for corporate control. The chapter further shows that the 
CEOs’ ability to adapt to mitigate the continuously declining CEO-firm match over time might 
help to overcome the negative effects on firm performance - particularly in the later years of 
the tenure. Overall, the findings suggest that a significant fraction of long-tenured CEOs 
constitute suboptimal matches for their firms and that boards have trouble replacing their CEOs 
particularly due to increasing entrenchment over time. The chapter’s results help explain why 
even good performing CEOs can be associated with declining firm value after some point in 
time as the economic environment changes over time (see Appendix 3.A).  
Finally, Chapter 4 of the dissertation presents a novel approach to study optimal board 
leadership structure decisions of public corporations using a 2009 regulatory disclosure reform 
by the SEC which required firms to reveal the yet unobserved rationales behind their decision 
to combine or separate the CEO and chairman position. The empirical results from the analysis 
of the two-day abnormal returns reveals that investors’ stock market reactions are contingent 
on the context and circumstances of the firm, and largely consistent with agency and 
organizational theory arguments. Particularly, the empirical results suggest that the dynamics 




leadership structure decisions. If firms operate in likely more (less) dynamic business 
environments, stock market reactions tend to be more positive (negative) for firms that combine 
the CEO and chairman position. By systematically identifying the firms’ leadership rationales 
and the analysis of investors’ stock reactions, a form of feedback from corporate shareholders, 
this chapter of the dissertation provides valuable insights on the qualitative determinants of 
board leadership structure decisions of corporate boards and how investors value the disclosed 
reasoning. The latter further allows for more sophisticated assessment of the firms’ choice of 
board leadership structure.  
The findings of the three chapters of this dissertation indicate that environmental dynamics and 
dynamic interactions are important factors in the determination and assessment of optimal 
governance and leadership structures. Specifically, dynamic changes can induce significant 
variation in how governance and leadership structures affect corporate performance over time. 
Even if the firm’s business environment might change only little, macroeconomic shocks can 
lead to severe changes in the effect of governance and leadership mechanisms. Overall, the 
results are to some degree contrary to recent developments in the regulatory requirements of 
corporate governance codes that frequently call for mandatory age and term limits for 
executives and directors or for a mandatory separation of leadership positions. Hence, the 
results of the dissertation suggest that a static “one size fits all” cure regarding corporate 
governance might be inappropriate and suboptimal for some firms because static and inflexible 
regulatory actions can prevent firms from selecting optimal board composition or leadership 
structures over time. The dissertation particularly indicates that boards should have the 
flexibility to pro-actively select governance and leadership structures according to the firms’ 
future needs and should put less emphasis on historic performance and economic conditions as 
governance structures are long-term oriented and might not be as quickly adaptable as the 




Building upon the research questions and the main findings of this dissertation, several related 
interesting aspects for future research might arise: First, given that substantial age dissimilarity 
between the CEO and the chairman is associated with enhanced monitoring and better 
governance (see Chapter 2), further research might investigate whether and how age 
dissimilarity affects corporate risk taking, managerial compensation, corporate investment 
behavior or the innovativeness of firms. Research might also address the question whether the 
relation of substantial age dissimilarity varies with the dynamics across business environments.  
Second, based on the findings of Chapter 3, further research might investigate whether the 
tenure-performance relation varies across other CEO types? Do professional CEOs of family 
firms exhibit a similar tenure-performance relation given that CEO entrenchment is expected 
to be less pronounced and hardly possible in family businesses? Are there differences across 
the characteristics of general managerial ability of CEOs that are more or less important for 
their ability to adapt to changes in the economic environment? 
Finally, related to the analysis of Chapter 4, future research might focus on whether and how 
the rationales for board leadership structure decisions change over time. Particularly, how does 
the company’s reasoning change after the announcement of changes in one of the two 
leadership positions, i.e., after the appointment of a new CEO or a new chairman. Do the 
disclosed leadership rationales on the choice of board leadership structure depend on the type 
of turnover of the previous CEO? Are rationales more related to agency theory subsequent a 
forced CEO turnover or are firms even more likely to split the roles following forced turnover 
of a dual leadership CEO? 
Answering the above questions would extend and improve the understanding of the research 
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Appendix 2.A: Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
Board meetings The number of ordinary and extraordinary board meetings as well as the number of 
video and telephone conferences held by the supervisory board during the fiscal year. 
Meetings are reported in the firms’ annual reports. 
ROA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by the 
book value of total assets. 
Tobin’s Q The firm’s market value to its replacement costs approximated by the market 
capitalization plus the difference between the book value of total assets and the book 
value of equity, all divided by the book value of total assets. 
Age characteristics  
CEO age The natural logarithm of the age of the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO). 
Chair-CEO age 
difference (+/-) 
The age difference (in years) between the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO 
calculated as chair age minus CEO age.  
Chair-CEO age difference 
absolute 
The absolute value of the age difference (in years) between the chair of the supervisory 
board and the CEO.   
Chair age The natural logarithm of the age of the supervisory board’s chair.  
Gap20 chair-CEO Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the age difference between the chair of the 
supervisory board and the CEO and is at least 20 years, and zero otherwise. This 
dummy variable measures a generational gap, as reflected by an age difference of at 
least 20 years as suggested by Strauss and Howe (1997). 
Squared chair-CEO age 
difference 
The squared age difference between the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board.  
Other chair-CEO dissimilarities 
Chair-CEO different education Dummy variable that is set to one if the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO do 
not have the same education (law, economics, else), and zero otherwise. 
Chair-CEO different gender Dummy variable that is set to one if the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO 
have a different gender, and zero otherwise. 
Chair-CEO different nationality  Dummy variable that is set to one if the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO 
have different nationalities, and zero otherwise. 
Chair-CEO joint tenure The number of years the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO have been working 
together in these positions. 
Chair-CEO same family Dummy variable that is set to one if the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO are 
from the same family. 
CEO characteristics  
CEO change Dummy variable set to one for years when there is a CEO change. 
 
CEO tenure The number of years the CEO has been serving as the CEO of the firm. 
Founder CEO Dummy variable set to one if the CEO is the founder of the firm, and zero otherwise. 
Chair characteristics  
Busy chair Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the chair of the supervisory board holds 
three or more directorships, and zero otherwise. 
Chair change Dummy variable set to one if either the firm’s chair of the supervisory board takes 
office in a given year. 
Chair tenure The number of years the chair has been serving as the chair of the supervisory board. 
Chair is former firm CEO Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the chair of the supervisory board is the 
firm’s former CEO, zero otherwise. 
Chair is former firm executive Dummy variable that takes the value of one if chair of the supervisory board is a former 
member of the firm’s management board, and zero otherwise. 
Founder chair Dummy variable set to one if the chair of the supervisory board is the founder of the 





Appendix 2.A: Definition of variables (cont’d) 
Supervisory board characteristics 
Board age The average age of all the shareholder representatives on the supervisory board. 
Board size The total number of members on the supervisory board. 
Busy board Dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least 50% of the shareholder 
representatives hold three or more directorships, and zero otherwise. 
CV board age The coefficient of variation of the supervisory board age defined as the standard 
deviation of the age of shareholder representatives on the supervisory board divided by 
the average age of shareholder representatives. 
Avg. tenure SB members 
 
The average tenure (in years) of all supervisory board members. Board appointment is 
traced back to the year 1998. 
No. of active committees  The number of committees involving members of the supervisory board and that meet 
at least once a year. 
Union representatives The number of union representatives on the supervisory board divided by the number 




CV management board age The coefficient of variation of the management board age defined as the standard 
deviation of the age of the members of the management board, excluding the CEO, 
divided by the average age of the members of the management board, excluding the 
CEO. 
Management board age The average age of the members of the management board, excluding the CEO. 
Management board size The natural logarithm of the total number of members of the management board. 
Management board tenure The average number of years the members of the management board have been serving 
on the firm’s management board, excluding the CEO.  
Firm characteristics  
Book leverage The firm’s book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets, both 
measured at the end of the fiscal year t-1. 
Blockholder 50% Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a single shareholder holds at least 50% 
of the common shares outstanding, and zero otherwise. 
Business segments The number of business segments reported in S&P Capital IQ that generate at least 
10% of the firm’s annual total revenues. 
CapEx/TA The firm’s capital expenditures (CapEx) standardized by total assets, both measured at 
the end of the fiscal year t-1. 
Family firm Dummy variable that is set to one if the firm is a family firm according to the definition 
used in Anderson and Reeb (2003), and zero otherwise. 
FCF/Sales Free cash flow (defined as EBITDA - CapEx) divided by total sales. 
Firm age (foundation) The natural logarithm of the number of years since the foundation of the firm. 
Free float The percentage of the company’s voting shares to be free float. 
Herf. control The Herfindahl index of all blockholders that own at least 5% of the firm’s ordinary 
shares. 
Intangibles assets The firm’s book value of intangible assets divided by the book value of total assets. 
R&D/sales The annual R&D expenditures divided by total revenue, both measured at the end of 
the fiscal year t-1. Missing R&D values are set to zero. 
ROA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by the 
book value of total assets. 
ROE The firm’s net income divided by the book value of equity, both measured at the end 
of the fiscal year t-1. 
Sales growth The nominal growth rate of total revenues over the past two years. 
Stock volatility Stock volatility is measured as the stock volatility (standard deviation) over the past 
two years using daily stock returns.  




Appendix 2.B: Histogram for Chair-CEO age difference (+/-) 
This figure shows a histogram of the age difference between the the chair of the supervisory board and the CEO for the sample of German firms listed on the 
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Appendix 2.C: Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm profitability (return on assets) 
This table reports panel regression results of return on assets (ROA) on measures of chair-CEO age dissimilarity and additional controls for German firms listed 
on the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX in 2005 and 2010. ROA is defined as EBITDA to book value of total assets. Regressions (1) to (4) use firm-fixed effects, 
regression (5) uses CEO-firm fixed effects, regression (6) uses chair-firm fixed effects, and regressions (7) and (8) are dynamic panel system GMM estimations 
(similar to those in Table 2.9). ROEt-1 is excluded from the set of control variables named Firm characteristics. All other sets of controls are as in Table 2.2. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 2.A. Regressions (1) to (6) use robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by industry (4-digit 
SIC codes) and year, regressions (7) and (8) use robust standard errors clustered by firm. A constant is included in all regressions, but not reported.  ***, **, * 





























Appendix 2.C: Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and firm profitability (return on assets) (cont’d) 
 ROA ROA ROA  ln(ROA)  ROA  ROA  ROA  ln(ROA) 
 Firm-fixed effects  CEO-firm FE  Chair-firm FE  System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 











Chair-CEO age difference (+/-)   0.0005 
(0.946) 
          
Squared chair-CEO 
age difference 
  0.0001*** 
(2.594) 
          
Chair-CEO age difference absolute     0.0013*** 
(2.794) 
       0.0025** 
(1.987) 
Chair younger     -0.0038 
(-0.429) 
       0.0130 
(0.455) 
CEO age  -0.0292 
(-0.862) 
           
Chair age  0.0582* 
(1.774) 
           
Other chair-CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 







 Yes  Yes 
Chair characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Supervisory board characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 646 646 646  646  646  646  502  502 
Fixed effects Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year  CEO-firm, year  Chair-firm, year  Firm, year  Firm, year 
R-squared (within) 0.208 0.212 0.211  0.184  0.248  0.248     
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value)           0.001  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)           0.593  0.363 
Hansen test for overidentification  
restrictions (p-value) 
          0.452  0.207 












“[…] Steve Ballmer was a strong fit for Microsoft’s challenges when he was promoted to CEO in 2000. The 
company’s twenty years of entrepreneurial success had positioned the company to reap greater financial rewards 
using a more disciplined operational focus. Ballmer effectively led this shift and saw strong revenue growth 
from it. However, by the middle of the decade, Google was growing, YouTube was forming, and “operational 
excellence” wasn’t a differentiating strategy in technology. Ballmer had done his job, but the strategic needs 
of the organization had shifted. As CEO fit decreased, Ballmer’s performance followed and he was pressured 




“[…] In the late 1990’s, Home Depot’s rapid growth had outpaced its corporate infrastructure and was hiding 
serious cost management challenges. Their board hired Robert Nardelli from GE to quickly install the 
organizational foundation necessary to continue the company’s growth and better manage costs. Nardelli’s 
background and personality were a perfect fit for that challenge and he delivered some of the company’s most 
profitable years. But with the infrastructure and discipline in place, the company needed a leader who 
could drive innovation-based growth. No one should have expected Nardelli to transition to fit with the new 
challenge and profile needed, but the board didn’t pro-actively change CEOs and Nardelli suffered through 
a needlessly messy exit.”  
 
  
                                                 




Appendix 3.B: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Board age The average age of the board of directors. 
Source: ISS (formerly RiskMetrics) 
Board meetings The number of meetings held by the board of directors over the fiscal year. 
Source: ExecuComp (until 2006), The Corporate Library (2007-2011), missing 
values hand-collected (1998-2011) 
Board size Natural logarithm of the number of directors on the firm's board of directors. 
Source: ISS 
Book leverage (Long-term debt + current liabilities)/Total assets, all at the end of the previous 
fiscal year. 
Source: Compustat 
Business segments Natural logarithm of the number of business segments.  
Source: Compustat Segments 
Busy board Indicator variable that equals one if a majority of the independent directors hold two 
or more additional outside directorships, zero otherwise. 
Source: ISS 
CapEx Capital expenditures/Total assets, all at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
Source: Compustat 
CEO age  Age of the firm's CEO measured in years. 
Source: ExecuComp 
CEO gender Indicator variable that equals one if the CEO’s gender is female, zero otherwise. 
Source: ExecuComp 
CEO ownership Percentage of shares outstanding held by the CEO, winzorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
Source: ExecuComp, ISS 
CEO power index The index is the sum of the following indicator variables: CEO ownership above 
median, Co-Option above median, Duality, Involved CEO, President, Only insider. 
The index can take on values between zero and six. 
CEO tenure  Number of years the CEO has been serving as the firm's CEO, calculated by using 
the ExecuComp “BECAMECEO” variable. Missing or incorrect data is replaced by 
the number of years the CEO has been serving on the board as reported in ISS. CEO 
tenure takes the value of zero for the CEO’s first year in office. 
Source: ExecuComp, ISS 
Co-Option Fraction of directors on the board who have been appointed to the firm's board after 
the current CEO assumed office. 
Source: ISS 
Director ownership Average fraction of outstanding shares held by all independent directors on the 
board, winzorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Source: ISS 
Divestiture Indicator variable that equals one if the company is listed as the target of a deal 
labeled by the variable “ACQUISITION TECHNIQUE” as a “DIVESTITURE”, 
zero otherwise.  
Source: SDC Platinum 
Duality Indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, zero 
otherwise. 
Source: ExecuComp 
E-Index Entrenchment index based on six anti-takeover protection devices as proposed by 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). 





Appendix 3.B: Variable definitions (cont’d) 
Firm age Natural logarithm of the number of years the firm is listed in CRSP. 
Source: CRSP 
Firm risk Standard deviation of daily stock returns during the year, all at the end of the 
previous fiscal year. 
Source: CRSP 
Founder CEO Indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is the founder of the company, zero 
otherwise. 
Source: The Corporate Library (2001-2011), hand-collected (1998-2000) 
Independence ratio  Percentage of directors on the board classified as independent directors. 
Source: ISS 
Involved CEO Indicator variable that equals one if (i) the board has established a nominating 
committee and the CEO serves as a member or (ii) if such a committee does not 
exist, zero otherwise. 
Source: ISS 
MTB Market-to-book ratio of equity, all at the end of the fiscal year. 
Source: Compustat 
New CEO Indicator variable that equals one if the firm's CEO took office in the current year, 
zero otherwise. 
Source: ExecuComp 
Only insider Indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is the only inside director on the board, 
zero otherwise. 
Source: ISS 





Average number of years the outside directors have served on the firm's board. 
Source: ISS 
President Indicator variable that equals one if the CEO also holds the title of President of the 
firm, zero otherwise. 
Source: ExecuComp 
R&D R&D expense/Total assets, all at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
Source: Compustat 
ROA EBITDA/Total assetst-1 
Source: Compustat 
Sales growth Annual change in net sales divided by previous year's net sales: (Salest/Salest-1) - 1 
Source: Compustat 
Tobin’s Q (Total assets - Book equity + Market value of equity)/Total assets  
Source: Compustat 








Appendix 3.C: Addressing alternative non-linear relations 
This table reports results from firm fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure and its squared 
term along with CEO, firm and corporate governance characteristics. The sample includes S&P 1500 
firms over the period 1998-2011 excluding regulated utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 
and 6000-6999). Regression specifications (1) to (5) each address one alternative non-linear relation 
with firm value. Regression specification (6) contains all control variables (to address all non-linear 
relations) at once. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.B. Control variables are identical to those 
used in regression (3) of Table 3.2. Year fixed effects and an intercept are included in all regressions, 
but not reported. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
 Tobin's Q 





























      
CEO age squared -0.0003 
(-1.276) 
    -0.0004 
(-1.354) 
Firm age squared   -0.0843 
(-1.603) 
   -0.0755 
(-1.426) 
CEO power index squared    0.0042 
(0.429) 
  0.0035 
(0.355) 












Outside director tenure 
squared 




CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governance characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,427 12,427 12,427 12,427 12,427 12,427 
R-squared (within) 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.300 0.300 
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Appendix 3.D: Addressing further alternative explanations related to investments and 
incentives 
This table presents results from firm fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure and its 
squared term along with CEO, firm and corporate governance characteristics. The sample includes S&P 
1500 firms over the period 1998-2011 excluding regulated utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4000-
4999 and 6000-6999). Additional control variables are included. Acquisition is a dummy variable that 
equals one, if the firm is identified as an acquirer within the M&A sample (not restricted to M&As of a 
minimum relative deal size) and has announced an acquisition during the year, zero otherwise. Fraction 
of variable compensation is calculated as total compensation (ExecuComp item “TDC1”) minus salary, 
all divided by the total value of total compensation (“TDC1”). Values of total annual compensation 
before 2006 are adjusted following the methodology in Walker (2011). Scaled wealth-performance 
sensitivity is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 100 percentage point change in firm value, divided 
by annual flow compensation (scaled by 1,000). The data is available on Alex Edmans’s data website 
(http://alexedmans.com/data/). All other variables are defined in Appendix 3.B. Control variables are 
identical to those used in regression (3) of Table 3.2. Year fixed effects and an intercept are included in 
all regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in 




                    Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






















Further explanations      
Acquisition  -0.0570*** 
(-3.053) 
   -0.0581*** 
(-2.724) 
Divestiture  0.0106 
(0.480) 
   0.0099 
(0.408) 
CEO ownership  -0.5926 
(-1.594) 
  -0.6012 
(-1.263) 
CEO ownership squared  0.1723 
(0.779) 
  0.1729 
(0.642) 
Fraction of variable 
compensation 




Fraction of variable 
compensation squared 

















CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governance characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,427 12,427 12,363 10,399 10,340 




Appendix 3.E: Firm value peak point 
This table presents regression results of Tobin’s Q on the dummy variable CEO tenure plateau [11-13] 
along with CEO, firm and corporate governance characteristics. The sample includes S&P 1500 firms 
over the period 1998-2011 excluding regulated utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 
6000-6999). The variable CEO tenure plateau [11-13] is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if CEO tenure is between 11 and 13 years, zero otherwise. Column (1) presents results from firm 
fixed effects estimations, while results shown in column (2) are based on CEO-firm fixed effects 
estimations. Control variables are identical to those used in specification (3) of Table 3.2. All variables 
are defined in Appendix 3.B. An intercept and year fixed effects are included in all regressions, but not 
reported. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses in column (1) are adjusted for clustering by firm. 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses in column (2) are adjusted for clustering by CEO-firm pair. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.     
 
 
                              Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) 






CEO characteristics   




CEO gender 0.0303 
(0.347) 
_ 




Founder CEO 0.3620** 
(2.349) 
_ 
Governance characteristics   




















Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes No 
CEO-firm fixed effects No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 12,427 12,427 







Appendix 3.F: Return on assets (ROA) as an alternative measure of firm performance 
This table presents results from fixed effects regressions of return on assets (ROA) on CEO tenure and 
its squared term along with CEO, firm, and corporate governance characteristics. The sample includes 
S&P 1500 firms over the period 1998-2011 excluding regulated utility and financial firms (SIC codes 
4000-4999 and 6000-6999). ROA is calculated as earnings before interest expense, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA) divided by the book value of total assets at the end of the previous year 
and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Results shown in specification (1) stem from a firm 
fixed effects regression. Results shown in specification (2) are based on a regression including CEO-
firm fixed effects and the use of the natural logarithm of CEO age instead of CEO age. Control variables 
are identical to those used in regression (3) of Table 3.2. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.B. An 
intercept, year fixed effects and interacted year and industry (based on Fama French 48 industries) fixed 
effects are included in all regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses in 
specification (1) are adjusted for clustering by firm. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses in 
specification (2) are adjusted for clustering by CEO-firm pair. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
                          ROA 
 (1) (2) 










CEO characteristics   




CEO gender 0.0003 
(0.035) 
_ 




Founder CEO 0.0115* 
(1.801) 
_ 
Governance characteristics   




















Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes No 
CEO-firm fixed effects No Yes 
Industry*Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 12,400 12,400 










Appendix 3.G: Outside CEOs and the relation between firm value and CEO tenure  
This table reports results from firm fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on CEO tenure and its squared 
term or the natural logarithm of CEO tenure (denoted ln(CEO tenure)) along with CEO, firm and 
corporate governance characteristics for outside CEOs. The sample includes S&P 1500 firms over the 
period 1998-2011 excluding regulated utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999). 
Outside CEO is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is not classified as an inside 
CEO according to the definition of Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011), zero otherwise. Accordingly, 
a CEO is considered an insider if the CEO joined the company more than a year before becoming CEO, 
or if the CEO is classified as the founder of the company (Founder CEO), or if the ExecuComp data 
item “JOINED_CO” is missing. Specification (1) shows regression results with interaction effects for 
Outside CEOs. Specifications (2) and (3) show regression results for the sample of Outside CEOs. 
Specification (2) uses CEO tenure and its squared term as the functional form for the relation between 
CEO tenure and Tobin’s Q, while specification (3) uses ln(CEO tenure). All other variables are defined 
in Appendix 3.B. Control variables are identical to those used in specification (3) of Table 3.2. An 
intercept and year fixed effects are included in all regressions, but not reported. Robust t-statistics 
adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.    
 
 
 Tobin’s Q 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
 All CEOs  Outside CEOs 
     














CEO tenure * Outside CEO -0.0157 
(-1.114) 
   
CEO tenure squared * Outside CEO 0.0011** 
(2.246) 
   
Outside CEO 0.0160 
(0.198) 
   






CEO characteristics Yes  Yes Yes 
Governance characteristics Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 10,234  1,812 1,812 
R-squared (within) 0.288  0.190 0.190 
Test of linear hypothesis 
(CEO tenure squared +  
CEO tenure squared * Outside CEO = 0) 
F-statistic 
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Appendix 4.A: Combined leadership structure: List of individual leadership reasons  
This table contains the complete list of 24 distinct leadership reasons disclosed by the 282 sample firms 
with a combined leadership structure. Reasons are listed in descending order by frequency of use.  
 
N = 282 firms Percentage Number of firms 
   
Unified leadership 56.0% 158 
Knowledge as CEO best qualifies as chairman 46.1% 130 
Bridge between management and board 23.4% 66 
Leadership structure has served well 18.8% 53 
Board efficiency and effectiveness 8.5% 24 
CEO experience/tenure with company 8.5% 24 
Business/Company circumstances 7.8% 22 
No reason 5.7% 16 
CEO is founder 5.0% 14 
CEO industry experience/other qualifications 5.0% 14 
Avoid costs and duplication of effort 4.6% 13 
Confidence/Trust in CEO 3.9% 11 
Common US/industry leadership structure 3.5% 10 
Company tradition 3.2% 9 
Rejection of shareholder proposal 2.1% 6 
Effective corporate governance structures 2.1% 6 
Equality among directors 1.8% 5 
Family ownership/large shareholder 1.1% 3 
CEO ownership 1.1% 3 
CEO employment contract 1.1% 3 
Facilitates monitoring 0.7% 2 
Necessary to attract and retain CEO 0.7% 2 
CEO focus on management 0.4% 1 




Appendix 4.B: Separate leadership structure: List of individual leadership reasons  
This table contains the complete list of 22 distinct leadership reasons disclosed by the 165 sample 
firms with a separate leadership structure. Reasons are listed in descending order by frequency of use.  
 
N = 165 firms Percentage Number of firms 
   
Differences between tasks/roles 32.7% 54 
Facilitates monitoring 30.3% 50 
CEO focus on management 22.4% 37 
Chair experience/tenure with company 18.8% 31 
No reason 13.3% 22 
Transition/Continuity of leadership 12.7% 21 
Chair's advice and mentoring 12.1% 20 
Business/Company circumstances 7.3% 12 
Chair is founder 6.1% 10 
Chair industry experience/other qualifications 3.6% 6 
Chair ownership 3.6% 6 
Bridge between management and board 3.0% 5 
Leadership structure has served well 2.4% 4 
Board efficiency and effectiveness 2.4% 4 
CEO experience/tenure with company 2.4% 4 
CEO is founder 1.8% 3 
CEO industry experience/other qualifications 1.2% 2 
Company tradition 1.2% 2 
Family ownership/large shareholder 1.2% 2 
Unified leadership 0.6% 1 
CEO ownership 0.6% 1 


















Appendix 4.C: Combined leadership structure: Descriptions of the five most frequently 
used leadership reasons  
 
Combined Leadership Structure 
Unified leadership 
The company stated the key word “Unified leadership” or described it similarly. 
 
Examples:  
The leadership structure… 
- “[…] effectively combines the responsibilities of strategic development and execution with management of   
day-to-day operations.” 
- “[…] promotes strong, clear, consistent leadership and directional clarity.” 
- “[…] fosters decisive leadership, clear accountability, and effective decision-making.” 
- “[…] ensures that the board acts with a common purpose and speaks with one voice.” 
Knowledge as CEO 
The company stated that the CEO is best positioned to serve as the chairman of the board because she has the 
“knowledge and understanding from being the CEO”. 
 
Examples:  
- “The CEO is responsible for the day-to-day operations, she possesses in-depth knowledge and 
understanding of the company, and is therefore best positioned to set the agenda and to chair board 
meetings.” 
- “[…] allowing the senior-most executive who possesses significant business and industry knowledge to set 
Board meeting agendas and to lead the related discussions.” 
Bridge between management and board 
The company disclosed that the CEO acts as a “bridge between management and board” or “Between the board 
and the other management”. 
 
Examples: 
- “[…] acting as both enables our CEO to be an efficient bridge between the Board and the Company 
management.” 
- “[…] promotes a more enhanced information flow between management and the Board.” 
- “Combining these roles facilitates efficient and effective board deliberation, since our CEO brings a 
leadership perspective that blends the outlook of both the board and management.” 
Leadership structure has served well 
The company either explicitly states that the leadership structure “has served well” over the past or emphasizes 
the company’s performance under the current board leadership structure.  
 
Examples: 
- “The structure has served the Company and its shareholders well in the past, as evidenced by the 
Company’s success.”  
- “[…] a structure that has proven effective for the Company in the past.” 
- “[…] has been effective thus far in the Company’s operating history.” 
- “[…] has proven extremely effective for the Company historically in the area of company performance.” 
Efficiency and effectiveness of board 




- “[…] combining the roles contributes to an efficient and effective Board.” 




Appendix 4.D: Separate leadership structure: Descriptions for the five most 
frequently used leadership reasons  
 
Separate Leadership Structure 
Differences between tasks/roles 
The company stated that it has chosen to separate the position of the CEO and the chairman of the board in 
recognition of the “differences between the roles”. 
 
Examples: 
- “We separate the roles of CEO and Chairman of the Board in recognition of the differences 
between the two roles.” 
- “[…] the structure creates a better balance in leadership and accountability, as the functions of 
the CEO and the Board Chairman are significantly different.” 
- “[…] because it separates the leadership of the Board from the duties of day-to-day leadership of 
the Company.” 
Facilitates monitoring 
The company stated that separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board “facilitates monitoring”. 
 
Examples: 
- “Splitting the roles allows the chairman to ensure that the Board is focused on its oversight 
responsibilities, including independent oversight of management.” 
- “[…] the leadership structure was and continues to be appropriate and beneficial, as this 
delineation creates increased oversight.” 
CEO can focus on management 




- “[…] separating the roles allows our CEO to focus on our day-to-day business, while allowing the 
chairman of the board to lead the board in its fundamental role of providing advice to and 
independent oversight of management.” 
- “In particular, it permits our CEO to focus his full time and attention of the business…” 
Chair’s experience with company 




- “[…] the leadership structure allows to draw upon the skills and 37 years of Company experience 
of a Chairman who continues to provide strategic oversight and broad direction […] “ 
- “The Board determined that the Chairman’s knowledge and past experience would serve our 
Company well, and his insights have been and continue to be invaluable to the Board.” 
No reason stated 
Companies either simply stated that they have a separate chairman or that they have separated the 
positions of the CEO and the chairman of the board. However, they neither explained why they have 
chosen to split the two positions nor why the present board leadership structure is currently the most 








Appendix 4.E: Comparing the frequency of use of board leadership structure reasons over time 
This table present two-sided difference-in-means tests between early and late disclosure events regarding the five most frequently stated rationales. Early 
disclosures are all observations where the firm files the proxy statement within the first two months (March or April 2010) after the new SEC disclosure 
regulation became effective on February 28, 2010. The remaining sample period contains all firms with event dates between May 01, 2010 and February 28, 
2011. Panel A shows difference-in-means tests for the sample of 282 firms with a combined leadership structure while Panel B contains the difference-in-means 
tests for the sample 165 firms that separate the CEO and chairman position. All tests for difference-in-means allow for unequal variances across both subsamples. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses behind the difference in the subsample means. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Combined leadership structure (N=282) 
 Early disclosures  Remaining sample period  Difference-in-means 
Board leadership structure reason N Mean  N Mean 
 Difference (t-stat) 
Unified leadership 230 0.561  52 0.558   0.003 (0.04) 
Knowledge as CEO 230 0.439  52 0.558   -0.119 (-1.54) 
Bridge between management and board 230 0.235  52 0.231   0.004 (0.06) 
Leadership structure has served well 230 0.174  52 0.250   -0.076 (-1.16) 
Efficiency and effectiveness of board 230 0.065  52 0.077   -0.012 (-0.29) 
Other reason stated 230 0.456  52 0.442   0.014 (0.18) 
  
 Panel B: Separate leadership structure (N=165) 
 Early disclosures  Remaining sample period  Difference-in-means 
Board leadership structure reason N Mean  N Mean 
 Difference (t-stat) 
Differences between tasks/roles 122 0.279  43 0.465  -0.186** (2.14) 
Facilitates monitoring 122 0.295  43 0.325  -0.030 (-0.37) 
CEO can focus on management 122 0.172  43 0.372  -0.200** (2.44) 
Chair’s experience with company 122 0.197  43 0.163  0.034 (0.05) 
No reason stated 122 0.123  43 0.163  -0.040 (-0.62) 
Other reason stated 122 0.475  43 0.442  0.033 (0.38) 
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